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Abstract 
Since the Internet revolution of the 1990s; ever increasing levels of connectivity have been 
integrated into society. This has ushered in the era of globalization and a new plateau 
in prosperity. Credit for this accomplishment can be placed firmly on our communication 
networks. However, our incorporation of telecommunications into society has led to a de-
pendency on it. Our escalating reliance on telecommunications has made society highly 
susceptible to fault occurrences. Consequently, the field of network survivability is required 
to maintain reliability in our telecommunications infrastructure. Mesh networks have been 
touted as the successor to the ring based networks of the past due to their efficiency and 
scalability. Unfortunately, mesh networks owing to their complexity have not been able to 
obtain restoration times comparable to its predecessor. This issue has led to a polarization 
of survivability schemes, where restoration time is pitted against redundancy requirements. 
In order to mitigate this problem; network coding based survivability algorithms are being 
proposed. Network coded based protection uses coding theory to linearly combine disjoint 
connections. This permits restoration times comparable to dedicated mesh schemes while 
having significantly less redundancy requirements. We propose three schemes of coded 
survivability known as Source Coded Protection, Multiple Source Coded Protection, and 
Network Coded Protection. From these three schemes, eight novel heuristic algorithms have 
been created. 
Two of these heuristic algorithms have been designed to generate realizations of Source 
Coded Protection. The first of these algorithms, Near Optimal Source Coded Protection 
produces highly capacity efficient version of Source Coded Protection. On the other hand, 
Fast Source Coded Protection also produces Source Coded Protection, but with a minimal 
amount of computation time. 
Adding to those two algorithms, three more have been designed for Multiple Source Coded 
Protection. Two of these algorithms have been designed to improve capacity utilization 
and computation time. Re-optimized Multiple Source Coded Protection creates a capacity 
efficient version of Multiple Source Coded Protection, while Fast Source Coded Protection 
creates the same scheme in a short time period. The third algorithm for Multiple Source 
Coded Protection known as Single Stream Multiple Source Coded Protection generates a 
specific version of Multiple Source Coded Protection that requires less decoding at the des-
tination. 
The last three algorithms are designed to create Network Coded Protection. Due to the 
greater varieties of the Network Coded Protection scheme, each algorithm generates its own 
version of the technique. Neighbor Decoded Protection creates a specific variation of Net-
work Coded Protection that guarantees at most one hop restorations during fault events. 
The second Network Coded Protection algorithm known as Trunk Coded Protection, uses 
predetermined coded paths to ease the economic burden of providing an entire network 
with coded protection functionality. Lastly, the Stream Based Network Coded Protection 
algorithm uses a novel stream based sharing technique to generate Network Coded Protec-
tion in capacity efficient manner. 
In house C++ simulations were used to compare the performance metrics of these eight 
heuristic algorithms with two established benchmark algorithms used for survivability. 
These two benchmark algorithms represent both edges of the choice between restoration 
time and redundancy. Through a comparison of the proposed algorithms with the bench-
ll 
mark algorithms, it will be shown that these coded based algorithms allow network operators 
to have both low restoration time and a reduced redundancy requirement. 
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The global communications network has exploded in size since its introduction at the 
dawn of the information age. From its humble beginnings with the telegraph, it has ex-
panded to meet humanities insatiable demands for first voice and now data. Resting on 
the achievements of this network is the information age, where the distance between two 
points provides no hindrance to cooperation and integration. Globalization is not possible 
without the services provided by our global communications network. With all of society 
virtually dependent on our communication networks for the performance of daily tasks, it is 
monumentally important that we ensure that events that can disrupt our communications 
are mitigated quickly and efficiently. Thus network survivability schemes are required to 
handle these disruptions. Normally, network designers are given a choice between quick 
dedicated protection and efficient shared restoration. For dedicated protection, large quan-
tities of bandwidth are reserved so that two copies of the same information can be sent 
disjointly from source to destination. This is costly and not an economically acceptable op-
tion for creating survivable networks. For shared restoration, every scheme is based off the 
automatic re-request concept where by a secondary route is used to circumvent a network 
failure. From a time sensitive point of view this can cause congestion for client networks 
operating over the network failure. This problem is especially true if a large amount of 
1 
1. Introduction 
connections have failed simultaneously. To resolve these issues, a forward error correction 
based protection scheme can be utilized. 
1.2. Thesis Contributions 
The contributions of this thesis are in the further development of coded based survivability. 
Presented in this thesis are three survivability schemes for providing coded based surviv-
ability. Adding to that, in order to create realizations of those three schemes, eight heuristic 
algorithms have been proposed. The contributions of this thesis can be further summarized 
as follows: 
1. A source coding based survivability scheme known as Source Coded Protection (SCP). 
By fragmenting and linearly combining traffic between a source-destination pair over 
multiple diverse paths, source coded protection protects a connection against single 
link failures. Since this technique uses the concepts of forward error correction and 
network coding, it combines the attributes of negligible restoration time with effi-
cient capacity consumption. Together these attributes produce a technique that is 
ideally suited for platinum service level agreements in logical networks. Two heuristic 
algorithms have been created to provide SCP. These algorithms are Near Optimal 
Source Coded Protection (NOSCP) and Fast Source Coded Protection (FSCP). Each 
of these algorithms are designed to maximize a specific quality of routing algorithms 
while generating SCP. NOSCP strives to produce the most capacity efficient version 
of SCP. However, it requires a significant amount of time to perform the path com-
putations. On the other end, FSCP generates paths in a short period of time, but 
with a less capacity efficient result. 
2. A multiple source coding based survivability scheme termed Multiple Source Coded 
2 
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Protection (IviSCP ). This technique combines the benefits associated with SCP with 
the ability to protect traffic from multiple source nodes. By removing the single 
source-destination pair and data fragmentation constraints of SCP, this novel tech-
nique produces favorable results under a greater variety of conditions. Due to the 
unique properties of MSCP, three heuristic algorithms have been generated for it. 
These three algorithms are presented as Fast Multiple Source Coded Protection (FM-
SCP), He-optimized Multiple Source Coded Protection (RMSCP), and Single Stream 
Multiple Source Coded Protection (SSMSCP). Like the realizations for SCP, each of 
the algorithms for MSCP attempt to maximize a performance criteria of the rout-
ing algorithm or function of MSCP. FMSCP reduces the MSCP routing problem so 
that it can be solved with the minimum number of path computations. However, it 
performs this function with a reduced level of network capacity efficiency. RMSCP 
re-optimizes previously established connections in a network with new connection re-
quests to produce a capacity efficient result. However, like NOSCP for SCP, RMSCP 
requires more computational time to resolve the new path for each of the connections. 
As opposed to FMSCP and RMSCP, which use different techniques that create same 
version MSCP, SSMSCP creates a specialized variant of MSCP. In SSMCP, the MSCP 
scheme is generated such that it is computationally easier for destinations to decode 
information. 
3. A network coding based survivability scheme known as Network Coded Protection 
(NCP). MSCP only allowed coding if connection requests were heading to the same 
destination. This can limit the sharing opportunities available in the network to 
an unacceptable level. Thus a coded survivability scheme is required that allows 
sharing between multiple sources and destinations. NCP is a coded based survivability 
scheme that obtains this functionality. It does this by merging the attributes of 
traditional survivability techniques with network coding. Three heuristic algorithms 
3 
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have been generated from NCP. These heuristic algorithms are Neighbor Decoded 
Protection (NDP), Trunk Coded Protection (TCP), and Stream Based Network Coded 
Protection (SBNCP). Each of these algorithms generates a specific form of NCP that 
is ideal for different applications. NDP has been designed to produce a form of NCP 
that guarantees at most one hop restorations for all connections. This is ideal for 
large networks, where the distance between the source and destination can create 
unbearable delays during restoration events. On the other hand, TCP has been 
created to allow network operators more control over the coding operations required 
for network survivability. It uses predefined coded trunks through the network to 
provide survivability. vVith this, operators can reduce the complexity and cost of 
certain areas of a network. Lastly, SBNCP has been designed to produce the most 
generalized form of NCP. It does this using a new technique known as Stream Based 
Sharing (SBS). With this technique, SBNCP produces a more capacity efficient form 
of NCP than the previous two heuristic algorithms. 
Each of the heuristic algorithms has been simulated using an in house C++ simulation of 
the Global Crossing Network (GCN) and National Science Foundation Network (NSFNET). 
In order to properly compare the presented heuristic algorithms, two benchmark algorithms 
have also been simulated. These benchmark algorithms are Simple Pool Sharing (SPS) and 
Shortest Pair Dedicated Path Protection (SPDPP). Together they represent opposite edges 
of the efficiency versus performance spectrum. With these two benchmarks as upper and 
lower bounds on performance, the heuristic algorithms have been compared. They are 
compared using demand blocking probability, redundancy, network capacity utilization, 
availability, and restoration time. 
4 
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1.3. Thesis Outline 
This thesis is outlined as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the background knowledge required 
for an understanding of network survivability. It begins with a treatise on transport network 
failures and their affect on customers. Following that is the concept of network survivability 
and the aspects that are important to this thesis. The last part of the chapter is reserved 
for a brief explanation coded based survivability. 
Chapter 3 presents in detail the three coded based survivability schemes proposed in this 
thesis. For improved understanding, the schemes are presented in order of complexity. SCP 
is the simplest of the coded schemes and therefore is presented first. Likewise, since MSCP 
is only a generalization of SCP, it follows it within the chapter. Lastly, the NCP scheme is 
presented. Due to the additional complexity and numerous variations, extra time will be 
spent on this concept. 
After each of the three survivability schemes has been explained, the eight different real-
izations can be introduced. The explanation of these algorithms are presented in chapter 
4. In order to maintain continuity with chapter 3, all the algorithms for SCP will be pre-
sented first, followed by MSCP and then NCP. The realizations for SCP and MSCP are 
presented in order of capacity efficiency. This is because explanations of each technique 
flows smoothly from the capacity efficient to the reduced computation time version. Thus 
for SCP, NOSCP is explained first and FSCP second. On the other hand, RMSCP is ex-
plained first for MSCP. This is followed by FMSCP. SSMSCP is explained last because 
its unique form of MSCP would disrupt the important relationship between RMSCP and 
FMSCP. For the NCP realizations, a different approach is taken. Since each algorithm 
generates a different form of NCP, they are ordered differently. Since NDP can be under-
5 
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stood as a modification of SSrviSCP using NCP principles, it is explained first. Likewise, 
since TCP shares some routing features in common with the MSCP heuristic algorithms, 
it follows NDP. At the end of the chapter is SBNCP. Included with the aspects of SB:NICP 
is an explanation of the SBS technique and how it is used in the algorithm. Since the SBS 
technique used in SBMSCP is different from all the other approaches to routing used by 
the previously mentioned algorithms, it is given special attention. 
With all the heuristic algorithms proposed for this thesis explained, chapter 5 can focus 
on the simulation results. In order to understand the results for each of the algorithms, 
chapter 5 begins with a brief explanation of each of the performance metrics. Following 
that are descriptions of the Global Crossing and National Science Foundation networks. 
Chapter 5 concludes with comparisons of each of the proposed and benchmark algorithms. 
Finally, chapter 6 is dedicated to our concluding remarks and proposals for future work. 
Following the conclusion, all the proposed algorithms are presented in algorithmic form 
in appendix A. Afterward, an overview of the benchmark algorithms is presented in this 
thesis in appendix B. These two benchmark algorithms can be used as a foundation for 
understanding some of the algorithms presented in this thesis. Therefore, it is important 
that they be briefly explained with the contributions of the thesis. Furthermore, because 
of its extensive use in this thesis, the min-cut max flow theorem is attached to this thesis 
as appendix C. Lastly, for quick reference, the path search algorithms used throughout this 




The idea of network survivability has been around since the dawn of the information age. 
Even the design of the original ARPANET was designed to ensure that communication 
should be available after large sections of the network fail from nuclear war. As mentioned 
in section D.l, the primary concern today is handling the network failures associated with 
day to day problems. These problems take the form of single-link failures as mentioned in 
section D.2.1. Node failure incidents are not considered day to day events and are usually 
protected by redundant hardware [1]. No matter how the failure occurs or what it's effects 
are on the network topology we want to restore connections as fast as economically possible. 
Due to the computerization of traffic rerouting, the speed of connection recovery has been 
reduced to a technical issue. As mentioned in section D.3 the connection recovery speed 
problem is now determined by it's effect on client layers of the physical network. This 
works along the concept that as long as the client layer doesn't have time to detect a 
major problem neither will the customer. However, some customers may want to purchase 
extremely fast restoration times and high levels of availability for their traffic. While at the 
same time some customers may not even want their traffic restored, if it reduces the cost. 
Therefore, allowing customers to select their desired service level agreement is required. 
Survivability techniques that take this into consideration will have distinct advantages over 
others. From this we can define network survivability as 
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Network survivability is the ability of a network to withstand failure events. It 
demonstrates the resilience of the network against failure events and is measured 
in terms of the reliability, restorability and end-to-end availability of the light 
path [2]. 
2.1.1. Physical Network Requirements 
A fundamental requirement for survivable networks is the ability for data to always 
have a possible connection between every source-destination pair after a failure has oc-
curred. Figure 2.1a is a tree like graph that does not meet this fundamental requirement 
for survivability. In a failure event there is no alternate connection possibility between each 
source-destination pair. Since an overwhelming majority of all failures are of the single link 
type, this requirement translates into the need for bi-connected networks. In figure 2.1b 
there are no single link failure scenarios that will separate a node from the network. Figure 
2.1c depicts the smallest possible bi-connected network as a ring, which is why it has been 
given preference for survivability in first generation SONET networks. 
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(a) Tree Like Graph 
2. Background 
(b) Bi-Connected Graph 
Figure 2.1.: Network Types 
2.1.2. Survivability Techniques 
(c) Ring Graph 
There are many different schemes capable of providing survivability to a network. Figure 
2.2 depicts a tree of the different methods. With the myriad of choices available, network 
designers are left to make the decisions. Where do we provide the survivability features. 
That is; do we protect links, paths, channels, or segments? If we choose to protect links, 
what kind restoration architecture do we overlay on these links to make them survivable? 
Likewise, if we choose to protect paths, do we pre-compute and assign the backup path 
before the failure occurs or do we restore traffic afterward? This choice is not black and 
white, as there are many variations that will be eluded to later. Moreover, if we choose 
to pre-compute backup paths for demands, do we allow it to share the redundant capacity 





Dedicated Shared Link Path 
Link Path Channel Segment Link Path Channel Segment 
Figure 2.2.: Survivability Techniques 
Until recently it was thought that you could only effectively use restoration techniques 
with link based survivability in ring networks. This ideology led the simple yet inefficient 
SONET ring based protection. However, this is changing as new path based schemes are 
being invented. Carrying on with this trend, this thesis utilizes path based schemes. The 
remainder of this section is devoted to path survivability. For more information on the 
other techniques available, refer to [2, 3, 4, 5]. 
2.1.2.1. Path Survivability 
In both path protected and restorable networks, survivability is created from the end-
to-end perspective of a connection. This technique can trace its roots to the late 1990s 
when path survivability became more competitive with link survivability [6, 7]. With path 
survivability, demands are provided with a working and backup route. For most path-based 
survivability schemes, the working route is used exclusively in normal operation, while the 
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backup route is reserved until a failure occurs. \Vhen a failure occurs on the -vvorking path of 
a demand, the source node will switch the demand onto the backup route. An exception to 
this is dedicated backup path protection, which will be explained with the other survivability 
techniques throughout this subsection. As shown in figure 2.3, when a working connection 
fails, information is switched at the source node onto a backup connection. 
Figure 2.3.: Path Protection 
Table 2.1 depicts several advantages and disadvantages associated with using path based 
survivability schemes. First of all, from the advantageous side, the minimum possible re-
dundancy requirements are exhibited by path perspective schemes. This advantage stems 
from the availability of all links in the network for finding the optimal backup paths. Addi-
tionally, since connections are protected individually, service level agreements can be offered 
to individual demands. Link and segment-based schemes can not provide that service. Fur-
thermore, since protection is offered at the ends of the network, it can be easily provided 
by higher layer logical connections. This can allow network operators to design traditional 
low intelligence fast transport layers. This can also allow networks the option of using 
simpler higher layer failure detection and correction protocols, such as the coded based 
protection techniques presented in this thesis. Unfortunately, these advantages come with 
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a series of disadvantages. vVhen a failure event occurs many individual connections need 
to be rerouted as opposed to one span in link restoration schemes. This can heavily con-
gest the network when it is already on its knees. Adding to that, each of those individual 
connections require an on-line computed backup route determined by heuristic algorithms, 
which can not always provide optimal results. Since most path protection schemes involve 
some form of sharing, a great deal of signaling is required to setup connections. This added 
signaling results in an increased restoration time. Lastly, with increased sharing and the 
possibility of long working and backup paths, traffic demands can experience lower levels 
of availability. In the worse cases this can be low enough to violate certain SLAs. 
Table 2.1.: Path Perspective Advantages and Disadvantages 
Advantages I Disadvantages 
Individual service level agreements Greater failure response complexity 
Minimal redundancy requirements Additional routing complexity 
Simpler transport networks Added signaling requirement 
Reduced transport layer signal monitoring requirement Longer restoration time 
Reduced availability 
With path based survivability, a new dimension of choice is given to network operators. 
Before with link based survivability, network redundancy was utilized for survivability at 
the physical layer. Path based survivability is not limited in this regard, since resources 
can be allocated at any physical or logical layer in the network. This has led to a wealth of 
studies on where survivability should be added to a network[8, 9]. From the studies, it has 




2.1.2.2. Dedicated Backup Path Protection 
In Dedicated Backup Path Protection (DBPP) multiple diverse connections with iden-
tical information are setup between a source-destination pair [10]. Since both signals are 
identical, in failure events the destination node chooses the best of the two. This results in 
extremely high availability and a negligible restoration time. Unfortunately, this requires 
that at least 100% of the working routes capacity utilization be reserved for the backup 
connection. In networks with low nodal degrees this redundancy requirement can skyrocket 
much higher. The concept behind DBPP is represented in figure 2.4a. In this figure, there 
two 1.5 Mbps demands routed in a simple network. The first demand has a working con-
nection along the path ABEH, and a backup connection along ACFH. Since the number of 
links along the backup route is equal to the number of links along the working route, the 
redundancy is 100%. Likewise, the second 1.5 Mbps demand has a working connection that 
goes along the path ADG and a backup connection that goes along ACFG. This results in 
a 133% redundancy requirement. Adding both demands together we get a total network 
capacity utilization of 16.5 Mb/s. This is opposed to the 7.5 Mbps required to route only 
the working paths for the traffic demands. 
2.1.2.3. Shared Backup Path Protection 
In Shared Backup Path Protection (SBPP) schemes, demands are allowed to share re-
dundant capacity along their backup routes[ll]. This sharing is usually done under the 
condition that both demands are disjoint from one another. Figure 2.4b depicts how a 
SBPP technique could be used to protect two 1.5 Mbps demands. As with figure 2.4a 
the two demands have working paths going over ABEH and ADG respectively. The two 
demands also have backup paths going over ACFH and ACFG. Additionally, since the two 
working paths are disjoint, they can share capacity along their backup routes. Since the 
redundant capacity is being shared between multiple demands, they can not use it until 
13 
2. Background 
a failure occurs. Furthermore, \Vhen a failure is repaired, the demand must revert to the 
v.rorking route, so that another demand can have the opportunity to utilize the shared ca-
pacity. This is opposed to DBPP which is non-revertive. With the redundancy reduction 
provided by SBPP, the total network capacity utilization is only 13.5 Mb/s. That is a 18% 
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2.1.2.4. Generalized Path Survivability Schemes 
As mentioned earlier, the choice between DBPP and SBPP is not black and white. 
Table 2.2 depicts the seven different variations available. Each of the seven schemes is 
distinguished by the three major components utilized in the failure recovery procedure. 
These three components are the alternate failure recovery route, the channel assignment 
along that route, and the optical switches cross-connecting the signal. Generally speaking, 
if a component is independent of any failure then it may be assigned before the specific event 
occurs. The only path survivability techniques which assign every component in advance 
of a failure are Dedicated Backup Path Protection and Shared Backup Path Protection with 
Pre-assigned Channels. The fundamental difference between the two is that the former 
sends two signals simultaneously, while the latter does not send redundant information 
until a fault occurs on the working path. All other calculations and setup operations are 
performed in advance. The difference between the two schemes is that in the latter the 
redundant signal is not sent between the source destination pair until after the failure 
occurs. The remaining five schemes are dependent on where the failure occurs and must 
re-actively perform computation and setup procedures. For example, in Shared Backup 
Path Protection with Non Pre-assigned Channels, the failure recovery route is computed 
and assigned before the failure occurs but no channel computations are performed. Of 
the remaining techniques, two utilize pre-planned maps. These two techniques Shared 
Backup Path Protection with ?replanned Maps (routes and channels) and Shared Backup 
Path Protection with ?replanned Maps (routes only) utilize preplanned maps to simplify the 
failure rerouting problem using a backup network map. This map is a network consisting 
of all the reserved bandwidth available for survivability. In a fault event, a connection can 
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be quickly rerouted over the backup network map. Unfortunately, this technique requires 
that the network be able to rapidly isolate the fault and quickly reroute over the redundant 
network. The remaining techniques, Re-provisioning and Shared Backup Path Protection 
with Pre-assigned Backup Paths and no Reservations are entirely reactive in nature. For 
them, best effort approaches are used. In the former technique, the failure recovery route 
and its channel allocation procedures are performed re-actively after the failure. While 




Table 2.2.: Path Based Survivability Classifications (Data from [12]) 
Category Failure recovery route Channel assignment Cross- Failure 
on failure recovery connect on specific 
route failure 
Computed Assigned Computed Assigned recovery 
route 
DBPP before before before before before no 
SBPP with before before before before after no 
pre-assigned 
channels 




SBPP with before after before after after yes (route 
preplanned and 
maps (routes channel) 
and channels) 




Re- after after after after after yes (route 
provisioning and 
channel) 





2.1.3. Performance Metrics 
When determining the general performance of a survivability technique, four criterion 
can be used. These properties are derived from the SLAs mentioned in section D.4 and 
physical properties of all networks. These properties are provided with a general description 
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in table 2.3. The first two metrics, restoration time and connection availability represent 
the requirements in SLAs for quick failure recovery. The second two metrics represent the 
economic problems of network survivability. These are the requirements of both simple and 
efficient solutions. 
Table 2.3.: Basic Survivability Performance Metrics 
Criteria I Definition 
Restoration Time Time required to restore the connection through the network 
Availability Percentage of time that a connection is available 
Redundancy Additional resources required to protect traffic 
Complexity Computation difficulty associated with the technique 
2.1.3.1. Restoration Time 
When a fault occurs along the working path of traffic demand r, the network must go 
through the restoration process to transfer the flow of data to the backup route. The 
restoration time is the period of time taken from when the the fault occurs to when the 
connection switches to the backup route. This time can be viewed as the amount of down-
time experienced by a demand when a fault occurs. Thus it can be used to define where a 
survivability technique fits in the restoration target ranges depicted in figure D.l. In [11], a 
technique was presented for determining the restoration time for a demand. In this thesis, 
the number of hops along the reactive section of the backup route is used as a metric for 
restoration time. As a longer reactive section correlates with a longer restoration time. 
2.1.3.2. Availability 
The availability is a measure how often a system is in a functional state. Thus the availabil-
ity can be described as the percentage of time a system is not experiencing a fault event. 
The availability can be calculated as a function of the mean time between failures (MTBF) 
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and mean time to repair (l'viTTR). The ?viTBF is the average time between failure events. 
It is measured in FITS, which is the number of failures experienced by a system in a billion 
hours. As mentioned earlier, optical cables experience a MTBF of 500 FIT/Mile. Likewise, 
the MTTR is the time required to repair a failure. As mentioned earlier, the MTTR for 
optical cables is around 5.2 hours. Using those two metrics, equation 2.1 can be used to 
determine the availability As of a system. 
A _ MTBF 
s- MTBF+MTTR (2.1) 
Equation 2.1 is used to predetermine the availability of individual links in a network. Like-
wise, the availability of a traffic demand is the percentage of time the connection is op-
erational. A connection's availability can also be predetermined with method depicted in 
equation 2.1. However, since the MTBF and MTTR for a connection are determined by the 
set of links traversed by the demand, it is easier to predetermine a connection's availability 
as a function of link unavailabilities. This is because the unavailability of a counection Uc 
is the sum of each link's unavailability Uj along the connection's route R(r). Thus, the 
unavailability of a connection can be expressed as equation 2.2. 
(2.2) 
Afterward, the availability of the connection Ac can be easily determined from the unavail-
ability Ac using the relationship in equation 2.3. 
(2.3) 
By utilizing this methodology, an estimation of the connection availability for a demand 
can be generated when it is routed. Afterward, in order to determine the true connection 
availability over the life of a demand a different technique can be utilized. This technique 
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consists of simply comparing the amount of time a connection was in a failed state F8 with 
the time it was in an operation state 0 8 • This technique used to determine a connection's 




According to their SLAs, connections are offered specific availability guarantees. These 
availabilities are usually offered using the nines notation. The nines notation is a method 
of segmenting availability into discrete levels that can be offered by service providers. As 
depicted in table 2.4, each nines category corresponds to a different quality of service. Ser-
vice providers will use the previously mentioned method for predetermining the availability 
of a connection, in order to ensure that a traffic demand does not violate a SLA. 
Table 2.4.: Nines Notation 
Availability Downtime 
90% (1-nine) 36.5 daysjyear 
99% (2-nines) 3.65 daysjyear 
99.9% (3-nines) 8. 76 hoursjyear 
99.99% (4-nines) 52 minutesjyear 
99.999% (5-nines) 5 minutesjyear 
99.9999% (6-nines) 31 secondsjyear 
Due to the difficulty in obtaining the high levels of availability required in SLAs, service 
providers will use survivability techniques. These techniques allow the service provider 
to significantly reduce the combined failure rate of the connection. When survivability 
techniques are utilized, it is equivalent to adding a redundant system in parallel to the 
primary system. From this, a connection can be considered operational if either of the 
systems are available. Therefore the availability of the connection with path survivability 
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can be predetermined with equation 2.5, where Uw and Ub are the vvorking and backup 
connection unavailabilities. 
(2.5) 
2.1.3.3. Hop Requirement 
The redundancy of a connection is a measure of how efficiently a survivability scheme 
protects information. As presented in equation 2.6, It is measured as the sum of the 
bandwidth b2(ij) reserved on a link {ij} along the backup route R2(r) over the sum of 
bandwidth b1 (ij) reserved of a link {ij} along the working route R1(r). 
R = .2:{ij}ER2(r) b2(ij) 
.2:{ij}ER1 (r) br ( ij) 
(2.6) 
When using the redundancy requirement as a performance metric, a degree of caution is 
required. Some path survivability techniques produce backup routes that are short in length 
compared with their working routes. However these schemes may also have unnecessarily 
long working paths. Therefore, even though the connections appear to have low redundancy 
requirement they in fact utilize more of the networks resources. In order to mitigate this 
issue, the hop requirement should be measured. The hop requirement can be calculated 
using equation 2.7. Since this metric provides a greater accuracy than the redundancy 
requirement, it will be used extensively to compare the results of each proposed algorithm. 
(2.7) 
{ij}ER2(r) 
2.1.4. Real Time Routing Concerns 
If you want to route a connection request r through a network in real time, heuristic al-
gorithms are required. There are many algorithms capable of creating paths through a 
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network. One such method is Dijkstra's algorithm, which has a popular following among 
practicing engineers [13]. It is a simple algorithm for solving the shortest path through 
a network that does not contain negative arcs. Due to its popularity, it has become the 
foundation to many complex algorithms, some of which will be mentioned in this section. 
When utilizing any shortest path algorithm in a survivable routing application, there are a 
few problems with creating working and backup paths. 
In order to provision a demand r with a working path R 1 (r) and a backup path R2(r), at 
least two iterations of a shortest path algorithm are required. Since at least one iteration is 
required for each of the paths. However, if successive iteration techniques are utilized, then 
that number can be much larger. Unfortunately, determining R 1(r) and R 2(r) sequentially 
in simple two step procedures is suboptimal and prone to the trap topology problem [13]. 
2.1.4.1. Sub-optimality 
Ideally, when determining the least cost R1 (r) and R2(r) combination, the relationship 
in equation 2.8 should exist for the total cost C(r) of the connection request. For the 
equation, C1(ij) and C2 (ij) represent the cost of using a link {ij} along the working R1(r) 
and backup routes R 2 (r) for a connection request r. 
C(r) =min [ L C1(ij) + L C2(ij)l 
{ij}ER1(r) {ij}ER2(r) 
(2.8) 
This unique situation where R 1 (r) and R 2 (r) are minimized together is known as the short-
est pair. Unfortunately, utilizing a shortest path algorithm in a simple two-step approach 
might not be able to produce this optimal solution. For a simple two-step solution to be 
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optimal the relationship in equation 2.9 must be true. 
For example in figure 2.5, there is a simple network. In the network, a demand r wishes to 
route R 1 (r) and R2(r) from node A to H. For cost reduction reasons, the demand should 
be routed so that the relationship in 2.9 exists. In a simple two-step approach, R1(r) is 
routed according to equation 2.10 using any shortest path algorithm. 
min [ L C1(ij)l 
{ij}ER1(r) 
(2.10) 
As depicted in figure 2.5a, this produces the path ACFH for R1(r). Following that, R2(r) 
is disjointly routed according to the backup path variant of equation 2.11. 
(2.11) 
This produces the path ADGH and a total cost C(r) of 12. However, in this graph the 
actual minimum cost determined by equation 2.8 is 10 when R1 (r) and R2(r) are routed 
over ACEH and ADGFH respectively. This scenario, depicted in figure 2.5b is in fact the 
shortest pair of paths available. This discrepancy in total costs between the optimal and 
simple two-step solutions is caused by R1 (r) unfairly utilizing links that should be given to 
R 2 ( r). Thus we can not rely on simple two-step algorithms to provide the shortest pair. 
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Figure 2.5.: Sub-Optimality of Two-Step Solutions 
2.1.4.2. Trap Topology 
In addition to the problem of sub-optimality associated with simple two-step algorithms, 
they are prone to the dreaded trap topology problem. In this problem, the shortest path for 
R1 (r) will block the path for R2 (r). This situation is best understood using figure 2.6. In 
figure 2.6a, R1 (r) is routed using a shortest path algorithm and obtains a path of ABCD. 
Afterward, the network can not form a disjoint backup route R2(r) given that R1(r) has 
blocked its path. Therefore, it is a trap, and this demand must be declined. However, a set 
of paths can exist in the network if the connections are routed as they are in figure 2.6b. 
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This erroneous result produced by simple tvvo-step algorithms could unnecessarily prevent 
customers from establishing connections through a network. 
~ 1 a 
~/. 
\~ 
(a) Network with R 1 (r) 
(b) Shortest Pair for R1 ( r) and R2 ( r) 
Figure 2.6.: Trap Topology 
2.1.4.3. One Step Solutions and their Limitations 
To resolve the problems of suboptimal pairs and trap topologies a one-step path computa-
tion solution is required. There are two algorithms that are capable of performing one-step 
solutions. These algorithms are Suurballe's algorithm [14] and Bhandari's algorithm [13]. 
The former of the two algorithms relies on graph transformations to allow multiple itera-
tions of Dijkstra's algorithm to determine the optimal shortest disjoint pair. The latter of 
the two uses multiple iterations of a modified variant of Dijkstra's algorithm introduced in 
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[13] that is capable of handling negative links to solve the problem. Due to the simplicity 
of Bhandari's algorithm which does not involve graph transformations, it is generally pre-
ferred over Suurballe's algorithm [2]. Due to its usage in this thesis, the Modified Dijkstra's 
algorithm and Bhandari's algorithm have been included in Appendix E as Algorithms E.2 
and E.5. Additionally, if Bhandari's algorithm is run for k iterations, it can be used to 
resolve the k-shortest path set (13]. This variant has also been included in the reference 
section as algorithm E.6. Unfortunately, there are major limitations associated with both 
shortest pair algorithms and their variants. The link costs C1 ( ij) can not be arbitrarily 
manipulated between each iteration of the shortest path search used in the algorithms. This 
inhibits the establishment of sharing based link costs for backup routes. Adding to that, 
SBPP schemes need to know the working route R1 (r) to determine link costs C2 ( ij) for the 
backup route R2 (r). Since the shortest pair algorithms resolve both paths simultaneously, 
they can not be used for survivability techniques which require two steps. There have 
been attempts to find a middle ground between two-step and one-step techniques like the 
Iteration Restoration Dijkstra [15], but these solutions are suboptimal and require many 
iterations to complete. Many of the algorithms in this thesis generate shortest path sets 
using one step algorithms. 
2.1.4.4. Re-optimized Solutions 
Networks can provision connection requests using on-line algorithms. These algorithms are 
provided with information about the current state of the network. As more connection 
requests enter and leave the network, the routes utilized by the connections may become 
suboptimal. That is, with a change in the connections in the network, superior routing and 
sharing opportunities might become available. Re-optimization takes advantage of these 
opportunities by offering network administrators the option of readjusting the routes used 
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by those connections. Re-optimization can be performed on a regular basis, or as a one time 
event. This quality is of particular importance to survivability techniques that depend on 
sharing between specific demands that are not very common. An example of this is when 
sharing can only occur if two demands are disjoint and heading to the same destination. In 
this thesis one of the proposed algorithms utilizes re-optimization to improve its results. 
2.2. Coded Survivability 
At the turn of the millennium, the idea of linearly combining independant data connections 
was proposed to increase throughput [16]. Originally this idea was proposed to improve 
latency in satellite communications, however it was expanded to include mesh networks 
[17]. The potential of this technology has produced a wealth of literature on improving our 
networks through network coding [18, 19, 20]. 
Recently, the idea of using coding to provide survivability to networks has been proposed 
by the authors of [21]. Although originally proposed to work in conjunction with protection 
cycles, the concept has since branched off so that it can be used on its own to provide sur-
vivability [22]. In [23], the authors proposed a strategy for providing l+N protection. This 
scheme was designed to provide fully proactive protection against single link failures for N 
connections using a single redundant path. The technique used coding to linearly combine 
all N connections onto a redundant circuit. Modulo two additions were specifically pro-
posed as the method of choice to make the linear combinations. This method was therefore 
posed to provide survivability without the need for fault localization or signal rerouting. 
Thus, the problem of network survivability would be reduced to an error correction problem. 
In [24], the authors proposed using network protection codes (NPC) so that the network 
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survivability could be reduced to an error correction coding issue. Therefore, we can rep-
resent every scheme with a generator matrix G. The generator matrix defines the sets of 
linear combinations sent over a set of disjoint connections. Each element in the matrix 9ij is 
a binary variable existing in F 2 space that determines whether a traffic demand i is linearly 
combined onto disjoint connection j. In its simplest form, for a scheme to protect n working 
paths, k connections must carry uncoded data and m = n- k connections must carry coded 
data. In this scheme, each source transmits a column vector ( g 1j g 2j . . . g(n-l)j f in 
F~- 1 . For single link failures we can define a simplified generator matrix G that can be 
used to encode survivability for n- 1 sources as in equation 2.12. 
1 0 ... 0 
! Ll)xn 
0 1 ... 0 
G= (2.12) 
0 0 1 
The columns in the matrix consists of of a set of disjoint connections between the sources 
and receivers. The encoded connection consists of a linearly combined set of the data from 
each source node. When there is only one coded connection the graph looks like figure 
2. 7. This technique has been used successfully to generate the generalized 1 + N protection 
scheme [23]. Later on, that work was expanded to protect against possible node failures 
in [25]. This was done by increasing the minimum required redundancy to be greater than 
the nodal degree. To further study coded protection, this thesis includes several novel 
heuristic algorithms. These algorithms were invented to provide coding based protection 
using heuristic algorithms 
28 
2. Background 
~s x. ,.~R-.'\ ~,).ol-----------------....:~ 
~+~--------~x<_. --------~•~) 
® x.+x,+ ... +X• ... +x., .. rx,, ~ S· +01111------------+Jio\. Ri J .l ~
~ 
Xfi .. , :9 
®01111 
x .. •® 
Figure 2.7.: Network Coded Protection Against Single Link Failures (from [24]) 
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3.1. Source Coded Protection 
Source Coded Protection (SCP) is the simplest coded-based path survivability technique 
presented in this thesis. This survivability scheme attempts to emphasize the importance of 
utilizing a minimum amount of computations and control signaling to protect information. 
Normally, in order to minimize the amount of computations and signaling, a dedicated 
backup path protection (DBPP) technique is required. Since all the computations and 
signaling are performed before a fault event, no restoration computations or signaling are 
necessary. This would allow the network to remain as simple as possible and dedicated 
to fast and efficient information transfer. However, with DBPP comes inefficient capacity 
utilization. This added redundancy requirement has been the weapon for opponents to the 
technique. Fortunately, with coding based survivability, information can be fragmented 
by a source node, encoded together and sent disjointly to the destination. This leads to 
reduction in bandwidth requirements over DBPP. Figure 3.1 depicts the general operation 
of a connection request r protected by SCP. 
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(a) Normal Operation 
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(b) Failure Operation 
Figure 3.1.: Source Coded Protection Appearance 
Depicted in figure 3.1a are the normal working conditions for a demand X protected using 
SCP. Under normal conditions a demand X at a source nodeS is separated into N fragments. 
These fragments are sent disjointly over N working routes Rw(r) = { Rwl (r), Rw2(r) ... , RwN(r)} 
to a destination node D. These working routes Rw(r) are supplemented by a single disjoint 
backup route Rb ( r) containing a linear combination of all the fragments of demand X, i.e 
X1 EB X2 EB .... EB Xn· If a fault event occurs along one of the working routes Rwi(r), the 
destination node will be able to decode the missing data using the redundant connection 
Rb(r). For example, in figure 3.lb, fragment X2 is lost due to a fault in the network. How-
ever, the destination still has enough information to decode X2 by performing the following 
operation. 
This allows the network survivability issue to be reduced to a simple error correcting code 
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problem. Since the fragmentation and reassembly are performed by the source and desti-
nation nodes, the intermediate nodes will not require any special computations or signaling 
procedures. As presented in table 3.1, from the path assignment and recovery perspec-
tive, SCP is identical to DBPP. Unlike DBPP that requires at least a 100% redundancy to 
protect traffic, SCP can provide survivability with a redundancy requirement as low as Jr, 
where N is the number of fragments. Assuming each path has a normalized cost of one, 
DBPP requires 2 units of network capacity, while SCP only requires NJ1. However, the 
scheme is bounded by the min-cut between the source and destinations nodes. In the worst 
case situation, where the min-cut between two nodes is only two, SCPs performance is equal 
to DBPP. As the min-cut increases to 3 and 4, best case capacity utilization approaches to 
1.33 and 1.25 respectively. In chapter 3, two novel heuristic algorithms have been designed 
to perform SCP. The first of these algorithms was designed to provide the most capacity 
efficient set of connections for SCP. The second algorithm, provides a much faster solution 
but with less efficient results. 
Table 3.1.: Source Coded Protection Characteristics 
Failure recovery route Channel assignment Cross- Failure 
on failure recovery connect on specific 
route failure 
Computed I Assigned Computed I Assigned recovery 
route 
before before before before before no 
3.2. Multiple Source Coded Protection 
Even with all the benefits of SCP, there are a few aspects of it that make it undesirable. 
First and foremost, the level of sharing is limited by the minimum nodal degree of the 
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source and destination nodes. If either the source or destination node has a degree of two, 
SCP is essentially DBPP. However, coded based protection has no requirement that forces 
it to allow sharing from only one source. By removing the single source constraint from 
SCP, this nodal degree problem can be partially mitigated, so that the amount of sharing 
is only dependent on the degree of the destination node. Adding to that, by removing the 
single source constraint of SCP, fragmentation becomes unnecessary, therefore removing the 
complexity associated with it. This new survivability technique is called Multiple Source 
Coded Protection (MSCP). As with SCP and DBPP, MSCP also performs all assignment 
operations before the failure occurs. Thus, as depicted in table 3.2, the failure recovery 
route, channel assignments and cross-connects are all computed in advance and independent 
of any failure. 
Table 3.2.: Multiple Source Coded Protection Characteristics 
Failure recovery route Channel assignment Cross- Failure 
on failure recovery connect on specific 
route failure 




before before before before before no 
Due to the removal of the single source restriction, MSCP has a slightly different operation. 
Since source nodes can be distinct from one another, coding must be performed inside the 
network. In SCP a single coded route was relied upon to protect connections, in MSCP this 
can require a set of coded routes Rw1(r). Figure 3.2 has been employed to further illustrate 
the operation of MSCP. In the figure, every source in a protection set s simultaneously sends 
two identical disjoint connections into the network. Within the network, these identical 
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connections are linearly combined onto separate coding streams Rwj (r) . Each of these 
routes are linearly independent, disjoint from one another, and stream converge on the 
destination node. In order to provide survivability to a protection set of n sources, n+ 1 
coded routes are required. 
Sources 
Figure 3.2.: Multiple Source Coded Protection Appearance 
The destination node will receive the n+ 1 streams Rwj (r). Each of these streams will have 
a header with the coding vector Cj in equation 3.1. 
. . . Ci.jn } 
lxn 
(3.1) 
The coding vector is an n-dimensional vector, used to determine which information sources 
have been linearly combined into stream j. For the purposes of providing survivability, each 
element a.ij E {0, 1}. That is, a.ij is a binary number, which determines whether a piece 
of information Xj exists in a coded route Rwi(r). With this information from each coding 
vector, the destination node can generate the matrix in equation 3.2. This matrix contains 
a set of n+ 1 linear equations, each representing a disjoint stream Rwj (r). Since the matrix 
has has n + 1 equations and n unknowns it can be considered over-defined. Adding to that, 
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since every equation is linearly independent, the matrix is full rank. Thus, any set of n 
linear equations from the matrix can be used to solve the source messages. 
(3.2) 
anlXl an2X2 O!nnXn Rwn(r) 
O!(n+l)lXl O!(n+1)2X2 O!(n+l)nXn Rw(n+l)(r) (n+l)xn 
In a single failure event, one link in the network will be disabled. Since every stream is 
disjoint, only one can be affected by the fault. Likewise, since each source sends two dis-
joint connections into the network, and each connection is linearly combined into different 
streams, no pair of connections can be lost. Therefore, the effect of the fault can be reduced 
to a loss of one linear equation at the destination. Since each linear equation is linearly 
independent, a failure will create a standard n x n or well-defined matrix. With the well-
defined matrix, each source message can be solved as if no failure occurred. 
Unlike SCP, the tree structures required for coded routes in MSCP require more capacity 
than point-to-point connections. However, these trees formations are required for encoding 
to occur. Thus it is important to minimize the collective size of these trees. For ann source 
node protection set, 2n disjoint branches are required to connect to n + 1 coded routes. 
This number of disjoint branches required corresponds to a pair of disjoint connections from 
each source node. Simultaneously, the n + 1 coded routes are required so that a full rank 
well-defined matrix will be maintained in any single failure event. The disjoint branch pair 
from each source node only needs to connect to two disjoint streams, since connecting to 
more will only increase capacity usage and offer no benefits. With that, MSCP requires 
at least one and at most n - 1 coded routes. The number of coded routes is bounded at 
the high end when the branches from each source are paired onto the n + 1 routes. That 
is, when each coded route contains at most two pieces of information. From that, at most 
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n- 1 coded routes will be required for any protection set. 
The capacity utilization of MSCP can be determined as a range bounded by SCP and DBPP. 
These bounds are depicted in figure 3.3. In figure 3.3a, if all the sources are collocated, then 
MSCP performs like SCP. In this instance, like SCP the normalized capacity utilization is 
1~~ 1 . On the other end, in figure 3.3b is the worst case scenario. In this scenario, the 
source nodes are farther away from each other than they are from the destination for both 
the working and backup routes. Therefore, it costs the same amount to send two disjoint 
connections to the destination as it would to linearly combine them. This situation is 
identical to DBPP and therefore has a capacity utilization of two. 
Sources 
Destination 
d '® ;( x~..____/ x., ~ Destination 
(a) Most Efficient Scenario (b) Least Efficient Scenario 
Figure 3.3.: Performance Bounds for MSCP 
There are a few drawbacks associated with MSCP. The worst of these is the new linear 
combining requirement imposed on intermediate nodes in the network. Unlike in SCP, 
MSCP must have a complex transport layer, where connections must be buffered and 
linearly combined into streams. This requirement of transport networks will be exhibited 
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by the remaining network coding schemes. Fortunately, as network coding becomes more 
prominent in networks for its increased throughput property, this issue will become less 
important. In chapter 3, three novel heuristic algorithms have been created to perform 
lVISCP. These algorithms will be explained in chapter 4. 
3.3. Network Coded Protection 
The previously proposed protection schemes all relied exclusively on coding to provide sur-
vivability to networks. SCP allowed a source to fragment a traffic demand into multiple 
connections that can be encoded together for survivability. MSCP expanded this coded 
attribute to allow many sources to share coded routes. Using their respective techniques, 
both of these schemes significantly reduced the redundancy requirement over DBPP. How-
ever, they have a fatal weakness that can not be solved with coding alone. Both schemes 
are dependent on nodal degrees. SCP is dependent on the nodal degree of the source and 
destination nodes, while MSCP is dependent only on the destination node. When shar-
ing is limited in that fashion, high levels of sharing are improbable. The goal of Network 
Coded Protection (NCP) is to create a scheme that is capable of allowing sharing between 
connections that have different source and destination nodes. Table 3.3 summarizes the 
differences between each of the coded protection schemes presented in this thesis. 
Table 3.3.: Difference Between Coded Protection Schemes 
Scheme I Number of Sources I Number of Destinations 
Source Coded Protection One One 
Multiple Source Coded Protection Many One 
Network Coded Protection Many Many 
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The single destination constraint was imposed on SCP and MSCP because a centralized 
location was required to decode each coded stream. NCP strives to decentralize this op-
eration so that intermediate nodes in the network can contribute to decoding operations. 
If decoding operations are allowed within the network, then there are three general points 
where a connection can be fully decoded. Figure 3.4 depicts these three possible decoding 
points. The first condition is where decoding occurs at the source. This situation repre-
sents the uncoded connections reminiscent of the worst case scenario for MSCP and DBPP. 
Under the bottom condition, the stream is decoded at the destination node. This is how 
SCP and MSCP normally operate. In the figure there is a middle condition between the 
fully coded and uncoded scenarios. If a coded route can be decoded at some intermediate 
node in the network, then the single destination constraint can be relaxed . 
. Source 
0 Stream left unroded : .......... ., ..... ,.. .............. "'::::... ............. .,., ....... """.., ............ i " . . 
j Stream J~wded at i 
i in:ermediate r.<:"..de l : ....r'T\. : 
~ - - -.... w ~···-·········,.,..; 
i ~ ! 
J Stmam d~coded a: ! 
l destinai:flnode _ (~'\ 
t---- -:--- --....~ 
1 
; Destina~mr 
Figure 3.4.: The General Decoding Points for Coded Based Protection 
This situation where an intermediate node decodes the coded stream is the premise behind 
NCP. In NCP, every traffic demand has its information decoded before or at the destination. 
For a set of traffic demands protected together in a protection set s, there is a node where 
all information must be decoded. This node is referred to as the critical node C(s) of 
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the protection set s. The critical node acts as the placeholder for the destination node in 
MSCP. Furthermore, in a coded route, the critical node separates the coded section from 
the uncoded section. In the coded section of a coded route, information can be encoded 
and decoded. However, in the uncoded section, since it is after the critical node, no coding 
is allowed. This organization for a coded route for a protection set is depicted in figure 3.5. 
Primary Path 
Source Node - -+@)-- - J.@·····-···l-13········· 
Crilical Node 
Coded Sec~ioo Uncoded Ser:~ico 
---:..,_~ Primar:v Pam - -)to Network Ceded Link ······)to Unc.cded Uri< 
Figure 3.5.: Network Coded Protection General Layout 
In order to help differentiate nodes before and after C(s), the set of nodes before C(s) shall 
be known as root nodes Rn(s) and the nodes after shall be known as branch nodes Bn(s). 
Adding to that, the set of links used to interconnect nodes in the coded section shall be 
known as root links R1 ( s) and the set of links used to interconnect nodes in the uncoded 
section shall be known as branch links B 1 ( s). The root and branch distinctions have been 
given to nodes and links in a NCP stream because of their collective tree-like appearance. 
This general form is depicted in figure 3.6. 
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Figure 3.6.: Network Coded Tree Appearance 
This tree depicts the general structure of a coded route for NCP. The coded section contains 
the root nodes Rn ( s) and links Rl ( s) of the protection set s. The roots of the tree defines 
the coded section. Each source for the traffic demands in the protection set connect to 
the coded route via the route nodes and links. Likewise, the uncoded or shared section 
is depicted as the branches of the tree. Each destination for the traffic demands in the 
protection set are connected to the coded route by the branch nodes and links. Branch 
links B1 ( s) can be either dedicated to an individual connection or shared between multiple 
demands in the protection set. For redundancy reduction reasons, this section should consist 
of shared capacity that can be used to route the last mile of a NCP demand in fault events. 
Thus, the uncoded section should be considered shared for NCP. In fault events, the failed 
connection will be forwarded from C ( s) to the destination node over Bl ( s). Since the cross-
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connects setup is dependent on the failure type and the set of channels is dependent on 
the cross-connections, they should be determined after the failure occurs. As depicted in 
table 3.4, this gives network coded protection two separate protection characteristics. The 
coded section is failure independent and dedicated to all the connections in the protection 
set, while the shared section is basically a last mile variant of SBPP. 
Table 3.4.: Network Coded Protection Characteristics 
Section Failure recovery route Channel assignment Cross- Failure 
on failure recovery connect on specific 
route failure 




Coded Section before I before before I before before 
Shared Section before I before after I after after 
Obviously, to ensure single failure survivability, the working path R1 (r) of each demand 
r E s should be disjoint from each other and from the set of root links Rz ( s) and branch 
links Bz ( s) in a protection set s. Fortunately though, there are no disjointness requirements 
between the set of root Rz ( s) and branch links Bz ( s). Three heuristic algorithms have been 
created to perform NCP. All of them will be presented in chapter 3. 
3.3.1. Secondary Connections 
As described for MSCP, in order to give a coded section the ability to decode any connection 
in a fault event, each stream requires two copies of every connection. However, the tree 
structure described in figure 3.7 only provides one connection to the coded section of the 
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combines every connection onto a single channel. No decoding operations can be performed 
as long as the coded section only has one copy of every signal. 
Input Data {X.} 
Figure 3.7.: Decoding Problem for Network Coded Protection 
The solution is to provide a second connection from the working route R1 (r) of each demand 
r E s to any node in the root section Rn ( s). The function of this secondary connection 
is to remove its demand's information from the stream. A simple exclusive OR operation 
can remove the redundant data from the coded section of the protection set. Under normal 
conditions, this will result in every connection being removed from the coded route before 
the critical node. The general appearance of the secondary connection is presented in figure 
3.8. 
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C~r.pu: Dnta (X.} 
......... 
·-.. 
Input Dn:a {X,} 
Figure 3.8.: Network Coded Protection Secondary Connection Solution 
In a fault event, the secondary connection associated with the failed demand can be dis-
abled, so that the failed demand's traffic can be forwarded through the shared section to 
the its destination. To do this only one working route in the protection set can fail at a 
time. Therefore disjointness must be enforced between working connections and the coded 
route. Since every connection except the failed connection will be removed from the coded 
section, the critical node C(s) will be provided with a redundant copy of the information 
for that connection. Using the shared section, the critical node will establish a connection 
to the destination node. When the failed connection is repaired the secondary connection 
will be re-enabled. This will remove the redundant connection from the stream and disable 
the connection over the shared section. 
There are three methods available for creating secondary connections. As portrayed in 
figure 3.9, these techniques are known as the feedback loop, intersection arc, and branch 
connection. Each is designed to provide specific advantages over the other two. 
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Figure 3.9.: Network Coded Protection Secondary Connection Types 
3.3.1.1. Feedback Loop 
The feedback loop is the simplest of all feedback types. It is an extension based solution to 
the secondary connection problem. In it, the working path is appended after the destination 
so that it connects to one of the root nodes of its protection set. Figure 3.10 has been 
employed to provide an example of the operation of a feedback loop. 
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(a) Normal Operation 
Nothhg ta feecbatk ----· 
Output Data {X1) 
(b) Failure Operation 
Figure 3.10.: Network Coded Protection Feedback Loop Example 
In figure 3.10, the normal operation and fault operation of the feedback loop are depicted. 
In it, two connections X 1 and X 2 are protected by a coded route with feedback connections. 
Under normal conditions, the connections are encoded and decoded in the coded section 
using the feedback loops. If a fault occurs along the working path of X 2 , the feedback loop 
will have nothing to feedback. Thus, the coded section will not be able to remove X 2 from 
the coded stream. Therefore, at the critical node the only connection left will be X2, which 
will be forward through the shared section to the destination. 
As mentioned in table 3.5, the feedback loop has a very simple routing operation. Routing 
from the destination to the root nodes can be done with a simple modification to the end 
conditions of Dijkstra's algorithm. Adding to that, since the feedback loop is appended 
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to the end of the working route, the working route must be fully functional in order to 
maintain. Thus, in fault events the feedback loop can be automatically disabled at the 
destination node. Therefore, without signaling the coded route of the protection set, it will 
establish the redundant path to the destination node. In false positive events where the 
feedback loop fails but not the working route, a special update message can be sent to the 
coded route notifying it of the failure type. 
Table 3.5.: Feedback Loop Characteristics 
Benefits I Drawbacks 
Simple routing Greatest redundancy requirement 
Minimum protection signaling Greatest delay 
Unfortunately, a feedback loop can require a significant amount of redundant capacity. 
Furthermore, large delays can be accrued by routing a connection from first the source to 
destination and then to one of the root nodes. However, delays are a fundamental prob-
lem associated with network coding and we believe that as the technique becomes more 
mainstream, the problem will become less evident. Adding to that, since the feedback loop 
is only required to decode redundant data, it does not need to be disjoint from either the 
working path or protection stream. If the working path and feedback loop fail simultane-
ously, the stream can still establish a redundant path to the destination. Likewise, if the 
stream and the feedback loop fail simultaneously, the working connection for the demand 
will still be operational. Moreover, since the purpose of the feedback is to provide redun-
dant data to the stream, other connections may utilize its route to linearly combine data 
into the stream. That is, the feedback loop essentially becomes part of the set of Rn ( s) and 
Rz(s). 
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3.3.1.2. Branch Connection 
The branch connection is a generalization of the feedback loop. Instead of forwarding 
connections to the coded section of the stream from the destination, the branch connection 
allows any intermediate node along the working route of the traffic demand can do it. Like 
the feedback loop, if the working path already intersects the coded section of the stream, 
no branch connection is required. In the case of a branch connection, an intersection can 
be interpreted as a zero length branch. Also like the feedback loop the branch connections 
can be added to Rn ( s) and Rl ( s) of the stream, so that other demands can use them too. 
Figure 3.11 has been employed as an example of the branch connection. 
X., xoc X, " NULL 
I Pp<l1 Dola {X } 
X,= X. xor x, xor X, 
(a) Normal Operation 
X,."-"')(. xcr X,= X, 
B(aN;h Disa:::mne.::;t-s X 1 
~-~-Failure 
lrput Da:a {X:} 
(b) Failure Operation 
Figure 3.11.: Network Coded Protection Branch Connection Example 
In figure 3.11 an example of the normal and fault operation of the branch connection is 
presented. During normal operation each demand provides a branch connection from their 
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working route to the coded section of the protection set. These branch connections are 
used to decode and remove each connection from the coded route. vVhen a fault occurs, a 
signal will be sent from the node adjacent to the failure to the branch connection to disable 
it. ·with the branch connection disabled, the critical node will receive the redundant copy 
of the failed signal. The critical node will then forward the redundant connection through 
the shared section to the destination node. When the failure is repaired, the adjacent node 
will signal the branch to re-establish its connection. The branch connection will forward 
the working connection to the coded route, where it is used to decode the redundant data. 
Lastly, when the critical node loses its redundant information for the failed connection it 
will disable the shared section. Table 3.6 summarizes the benefits and drawbacks of using 
the branch connection. 
Table 3.6.: Branch Connection Characteristics 
Benefits Drawbacks 
Least redundancy requirement Greatest protection signaling requirement 
Difficult to route 
Since the branch connection takes the most general approach to the secondary connection 
problem, it can produce the smallest redundancy requirement. In fact if the source is 
close enough to its destination a branch connection can be disregarded altogether. This 
scenario is where the branch occurs at the source node and results in the connection not 
using the coded route of the protection set until the failure occurs. Of course, this option 
is dependent on the restoration time and latency requirements of the SLA. However, the 
branch connection has a few drawbacks associated with it. Branch connections require 
significantly more signaling than feedback loops. In fact, if there is a branch from the 
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source node to the coded section, the restoration time -vvill be comparable to some SBPP 
schemes. Adding to that, there is a degree of complexity associated with routing branch 
connections. In its most general sense, routing the branch connection is akin to routing 
a tree from the source node to the destination and one of the root nodes such that the 
capacity utilization is minimized and the delay is acceptable. 
3.3.1.3. Intersection Arc 
The intersection arc is a technique that forces the working path to provide the redundant 
data without using any feedback loops or branch connections. Ideologically it strives to 
create the ideal situation where the working path intersects the coded section of the pro-
tection set. Figure 3.12 has been employed to summarize the operation of the intersection 
arc on the coded route of a protection set. 
X, 
:(, xnr X, = NULL 
X, 
(a) Normal Operation 
X1 tB r"HJt tB~'-rt<;vt~··d ftorr. tl~ 
coded· secrioo 
x, 
x,"' x. xm x, xar X, 
(b) Failure Operation 
0~\pu: Data (X<} 
Figure 3.12.: Network Coded Protection Intersection Arc Example 
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In figure 3.12a, under normal operation, the intersection point acts as a decoding point for 
the coded route. In the figure, two traffic demands X1 and X2 are both utilizing a coded 
route for protection. The redundant information for X 1 is connected to the coded section 
of the protection set, where it is linearly combined with demand X 2 . Demand X 1 also has 
a working route that intersects a root node in the coded section before proceeding to its 
destination. At the intersection point, the information from the working route of demand 
X 1is used to decode its information from the coded section. As with all other secondary 
connections, this can be done with an exclusive OR operation. This event is allowed, since 
the working route of X 1 is disjoint from the working route of X2 and the coded route. 
Figure 3 .12b depicts the failure operation for a network coded stream with intersection 
arcs. If a failure occurs across the working route of demand X2 then, like a normal fail-
ure in path protected networks, the failure will first be detected by the nodes immediately 
adjacent the failure. The node on the source end will propagate a failure message to the 
intersection point with the coded route. At the intersection point the decoding operation 
will be canceled so that the redundant data is propagated to the critical node. At the criti-
cal node, the redundant data will be forwarded down the shared section to the destination. 
This reduces the restoration time since the error propagation only needs to travel to the 
intersection point and the backup path only needs to be setup from the critical node to the 
destination. 
For the intersection arc, since no secondary connection is required then the additional 
redundancy and extra signaling are also not required. Unfortunately, by forcing the working 
route of a connection to intersect the coded route of a protection set, the working path can 
become significantly longer. This may affect the latency of connections, possibly violating 
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SLAs. Adding to that, routing a working path that intersects a coded route such that the 
minimum possible capacity is utilized is complex and difficult to route. These benefits and 
drawbacks of using the intersection arc are summarized in table 3. 7. 
Table 3. 7.: Intersection Arc 
Benefits Drawbacks 
No branches or feedback loops Increased working path length 
Difficult to route 
3.3.2. Coded Section Setup 
The coded section layout is the most important aspect of network coded protection. The 
layout and critical node of a stream can dictate how capacity efficient it is and how quickly 
restoration can occur for demands in its protection set. Adding to that, if some nodes 
are not capable of performing coding operations, coded sections must be designed to not 
incorporate those nodes. Thus, the placement of the coded section of the stream is of 
extreme importance. There are generally two options available for positioning of coded 
sections for protection sets: Pre-established Trunks and Demand Generated Formations. 
Each technique takes a radically different approach to the placement of the coded section. 
The first technique utilizes predefined coded sections called trunks, which connections can 
utilize for protection. That is, potential coded sections are defined when the network is 
created. This provides network operators with the option of ensuring certain quality of 
service levels at the cost of efficiency. The latter technique relies on connections to generate 
the placement of the coded section with path search algorithms. This allows for efficient 
results but removes control from operators. 
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3.3.2.1. Pre-established Trunks 
Pre-established Trunks are operator specified coded sections. They can be defined by 
the availability of network coding compatible nodes or through manual placement. ·when 
connections are added to the network, each will have to determine if it should be protected 
by a certain trunk. An example of this technique is in figure 3.13, where demands X 1 and 
X 2 want to be provisioned in the network. Demand X 1 wants to be routed from node 
B to node H. If it routes its working connection along BEH, then the trunk is available 
for protection. To solidify its protected status, the demand can route a disjoint backup 
connection along BC in order to connect to the trunk. Likewise, it can route a branch 
connection from its working route at node E to the trunk close to its destination at node H 
to remove its information under normal conditions. Finally, a shared backup route can be 
created from the critical node at node F to the demand's destination at node H to restore 
xl in fault events. 
X, Co(lnect!on. 
Coded &:!eliot: flF th~ 
pwtection set 
_,... 
Figure 3.13.: Pre-Established Trunks 
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The second connection X 2 can be routed in the same fashion as the first. In order to 
get from its source node A to the destination at G it can follow the path ADG. Since no 
disjointness requirements are violated it can route a backup connection to the trunk from 
its source and from the critical node to its destination. A simple feedback loop can be 
used to provide the secondary connection to the trunk. In this instance, only nodes C 
and F require network coding functionality, yet overall capacity has been reduced and both 
connections can have one hop restorations from the critical node to their destinations. 
3.3.2.2. Demand Generated Formations 
Demand Generated Formations is a coded section creation method that closely resembles 
the techniques used by SCP and MSCP. That is, the network coded section is initially 
created from the backup route of a connection. This operation is summarized as figure 
3.14a. In it, demand X 1 requires a connection from node B to node H. The primary route 
can be routed as normal with a shortest path algorithm. Afterward the demand needs to 
determine if it will use a pre-existing protection set or create a new one. The simplest 
method for determining if a connection should generate a protection set is to base the 
decision on the available existing protection sets. If there are no efficient protection sets 
available, then a new one should be created. The critical node can be set as the destination 
node or the highest degree node along the backup route. This setup requires that the 
entire network is capable of performing coding operations. Under conditions where only 
a subset of the intermediate nodes can perform coding, those nodes can perform all the 
linear combining operations. The other nodes in the coded route will only forward the 
coded information closer to the critical node. However, the critical node must be coding 
compatible or else the decoding process will not function correctly. 
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Figure 3.14.: Demand Generated Formations 
As in figure 3.14b, when a second demand X 2 enters the network it will be given the option 
of joining the NCP protection set generated from demand X1. There are four operations 
that must be completed in order for X 2 to join a protection set already containing X1. 
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1. The working route for X 2 must be disjoint from the working route for X 1 and the 
coded route of the protection set. 
2. X 2 must be able to route from its source node to the coded section of the protection 
set via a connection disjoint from its working route. 
3. A route must be available from the critical node of the protection set to the destination 
of traffic demand x2. 
4. A route must be available from the destination of X 2 to the coded section of the 
protection set. 
In figure 3.14b the backup route for traffic demand X2 is provisioned using the four oper-
ations. First of all, X 2 has a working route provisioned from its source at node A to its 
destination at node G along the route ADG. Since, Its is disjoint from the coded route 
BCFH and the working route of traffic demand X 1 , X 2 can join the protection set. In 
order to join this protection set, a backup route is routed from the source at node A to 
the coded route of the protection set at node C. Likewise, a connection is routed from the 
critical node of the protection set at node H to the destination of X 2 at node G. Finally, 
a secondary connection is required from the working route to the coded section. For this 
example, X 2 uses a feedback loop from its destination at node G to the coded section of 
the protection set at node F. 
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4.1. Source Coded Protection Heuristic Algorithms 
In this thesis we are proposing two SCP based heuristic algorithms. These algorithms 
are Near Optimal Source Coded Protection (NOSCP) and Fast Source Coded Protection 
(FSCP). As specified in table 4.1, these techniques represent the trade offs between speed 
and efficiency. NOSCP produces an almost optimal set of paths for SCP. However, this can 
require many iterations of a shortest path algorithm. Conversely, FSCP has been created 
to establish a set of paths for SCP in a fraction of the time required by NOSCP. However, 
the results generated by the technique can be less optimal if the available capacity in the 
network is limited. 
Table 4.1.: Source Coded Protection V. Fast Source Coded Protection 
Technique Benefit Drawback 
Optimal Source Coded Provides the optimal set of Requires many iterations to 
Protection paths for a connection complete 
Fast Source Coded Reduces the number of Provides suboptimal paths for 
Protection iterations the connection 
The problem with the heuristic algorithms for SCP is determining the optimal number 
of fragments that should be created in order to minimize capacity. Conventional wisdom 
would dictate that as the number of fragments is increased the capacity should decrease. 
However, increasing the number of fragments does not necessarily decrease the capacity 
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required for the demand. This issue can be explained with table 4.2. For a SCP connection 
fragmented into N pieces, the capacity utilized is (J~~l) AN+l, Where AN+l is the average 
capacity requirement for each of the N + 1 paths. Since shorter routes are always favored 
over longer ones, as the number of fragments is increased, the average hops per path also 
increases. Thus, there is a point where the benefit from fragmenting is negated by the 
increase in path length. At this point it is no longer beneficial to increase fragmentation. 
This point can be determined with equation 4.1. If equation 4.1 is true, then it is more 
capacity efficient to use N- 1 fragments with N paths instead of N fragments with N + 1 
paths. 
(N + 1) N 
N AN+l > (N -1)AN (4.1) 
However, in the case of SCP algorithms, it is possible that AN+l < AN after the point 
specified by equation 4.1. Since the size of a fragment is inversely proportional to the 
number of fragments. Therefore, as fragments increase, capacity requirements on each link 
decrease. Thus, the available links might increase, freeing up a shorter path set. This 
event occurs when the available capacity Aij on a link { ij} can be bounded by equation 
4.2 for a bandwidth request b. In equation 4.2, the bounds are created by an increase in 
fragmentation from N-1 pieces to N pieces. This circumstance may be able to generate the 
situation after the point specified by equation 4.1 where AN+l <AN. 
b b 
-<A<---N - 21 (N- 1) (4.2) 
Fortunately, this situation only occurs when a network is heavily congested and rarely 
affects the relationship between AN+l and AN in the drastic ways specified by equation 
4.2. Thus, in order to allow a SCP based algorithm to solve in a reasonable degree of 
time we let equation 4.1 decide the endpoint. That is, when the relationship in equation 
4.1 exists then a SCP algorithm should end and provision the demand with the N paths 
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created in the previous iteration. 
Table 4.2.: Capacity Requirements for Source Coded Protection 
Number of Size of Number of Average Capacity 










Unfortunately, discarding the last iteration means that a set of N + 1 paths must be created 
only to be discarded, because it is less capacity efficient than theN paths set. This problem 
can be partially mitigated by determining in advance when N + 1 disjoint paths is impossible 
and therefore unnecessary to calculate. This can be done with a min-cut max-flow check. 
As mentioned in section ??, the min-cut can be used to determine the maximum number 
of disjoint paths available between a source destination pair. For SCP, N + 1 disjoint paths 
are required for a demand subdivided into N fragments. Therefore, we can bound the 
maximum number of paths set for SCP by the min-cut between the source and destination. 
However, determining the true min-cut of a graph is computationally significant and may 
mitigate the benefits of using the min-cut max-flow theorem. Thus we are using a pseudo 
min-cut determinator technique. This method is presented in section C.1 of appendix C. 
4.1.1. Near Optimal Source Coded Protection 
As mentioned earlier Near Optimal Source Coded Protection (NOSCP) strives to generate a 
near optimal set of paths for SCP. In order to determine the number of paths required in the 
near optimal set of connections we have to generate all the path sets until the relationship 
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in equation 4.1 exists. As mentioned in section 2.1.4, if a simple step by step approach is 
taken to discovering the path set, it will be suboptimal and prone to the trap topology. 
This is unacceptable for SCP, since high diversity is a fundamental requirement to achieve 
the benefits of the scheme. Thus, a shortest path set algorithm is required. Therefore we 
inherit the inflexibility of link costs and additional computation time associated with the 
shortest path set algorithms. 
Since the availability of links changes with fragmentation, shortest path set algorithms 
must be rerun whenever fragmentation increases. For NOSCP, each time fragmentation 
increases, a shortest path set algorithm is run for the new set of paths. NOSCP can be 
best explained with the flowchart in figure 4.1. 
Fail 
® 
Figure 4.1.: Near Optimal Source Coded Protection Flowchart 
In NOSCP, when a connection request r enters a network protected with NOSCP, the 
following procedure will be performed. First, the pseudo min-cut will be determined for 
the source-destination pair. This provides the algorithm with an upper bound for the 
number of paths possible with the algorithm. Afterward, the algorithm is setup to the 
starting parameters. For any SCP based algorithm to function correctly, it requires a min-
cut of at least three. If the min-cut between a source-destination pair is two then coded 
fragmentation is not possible. Thus, NOSCP must decline connection requests between 
source-destination pairs with a min-cut of two. If a min-cut of at least three is available 
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then the algorithm will begin the path finding operation. The algorithm is designed to 
increase fragmentation in a looped fashion until the endpoint cost function in equation 4.1 
becomes true. Figure 4.2 depicts the flowchart for the fragmentation loop in NOSCP. 
Figure 4.2.: Near Optimal Source Coded Protection Fragmentation Loop Flowchart 
Inside every iteration of the fragmentation loop the link costs are assigned and a new 
shortest path set is calculated. The cost function in each iteration can be defined with 
equation 4.3, where d is the number of disjoint paths being generated in that iteration. 
The cost of a link for routing is only dependent on whether a fragment can fit inside the 





Initially, in the first iteration with two fragments, each is ~ the bandwidth b required. 
If there is enough capacity on the link to provision the connection request, the link cost 
C(ij) will be set to some small number E, otherwise it will be set to co. After the link 
costs are setup, the algorithm will run the shortest path set algorithm for three routes 
in the first iteration. The number of paths d generated by the algorithm is incremented 
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in each iteration. For the first iteration, two routes will be used for the fragments and 
one will be used as the protection path. As the number of paths d increases so does the 
number of fragments. For every level of fragmentation only one path is devoted to coded 
information. At the end of every iteration, the endpoint cost function in equation 4.1 is 
used to determine if the cost Cn ( r) of the new path set Rn ( r) is less than the cost C0 ( r) 
of the previous iterations path set R 0 (r). For computational reasons, the endpoint cost 
function in the algorithm is modified into equation 4.4. It is different from equation 4.1 
because the original endpoint cost function is based on the number of fragments and the 
average path length, which is good for explaining the concept but inefficient for heuristic 
algorithms. The endpoint function used in the algorithm instead uses the combined cost of 
all the routes on the new path set Cn ( r) and old path set Co ( r). It also uses the number 
of disjoint paths instead of the number of fragments. Functionally though, both equations 
are equal. 
Cn(r) C0 (r) -->--d-1 d-2 (4.4) 
If the costs are equal in equation 4.4, the path set with more routes is favored because it 
will distribute the capacity more evenly throughout the network. If the shortest path set 
algorithm fails to find Rn(r), its corresponding cost Cn(r) will be oo. Since the initial old 
path set cost C0 (r) is set to oo the endpoint cost function will ensure that the algorithm 
does not end prematurely without a path set. Thus for any iteration of the algorithm, if no 
acceptable path set has been found thus far, it will always allow another iteration to occur 
with increased fragmentation. If the endpoint cost function is true, then the algorithm will 
check if a path set is available. The easiest way to determine this is with the cost of the 
previous iteration C0 (r). If C0 (r) = oo then no good path set has been found and the 
connection request should be rejected. Otherwise the connection should provisioned on the 
set of routes defined by Ro(r). 
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For a connection that should be fragmented into N pieces, NOSCP requires up to N 2!5N 
iterations of a Dijkstra's algorithm to complete. In order to mitigate some of the compu-
tation time requirements, the pseudo min-cut described earlier is utilized. If the optimal 
set of paths for a SCP demand has N fragments with the pseudo min-cut of N + 1, the 
number of Dijkstra iterations required will be reduced to N2 +~N-4 . The NOSCP algorithm 
is depicted in algorithmic form as algorithm A.l in appendix A. 
4.1.2. Fast Source Coded Protection 
NOSCP provided an efficient set of paths for a SCP demand. However, it required up to 
N
2!5N iterations of Dijkstra's algorithm to solve the path set. Therefore, a SCP demand 
with an optimum set of three fragments could require up to twelve iterations to complete. 
This is because the algorithm may have to generate the shortest triplet, quadruplet, and 
quintuplet before finishing. The problem was partially mitigated with the pseudo min-cut 
so that NOSCP would require only seven iterations if the min-cut was reached with the 
optimum set. This corresponds to the situation where the NOSCP algorithm only generates 
the shortest triplet and quadruplet. We were forced to do this many operations because the 
link costs C(ij) change when the amount of fragmentation increases. If the algorithm were 
to attempt to get the shortest set with changing link costs, negative cycles could desta-
bilize it. Thus, for NOSCP, the shortest path set must be reset whenever fragmentation 
increased. If the link costs are not changed when fragmentation increases, the algorithm 
doesn't have to reset the shortest path set algorithm. This reduces the required number 
of iterations in the worst case scenario from N 2!5N to N + 2. Modifying the algorithm 
in this regard reduces the number of iterations of Dijkstra in the previous example with 
three fragments from twelve to five iterations without the benefits of the pseudo min-cut, 
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and seven to four iterations with the pseudo min-cut. Since four routes are required for a 
SCP demand with three fragments, this is the minimum number of iterations possible for 
generating that many paths. 
This novel heuristic algorithm for providing SCP is known as Fast Source Coded Protection 
(FSCP). In it the link costs C(ij) are only calculated once instead of each time the fragmen-
tation increases. Thus, the Algorithm can use the path sets of the previous iterations while 
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Figure 4.3.: Fast Source Coded Protection Flowchart 
Functionally, FSCP is very similar to the NOSCP algorithm. Both use the same endpoint 
cost function and pseudo min-cut technique. However, they differ in respect to how the 
internal loops are performed. In NOSCP, each iteration consists of a link cost update and 
a K-shortest path set algorithm. FSCP is completely different in this respect, since its 
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internal loop only adds a path to the previously created set. In order for this path to 
generate a shortest set each iteration also incorporated features of the shortest path set 
algorithms. Initially, the FSCP algorithm starts off with a check if SCP is possible for 
the source-destination pair, using the pseudo min-cut. If three disjoint connections are not 
possible, then SCP can not be created and the connection request must be denied. If SCP 
is possible, then the link costs are setup for the first and only time with a fragmentation of 
two. If fragmentation increases afterward, the benefits of recalculating the link costs are ig-
nored. Fortunately, the loss of these benefits are only evident when the network is congested. 
After setting the link costs, FSCP gets the shortest triplet using the K Shortest Path 
Algorithm. This technique is reminiscent of NOSCP, which also initially gets the shortest 
triplet. However, in NOSCP this triplet may be discarded if more iterations are allowed 
with increased fragmentation. FSCP utilizes this triplet as the foundation for the internal 
loop iterations. This creates the major difference between NOSCP and FSCP. In NOSCP 
if the initial triplet calculation fails, the algorithm can look for a four disjoint path solution 
with increased fragmentation. In FSCP, since link costs are not affected by fragmentation, 
if the shortest triplet fails, the connection request is declined. Fortunately, this difference is 
only noticeable when the network is congested. Afterward, the algorithm enters the internal 
loop depicted as a flowchart in figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4.: Fast Source Coded Protection Internal Loop Flowchart 
Inside the internal loop flowchart, the endpoint cost function described in equation 4.4 is 
used to determine when the algorithm finishes. After, at the beginning of each iteration the 
pseudo min-cut determines if another path is possible before the next path is calculated. 
Following that, the fragmentation is increased and the d- 1 shortest path set is converted 
into the d shortest path set. This structure is basically the same as the internal loop 
structure of the K-shortest path algorithm depicted as algorithm E.6. That is, the internal 
loop follows the same three major steps as a loop in the K-shortest path algorithm. 
1. The existing path is modified with shortest path set characteristics. 
2. An additional route is generated. 
3. The two routes are merged to create a new shortest path set. 
For additional information on the K-shortest path set algorithm, please refer to [13]. FSCP 
is depicted in algorithmic format as algorithm A.2 in appendix A. 
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4.2. Multiple Source Coded Protection Heuristic Algorithms 
Presented in this section are three algorithms for performing l'viSCP. These algorithms 
are Re-optimized Multiple Source Coded Protection (RMSCP), Fast Multiple Source Coded 
Protection (FMSCP), and S'ingle Stream Multiple Source Coded Protection (SSMSCP). As 
described in table 4.3, The first technique has been designed to take full advantage of 
the possibilities available for coding multiple connections together. It strives to produce 
an near optimal set of routes connecting multiple demands from different sources to a 
single destination. It does this by re-optimizating pre-existing traffic demands. The second 
algorithm, provides a simplified approach by modifying the available destinations for the 
backup route based on previous paths in the protection set. By utilizing this method 
re-optimization can be avoided. This drastically reduces the overall complexity of the 
routing algorithm. However, without re-optimization the capacity efficiency of FMSCP is 
significantly reduced. This problem is slightly mitigated by the use of shortest path set 
characteristics for the working and backup connections in FMSCP. As opposed to RMSCP 
and FMSCP, which generate a generalized form of MSCP, the third algorithm, SSMSCP 
creates a specific variety of the MSCP scheme. Instead of allowing coding on any of the 
routes in a protection set, SSMSCP only allows a single route in the protection set contain 
coded data. This generates a MSCP protection scheme that appears like SCP to the 
destination. That is, in SSMSCP the destination will receive only one coded path containing 
the linear combination of all the traffic demands in the protection set. This reduces the 
amount of decoding required at the destination at the cost a of a greater capacity usage. 
The following three sections will explain in detail the operation of these heuristic algorithms. 
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Table 4.3.: Re-optimized Multiple Source Coded Protection V. Single Stream Multiple 
Source Coded Protection 
Technique Benefit Drawback 
Re-optimized Multiple Greatest capacity efficiency Requires re-optimization 
Source Coded 
Protection 
Fast Multiple Source Reduced routing complexity Not as capacity efficient or 
Coded Protection easy to decode at the 
destination 
Single Stream Minimal decoding required at Least capacity efficient 
Multiple Source the destination 
Coded Protection 
4.2.1. Re-optimized Multiple Source Coded Protection 
Re-optimized Multiple Source Coded Protection (RMSCP) is a heuristic algorithm for pro-
viding the generalized form of MSCP. That is, it aspires to allow N connection requests 
to encode their data together onto N + 1 disjoint connections. For these N connections to 
encode together they must share a destination with a nodal degree of N + 1. Since this 
algorithm re-establishes paths for existing demands when a new one is added to the net-
work, it requires re-optimization. That is, all the routes chosen for a set of demands must 
be reconfigured, so that they perform MSCP while using the minimum amount of band-
width. The initial problem with re-optimization is the decision of which demands should 
be optimized together. For standard shared mesh techniques this poses a great problem for 
re-optimization. There are limitless combinations of demands available for re-optimization. 
Determining an efficient set will be a computationally complex task. Fortunately, since 
MSCP requires that demands travel to the same destination for coding to occur, it limits 
the available options to an acceptable level. Like in SCP schemes, the min-cut theorem 
is important for providing sharing in RMSCP. However, Since sharing in RMSCP is only 
dependent on the nodal degree on the destination node, the previously described method 
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of determining the min-cut requires a slight modification. As mentioned earlier, the pseudo 
min-cut used the nodal degree of the source and destination nodes to determine the min-cut. 
Since Riv'ISCP utilizes multiple source nodes, it is not dependent on source nodal degrees. 
Therefore, the pseudo min-cut for RMSCP should only be based on the nodal degree of the 
destination node. Thus it can be described by equation 4.5, where if Di is the nodal degree 
of the destination node. 
( 4.5) 
The flowchart in figure 4.5 has been employed to explain the routing operation for RMSCP. 
Due to the complexity of RMSCP, several of the blocks in the flowchart can be further 
expanded into additional flowcharts. These flowcharts will be presented as the RMSCP 
flowchart is explained. 
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Figure 4.5.: Re-optimized Multiple Source Coded Protection Flowchart 
In the RMSCP, whenever a new demand enters the network, re-optimization will be at-
tempted. To facilitate the re-optimization, an arbitrary protection set of pre-existing de-
mands will be chosen to be reorganized. A connection request can join an existing protection 
set if equation 4.6 is true. In the equation, A(s) determines if a connection request r can 
potentially join a protection set s. 
0 D(r) # D(s) 
A(s) 0 dmax < (lsi + 2) (4.6) 
1 otherwise 
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In order for a connection request r to join a pre-existing protection set s, it must have the 
same destination D ( r) as the protection set D ( s). This is because the protection sets for 
MSCP based algorithms must have a common destination. 'the second criterion is used 
to ensure that protection sets that have reached thier min-cut can not be used for more 
sharing. In it, if the number of traffic demands in the protection set lsi plus the two addition 
routes required for the coded redundant path and connection request is greater than dmax, 
then the protection set can not be used. Either way, the algorithm will proceed to the next 
available protection set and test its availability with equation 4.6. If the algorithm does not 
find an available protection set, a shortest pair will be generated for a new protection set 
s, containing the connection request r. Otherwise, if the algorithm finds a protection set 
that is capable of handling an additional demand it will proceed with the re-optimization 
procedure. Before performing any re-optimization operations, the connection request r is 
added to the set of traffic demands that exist in the protection set s. This allows the 
algorithm to re-optimize all the pre-existing traffic demands and the connection request 
together. The re-optimization procedure consists mainly of a modified variant of the K-
Shortest Paths Algorithm and a redundant connection generator. The modified variant of 
the K-Shortest Paths Algorithm used for RMSCP generates the shortest set of for all of the 
traffic demands in the protection set. Its operation is depicted in figure 4.6. 
1• Gene~;~le v.orking Tn\lle Rr.,,.(sj for aiJ lr<ifflc demands in the rro~ec:',ion set-------_., ! Transfam graph with phantom source_... 
:+- P.(s} and phantom links P.·(s.f ! 
Get lsi'" shortest p1>th set 
R<,,.(s) from the phantom 
-+ ;;(lurce P,(s) to I he 
'-------' conll<YKtn dtJS!it1atit:m D(t:) 
Figure 4.6.: Working Route Generator Flowchart 
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To generate a shortest path set from a set of source nodes to a single destination, a special 
graph transformation is required. This transformation is depicted in figure 4. 7. The trans-
formation consists of a phantom source node Ps ( s) and a set of phantom directional links 
fl(s) between P8 (s) and the source node S(rj) of each traffic demand T'j in the protection 
set s. This phantom node and its directional links are only created for routing purposes. 
They do not represent any real connections in the network. 
Phantom p 
Source P.Js, 
phar.tom links P,(s) 
Figure 4.7.: Phantom Source Graph Transform Appearance 
With the phantom source node and its directional links, the K Shortest Paths Algorithm can 
determine the new lsi disjoint paths Rn.w (s) required for the working routes in the protection 
set. From the set of working routes Rnw(s), each traffic demand T'j has a corresponding 
working route mw ( s). Generating the path set is done by treating the phantom source 
node P8 (s) as the source node for the K Shortest Paths Algorithm. As depicted in figure 
4.8, each of the lsi disjoint paths from the phantom source node connects through a traffic 
demand source S(rj) from the protection set to the destination node D(s). 
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Figure 4.8.: K Shortest Paths Algorithm with Phantom Source Appearance 
For the path search operation, the link costs are set according to equation 4.3. Of course, 
the phantom links generated in the graph transformation are not based on any physical 
links and therefore have unlimited available capacity Aij. 
(4.7) 
b <A-- t) 
If the shortest path set can not be generated because of network congestion or differences 
between the pseudo min-cut and the true min-cut, the algorithm will remove the connection 
request from the protection set and cycle into the next available protection set. 
If a shortest paths set can be generated between the phantom source node and destination 
node, the algorithm will proceed to the next stage. Since the K Shortest Paths Algorithm 
was routed from the phantom source node to the destination, it will include the phantom 
links. These phantom links have no function in the shortest paths set and must be removed 
before survivability can be added. Equation 4.8is employed to remove all possible phantom 
links P1(s) from the working route set Rnw(s). 
Rnw(s) = Rnw(s)- Rnw(s) n P1(s) (4.8) 
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Figure 4.9 also portrays this removal operation. The phantom links Pt(s) are only removed 
from the new shortest path set Rnw(s) and not from the graph abstraction of the network. 




Figure 4.9.: Phantom Connection Removal Operation 
In order for RMSCP to provide protection to a set of demands, it requires that there is one 
more path than there are demands in the protection set. Thus, the RMSCP algorithm must 
generate a redundant path between one of the source nodes S(rj) and the destination node 
D(s) of the protection set. Since it is not known which source node is the optimal source 
node to have the redundant connection from, the routing will be done from the phantom 
source node Ps ( s). In this case the shortest path algorithm will be able to find the shortest 
available redundant path out of all the paths from each the source nodes S(rj). Figure 4.10 
has been employed to explain how the first redundant path is generated. 
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Figure 4.10.: Redundant Connection Generator Flowchart 
From the phantom source node, the redundant connection can be routed using shortest path 
set principles, so that it creates another shortest path to the destination without suffering 
from the trap topology problem. This event is depicted with figure 4.11 as an additional 
route connecting from the phantom source through any one of the sources to the destination 
node. In fact, this additional connection turns the lsi shortest paths set into the lsi+ 1 
shortest paths set Rnw(s). After this procedure, a traffic demand rj with the redundant 
connection will have two routes between its source S(rj) and the common destination D(s) . 
. , '2 






Figure 4.11.: Redundant Connection Appearance 
The redundant connection added in the previous iteration is enough to provide protection 
to the one demand which shares a source node with it. However, there are still lsi - 1 
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demands in the protection set that require a redundant connection in the network. These 
demands will use branch connections to carry their redundant information into paths that 
carry linearly independent data. The flowchart in figure 4.12 depicts the set of operations 
required to create the redundant branch connections. 
,,. Gere-rlite v.r,,kir'i] <ol>te ,"?,,.,,.js,l fur C~ll traffic oerr<~rd~ in the ;:mPK~ior set--------+. 
; Tr;JnsfOfm gra;Jh wi:h phar~,)m source 
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·-i> !>otm;e P.(s) to the 
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Figure 4.12.: Redundant Branch Connection Generator Flowchart 
Normally the redundant branches can connect to any route as long as they are disjoint 
from the individual demand's primary route and no linearly dependent routes are generated. 
However, in RMSCP the two connections R~~(s) and ~~(s) in the previous stage is already 
carry linearly dependent information. This is unacceptable for solving missing demands in 
fault events at the destination and must be mitigated. For this reason, the first branch 
connection generated by the algorithm should go to one of the intermediate nodes along 
R~~ ( s) or R~~ ( s). Thus, the available destinations Db ( s) for the branch connections are 
determined with equation 4.9. 
(4.9) 
Figure 4.13 depicts this situation with a branch connection routed to any of the intermediate 
nodes in the redundant connection or its linearly dependent primary route. To perform this 
special routing operation a modified variant of Dijkstra's operation is required. This special 
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Dijkstra's algorithm is modified so that it ends if it incorporates any of the intermediate 
nodes along the two linearly dependent routes. This modification has been included in 
appendix E as algorithm E.3. In order to ensure that the shortest possible branch is taken 
by the algorithm, the phantom source Ps ( s) is utilized. 
Source<S 
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Figure 4.13.: First Redundant Branch Connection Appearance 
The previous iteration involving the redundant path connection was the last path search 
that relied on the shortest path set link assignments. Since, the branch connection does not 
benefit from the interlacing of paths used to create the shortest path set, it can be routed 
using the normal approach. To maintain disjointness between all connections, the branch 
connection can not use any links used by any of the working routes already defined. Thus 
the path cost for the branch connection must be defined by equation 4.10. 
00 {ij} E Rn.w(s) 
Cr(ij) = oo else if b > Aij (4.10) 
E elseijb:s;Aij 
The phantom source node Ps ( s) is used as the source node for the branch connection for 
two reasons. First off, so that the real source with the shortest branch connection will be 
generated in each iteration. Secondly, so that no real source node can be branched from 
76 
4. Proposed Coded Protection Algorithms 
more than once. The second criteria is maintained with the phantom links between each 
of the source nodes and the phantom source node. \Vhen the phantom source generates 
a branch connection through a real source node, the phantom link between them becomes 
part of the new working path set Rnw ( s). Therefore, in the proceeding iterations, the link 
cost Cr ( ij) for that phantom link will be infinite, forcing the branch connection through 
another real source node S(rj)· The branch connection itself with the path that it merged 
with becomes a new redundant route ~~(s) for a traffic demand Tj in the protection set 
s. 
In the first iteration of the branch connection generator, the branch had to be routed 
to one of the linearly dependent connections. In the remaining lsi - 2 iterations of the 
generator, the set of nodes which can be a destination for a branch perpetually increase. 
When a branch connection is routed though one of the real sources S(rj), the nodes along 
its primary route ~~(s) and branch connection R~~(s) become available as destinations 
for proceeding iterations. Thus, equation 4.9 is performed in every iteration of the branch 
connection generator. This situation is depicted in figure 4.14, where the oval of available 
destinations increases with every iteration. However, it is important to note that each 
branch connection is still bounded by the link costs defined by equation 4.10. That is, no 
redundant connection can be routed over the same bidirectional link as a another branch 
connection or the working paths. Since the branch connections are merged with the working 
route Rnw ( s) in every iteration this can be done easily by recalculating the link costs in 
equation 4.10. In the final iteration of the branch iterator, the phantom node will route 
through the last real source to a node along any of the connections in working routes Rw· 
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Figure 4.14.: Second Redundant Branch Connection Addition Appearance 
After the final branch connection has been routed, the routes required to create MSCP is 
essentially complete. The last remaining operation, is the final removal of the phantom 
source P5 (s) and its phantom links Pz(s) from the new route set Rnw(s) and the graph 
abstraction of the network. This is done by using the set of operations depicted in figure 
4.15. 
. Rerrcve the phan:om graph 'mrsforrnation---__,., 
~. Remo•,>e phar~lom lin~,,. Remove the p~~'lrtorn source PAsl and S 
! worn the new rcu:e R.."(S) 1 f il1e phantom link.s p,f,;) · 1 
( Slart }Jo.l ,C/,,..vf&,i=K,,,,(.5)-R,,.{s.f(if>.{s) ~·~ Let )=J-{P.(sJ,tj··•l Lei N=~-{P,{!ij) ,_ ·!J.~ 
Figure 4.15.: Phantom Transformation Removal Flowchart 
Removing the phantom network is basically a three step operation. First all the phantom 
links Pz(s) are removed from the working route set Rnw(s) using equation 4.11. 
Rnw(s) = Rnw(s)- Rnw(s) n Jl(s) (4.11) 
Afterward, all the phantom links Pz(s) can simply be removed from the set of links J in 
the network. Lastly, the phantom source Ps ( s) can be removed from the set of nodes N 
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that are in the network. This operation is also performed if the algorithm fails to generate 
a working or redundant route and must find a different protection set. 
The final operation required for RMSCP is the re-provisioning of the entire protection set 
s. Before and during the routing of a new connection request r to an existing protection 
set s, the protection set still had its traffic provisioned on an existing set of working routes 
Rw ( s). However, the algorithm generated a new set of working routes Rnw ( s). Since during 
the routing phase the capacity used by the existing set of routes Rw ( s) was not taken into 
consideration, the traffic demands T'j in the protection set can be switched over to the 
new route Rnw(s) without any effects of their service quality. The other option was to 
consider the resources used by Rw ( s) in the calculations for the new path set Rnw ( s). This 
would improve the performance of the algorithm under congested conditions, but would also 
generate a drop in service every time a connection request r was added to the protection 
set s. The set of operations is depicted in further detail in figure 4.16. 
Figure 4.16.: Protection Set Re-provision Flowchart 
In the figure, the new route Rnw(s) is provisioned before the old route Rw(s) is un-
provisioned. Thus, the traffic demands in the protection set will not experience any loss in 
serv1ce. 
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After the re-provisioning is complete, the R:VISCP algorithm is complete. The completed 
appearance of the MSCP created by RMSCP is displayed as figure 4.17. In it, the branch 
connections from each of the source nodes are routed to any of the nodes that were available 
to it in its iteration of the branch connection generator. 
Destination 
D(s) 
Figure 4.17.: Final Re-optimized Multiple Source Coded Protection Appearance 
Since each source is given a primary connection and a branch or redundant connection that 
are disjoint, it is impossible for a single failure event to disable a source. Likewise, since 
the available destinations for each branch connection are sequentially increased with each 
iteration there are no possibilities for linear dependent information streams. Algorithm A.3 
in appendix A has been employed to further explain the operation of RMSCP. To aid in 
its readability, the redundant path generator and the branch redundant path generator has 
been displayed after the main aspects of the algorithm. 
4.2.2. Fast Multiple Source Coded Protection 
Fast Multiple Source Coded Protection (FMSCP) is a heuristic algorithm designed to be a 
quick and effective technique for routing MSCP connections. Unlike RMSCP mentioned 
earlier, FMSCP does not use re-optimization. FMSCP relies on a modified version of Bhan-
dari's Algorithm to generate MSCP with shortest path set characteristics. Since FMSCP 
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utilizes these characteristics, it is not prone to the trap topology problem. Likewise, since 
the algorithm is a modification of Bhandari's algorithm it only requires two iterations of 
Dijkstra's algorithm to resolve a connection request. This is much faster than RMSCP, 
since the 2 x [s[ iterations of Dijkstra's algorithm required to complete a RMSCP connec-
tion request can be significantly greater than FMSCP. Figure 4.18 has been employed to 
explain the operation of FMSCP. 
Figure 4.18.: Fast Multiple Source Coded Protection Flowchart 
As with all algorithms that use shortest path set characteristics, the link costs C ( ij) are 
assigned only once at the beginning. The link costs will be generated based on the available 
capacity in the network. If a link { ij} does not have enough available capacity Aij to route 
the connection request, it will set the cost C(ij) equal to oo. Otherwise, C(ij) can be set 
to some small number E. Afterward, the path R1 (r) will be generated from the source to 
the destination node of the connection request. 
Following the creation of the first route R 1 (r), the potential destinations for the redundant 
path R 2 (r) can be determined. These potential destinations represent the intermediate 
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nodes along the routes in available protection sets. To determine which nodes can be used 
as potential destinations, the algorithm must find out which protection sets are available 
for sharing. The availability of a protection set A1(s) is determined by equation 4.12. 
0 D(r) I- D(s) 
A1(s)= 0 elseifRl(r)ERl(s) (4.12) 
1 otherwise 
There are two constraints on imposed on a protection set s. First, the destination of all the 
traffic demands D(s) in the protection set s, must be the same as the destination of the 
D(r) connection request r. This is a requirement for all MSCP based algorithms. Second, 
the first route R 1 ( r) of the connection request r, must be disjoint from all links Rl ( s) in 
the protection set s. This is necessary to maintain the disjoint requirements of survivability 
algorithms. 
As mentioned earlier, in MSCP sharing can only occur if multiple demands share the same 
destination node D(s). Thus, FMSCP requires that this constraint be imposed on any 
potential protection set s. Adding to that, in order to ensure that no two connections fail 
simultaneously, no link can be utilized twice in a protection set s. Therefore, a connection 
request can only join a pre-existing protection set if it is disjoint from it. If those constraints 
are met, a connection request can join a pre-existing protection set. In order to conceptu-
alize the available protection sets that can be used by a connection request, the possible 
destinations D2 (r) for the second route R2(r) are manipulated. The second route R2(r) 
is given the option of linearly combining it's contents with any existing path R1(s) of any 
available protection set s. This is done by routing R2 ( r) to any of the intermediate nodes 
Rn(s) along the routes R1(s) traversed by any available protection set s. This operation 
can be performed using the operations in figure 4.19. 
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Figure 4.19.: Fast Multiple Source Coded Protection Potential Destination Generator 
Routing to any of a set of nodes can be done using the Node Set Dijkstra algorithm in 
appendix E. The Node Set Dijkstra algorithm is a variant of Dijkstra's algorithm that will 
end if any of the potential destinations are incorporated. The first potential destination to 
be incorporated becomes the destination for the path search operation. 
To ensure that R1 ( r) does not generate a trap topology, shortest pair attributes from 
Bhandari's Algorithm are imposed on it before R2(r) is routed. Likewise, after R2(r) is 
routed, shortest pair modifications must be performed on it and R 1(r) to generate the 
shortest pair Rp(r). Since a protection set is depicted as a set of possible destination nodes 
D 2 (r) and multiple protection sets do not have to be node disjoint, it is possible that a 
connection request can choose from multiple protection sets after routing is completed. It 
is not important which of the available protection sets is chosen, so it can be determined 
by an arbitrary technique. Thus, in order to determine which protection sets can be used 
with R 2 ( r), the routed protection set availability equation A2 ( s) is required. The original 
protection set availability equation determined which protection sets could be routed to 
by R 2 (r). After R2 (r) has been routed, the routed protection set availability equation is 
required to determine which of the available protection sets were routed to. This routed 
protection set availability equation is depicted as equation 4.13. 
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The difference between the original protection set availability equation and the routed 
protection set availability lies in one additional case statement. A protection set is only 
available if the destination d of R2(r) is an intermediate node along the route R1(s) in the 
protection set s. If R2(r) could not share with any of the protection sets, it will route 
its destination d to the true destination D{r) for the connection request r. Under this 
circumstance, the shortest pair Rp ( r) will be used to create a new protection set s. This 
operation is depicted as a flowchart in figure 4.20. 
Figure 4.20.: Fast Multiple Source Coded Protection Protection Set Joining Operation 
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Figure 4.21.: Fast Multiple Source Coded Protection Operation 
Figure 4.21 has been employed to further illustrate the appearance of FMSCP. In the figure, 
an unconstrained route R1(r) is initially generated for a connection request r. If R1(r) is 
disjoint from every link that exists in Rt ( s) for a protection set s then the nodes along the 
route R1(s) will be added to the available destinations D2(r) for route R2(r). If R2(r) is 
routed to one of the destinations created by s then the shortest pair Rp(r) and connection 
request r will be added to the protection set s. If R2(r) connects to the destination node 
D ( r) for connection request r then Rp ( r) will be used to generate a new protection set 
s. Algorithm A.4 in appendix A has been created to further explain how the FMSCP 
algorithm works. 
4.2.3. Single Stream Multiple Source Coded Protection 
Single Stream Multiple Source Coded Protection (SSMSCP) is a heuristic algorithm de-
signed to perform MSCP protection using only one coded path. In RMSCP and FMSCP 
any path between the protection set and the destination could be encoded with multiple 
demands. Although efficient, this method puts strain on the computation capabilities of 
the destination by forcing it to always decode the lsi demands in the protection set s. To 
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reduce the number of calculations at the destination, it may be desirable to make MSCP 
appear like SCP at the destination node. That is, SCP normally sends its working informa-
tion through uncoded channels and uses a single redundant channel as the coded redundant 
route. Thus, under normal conditions SCP does not require any decoding. Likewise, during 
single link failure events, linearly combining all connections together using an exclusive OR 
operation recovers the missing information. However, in RMSCP and FMSCP a complex 
matrix decoding technique is required to perform the same function. Figure 4.22a has been 
employed to illustrate how SSMSCP appears under normal conditions. Under these normal 
conditions, the destination receives uncoded connections from each of the source nodes. In 
this instance, no decoding is required for any of the information. In figure 4.22b, the failure 
event for SSMSCP is depicted. If any of the uncoded connections fail due to a single link 
failure event, the coded connection can be used to decode the missing information. If the 
coded connection is affected by the single failure event, the uncoded connections will still 
be able to carry their information to the destination. 
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Figure 4.22.: Single Stream Multiple Source Coded Protection Appearance 
Since SSMSCP is meant to be a simplest heuristic algorithm for MSCP, it is based on the 
FMSCP routing technique instead of complex re-optimization. From FMSCP, SSMSCP 
inherits the shortest pair characteristics and Node Set Dijkstra algorithm. Thus, SSMSCP 
is immune to the trap topology problem and uses multiple available destinations for its 
second path calculation. The operation of SSMSCP is depicted as a flowchart in figure 
4.23. 
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Figure 4.23.: Single Stream Multiple Source Coded Protection Flow Chart 
In order to route a connection request r with SSMSCP a slightly modified version of the 
heuristic algorithm for FMSCP is required. In fact, the only major difference between the 
two routing algorithms is in the assignment of available destinations for the second route 
R 2 (r). In SSMSCP each protection set s distinguishes between the working routes Rw(s) 
and backup route Rb ( s). When the backup route for a new connection request is established 
only the nodes Rbn ( s) along the backup route Rb ( s) for a protection set s are available as 
destinations D 2(r) for the backup route R2(r). Thus, the SSMSCP potential destination 
generator is slightly different from the FMSCP version. This new version is depicted in 
figure 4.24. 
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Figure 4.24.: Single Stream Multiple Source Coded Protection Potential Destination Gen-
erator 
Functionally, the protection set availability equation A1 (s) for SSMSCP is the same as 
FMSCP, however since a protection sets now has working Rw(s) and backup Rb(s) links, 
the equation is different. This new protection set availability equation is presented as 
equation 4.14. 
0 D(r) :/= D(s) 
(4.14) 
1 otherwise 
The protection set joining operation for SSMSCP is also similar to that of FMSCP. The 
only difference is in the routed protection set availability equation A2 ( s). This new method 
is presented as equation 4.15. 
0 D(r) :/= D(s) 
0 else if R1(r) E (Rw(s) U Rb(s)) 
(4.15) 
0 else if d tf_ Rbn(s) 
1 otherwise 
The actual SSMSCP protection set joining operation is the same as FMSCP. For reference 
it is depicted here as figure 4.25. 
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Figure 4.25.: Single Stream Multiple Source Coded Protection Protection Set Joining Op-
eration 
Likewise, at the end of the routing algorithm, the working route Rw(r) and backup route 
Rb(r) of the shortest pair Rp(r) must be individually added to the working Rw(s) and 
backup Rb(s) routes of the protection sets. The SSMSCP algorithm is further summarized 
in algorithmic form as algorithm A.5 in appendix A. 
4.3. Network Coded Protection Heuristic Algorithms 
Network Coded Protection is significantly more complex than MSCP and SCP. Connection 
requests protected by a NCP scheme have a proactive coded section and a semi-reactive 
shared section. Therefore, unlike the algorithms for SCP and MSCP, NCP heuristic al-
gorithms must utilize one of the three secondary connections to decode the redundant 
information. This makes a NCP connection request a four part routing problem. How do 
we determine: 
1. The working route 
2. The backup route coded section 
3. The backup route shared section 
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4. The working route secondary connection 
In every MSCP and SCP routing technique, no backup route shared section or working 
route secondary connection were required because the destination was the decoding point 
for a protection set. However, in NCP since this constraint is relaxed, additional effort is 
required to route demands. Furthermore, in RMSCP and FMSCP, the working and backup 
routes can be mixed together to improve the efficiency. Since NCP uses a semi-reactive 
approach to survivability instead of pure protection, working and backup paths must be 
separated like in SSMSCP. Of particular concern for routing is the backup route. It consists 
of two sections different in operation and method of sharing. Of these, the coded section 
can be routed easily using algorithms with shortest paths set attributes. However, the 
shared section, depending on its method of conceptualizing sharing can not be routed using 
shortest paths set attributes. An example of this is the link cost sharing concept used by 
pool sharing algorithms. Without shortest path set attributes, the trap topology problem 
can cause NCP to be unattractive. Thus, there are essentially three methods for handling 
this problem. 
• Pre-determine the route of one of the sections. 
• Solve it as a special constrained simple two step problem. 
• Use graph transformations to represent individual sharing opportunities. 
The following three algorithms each use one of these techniques to generate NCP. 
4.3.1. Neighbor Decoded Protection 
Neighbor Decoded Protection (NDP) is NCP heuristic algorithm designed to guarantee at 
most one hop restoration times to demands. It performs this function by constraining the 
layout of the shared section so that it can be no more than one hop. Modifying the general 
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layout of NCP so that one hop restorations are guaranteed produces a new structure. This 
new structure can be specified with figure 4.26. 
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Figure 4.26.: Neighbor Decoded Protection Normal Operation Appearance 
In the figure, the coded section is unchanged from the general NCP layout described in 
section 3.3. Likewise, the primary path is still provisioned disjointly from the coded and 
shared section of the protection set. The major difference is in the shared section. The 
shared section can only consist of the zone of nodes that are at most one hop away from 
the critical node. To ensure that restoration times are not increased by the secondary 
connections, a special variant of the feedback loop is used exclusively for NDP. This variant 
of the feedback loop is constrained so that it traverses the same bidirectional link as the 
shared link. By limiting the options of the feedback loop in this respect, it can only be 
at most one hop and it can be predetermined without an additional step. The constraint 
only affects the algorithm under heavily loaded conditions where there isn't enough available 
bandwidth to provision the feedback loops. Thus, NDP eliminates the need for shortest path 
searches for both the shared section and the secondary connection. The failure operation 
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for NDP is the same as the general NCP technique described in section 3.3. However, for 
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Figure 4.27.: Neighbor Decoded Protection Failure Operation Appearance 
As with all NCP heuristic algorithms, the primary routes are disjoint from the coded and 
shared sections of a protection set. Thus, in a failure event either the primary route of a 
traffic demand or some part of the coded/shared section of the protection set fails. If a part 
of the coded/shared section fails, normal operation is maintained. Likewise, if a primary 
route fails, redundant information can be decoded at the critical node and forwarded to the 
destination through the one hop shared section. 
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Figure 4.28.: Neighbor Decoded Protection Flowchart 
Figure 4.28 illustrates the operation of NDP as a flowchart. By removing the path search 
operations for both the shared section and the secondary connection, the NDP heuristic 
algorithm can be simplified into a variant of the SSMSCP algorithm. Like SSMSCP, NDP 
uses the Node Set Dijkstra algorithm, shortest set characteristics, and the protection set 
availability equations to route the primary route and the coded section. Initially, the link 
costs for the algorithm are setup according to equation 4.16. This ensures that only the 
links that are capable of provisioning the connection request are used in the path search 
operations. 
C(ij) = { ~ (4.16) 
b <A - ~J 
Afterward, the first route R1(r) between the source and destination D(r) of the connection 
request r can be determined. In order to gain shortest path set characteristics, R1 ( r) is used 
to modify the link costs of the graph. With that completed, the protection set availability 
equation can be used to determine which protection sets can be used by the connection 
request. Since NDP generates at most one hop restorations for any traffic demand r, the 
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critical node C(s) of the protecting sets must be a neighbor of the destination node D(r). 
Thus, a connection request r can not join a protection set s if it is not a neighbor of the 
critical node C(s). This is conceptualized as equation 4.17, where r C(s) is the set of nodes 
that are neighbors of the critical node C(s). 
D(r) E f C(s) ( 4.17) 
Even, if the destination is a neighbor of the critical node, the protection set still might not 
be available for restoration purposes. Two critierion are required for disjoint reasons: 
• The working route of a traffic demand must be disjoint from its backup route. 
• The working route of a traffic demand must disjoint from any traffic demands it shares 
resources with. 
To ensure that these two criterion are met, equation 4.18 must not be true. 
R1(r) E (Rs(s) U Rc(s) U Rw(s) U {C(s)D(r)} U {D(r)C(s)}) (4.18) 
Of particular importance to routing the backup route for NDP is the bidirectional link 
which will contain shared section and feedback loop. This is because the bidirectional link 
between the critical node and the destination for the connection request might not have 
enough capacity to add the connection request. For this bidirectional link, the bandwidth 
b of a connection request is required in both directions. Specifically, one unit of bandwidth 
is required from the critical node C(s) to the destination D(r) for the restoration route and 
another unit is required for the feedback loop from the destination D(r) to the critical node 
C(s). Fortunately though, if there already is a traffic demand in the protection set that 
heads to the same destination as the connection request then the connection request can 
share the capacity reserved on the bidirectional link. This is conceptualized as having the 
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link from the critical node C(s) to destination D(r) {C(s)D(r)} in the shared section R 8 (s) 
and the link from the destination to critical node {D(r)C(s)} in the coded section Rc(s) of 
the protection set s. Otherwise, if no other traffic demand in the protection set heads to 
the same destination as the connection request, the connection request must provision the 
capacity on the bidirectional link. Therefore, there must be enough free capacity on both 
directions of the link to provision connection request. If neither of these two criterion are 
met, the connection request can not join the protection set. The protection set availability 
equation for NDP is presented as equation 4.19. 
0 D(r) '{. r C(s) 
0 else if R1 (r) E (Rs(s) U Rc(s) U Rw(s) U { C(s )D(r)} U { D(r)C(s)}) 
A1(s) = 1 elseif {C(s)D(r)} E R 8 (s) and{D(r)C(s)} E Rc(s) 
1 else if Ac(s)D(r) 2: band AD(r)C(s) 2: b 
0 otherwise 
(4.19) 
Once all the available protection sets have been determined, the potential destinations for 
the second route R2(r) can be created using the Node Set Dijkstra's algorithm. The second 
route R 2 (r) will be established between the source node and any of the potential desti-
nations created from the protection sets or the real destination of the connection request. 
Afterward, shortest path set modifications will be performed to make the two routes R1 ( r) 
and R2 (r) into the shortest pair Rp(r). Based on the destination of the second route R2(r) 
the routed protection set availability function can be used to determine which protection 
set the connection request should join. Unlike FMSCP and SSMSCP which could use a 
simple modification of the original protection set availability equation to determine which 
protection set to share with, NDP requires a three step procedure. This is because there are 
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three types of protection sets that the connection request can join based on the destination 
D ( r) of the connection request. The protection set can have already provisioned: 
1. the link { C(s)D(r)} between the critical node C(s) and the destination D(r), in its 
shared section Rs(s) and the link {D(r)C(s)} between the destination and the critical 
node in its coded section Rc(s) for a previous traffic demand. 
2. the link {D(r)C(s)} between the destination and the critical node in its coded section 
Rc(s) for a previous traffic demand. 
3. nothing. 
Obviously, in order to minimize capacity usage, the connection request should first attempt 
to join a protection set that already has the links for the coded and shared section already 
provisioned. This corresponds to the situation where a protection set has already added 
a traffic demand heading to the same destination as the new connection request. This 
is the ideal scenario, since no additional bandwidth provisioning is required to generate 
the shared section and feedback loop. If no protection set has these characteristics, the 
algorithm will use a protection set that has already provisioned the feedback connection 
from the destination to the critical node in the coded section. In this situation, the capacity 
of the connection request only has to be provisioned for the shared section. Otherwise, if no 
protection sets are available with a pre-existing coded link between the destination and the 
critical node, the connection request will have to provision the shared section and feedback 
loop. If the connection request still is unable to find a suitable protection set it will create 
a new protection set. Figure 4.29 depicts a block diagram of the NDP routed protection 
set availability function. 
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Figure 4.29.: Neighbor Decoded Protection Routed Protection Set Availability Function 
If a connection request can not share with a pre-existing protection set it must create a 
new one. When a new protection set is created, considerable care must be put into setting 
the critical node. Since NDP protection sets are partially reliant on the nodal degree of the 
critical node for the number possible of traffic demands, higher degrees should be favored. 
Thus when a new, protection set s is created, a high degree node must be selected to be 
the critical node C(s). From the shortest pair Rp(r), three nodes are candidates to become 
the critical node of a new NDP protection set. As depicted in figure 4.30, these are the 
destination node and the nodes from each of the paths immediately preceding it. 
Source 
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Figure 4.30.: Neighbor Decoded Protection Critical Node Assignment Strategy Appearance 
In order to ensure that critical nodes are given high degrees, the highest degree node is 
chosen. Figure 4.31 depicts the flowchart for the critical riode assignment strategy. In 
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the event of a tie between the nodal degree of two or three of the nodes the destination 
D(r) is favored to become the critical node C(s). Otherwise, the second last node D1(r) 
along the longer route becomes the critical node C(s). Longer routes are favored because 
the intermediate nodes along the routes can be used as the coded section for future traffic 
demands. If the longer route can not be chosen because of insufficient capacity, the second 
last node D 3 (r) along the shorter route can be utilized. Otherwise, the algorithm will revert 
back to the destination D ( r) as the choice for the critical node C (s). 
A;!'~)=R,{.s.IU{C(s}D(:c)! 
- R.,{s)=Rls}U{O(r)C{s)} . 
Figure 4.31.: Neighbor Decoded Protection Critical Node Assignment Strategy Flow Chart 
The NDP technique is depicted in algorithmic form as algorithm A.6 in appendix A. In 
order to ease the understanding of the algorithm it has been divided into three pieces: 
The main algorithm, the NDP Routed Protection Set Availability Function, Critical Node 
Assignment Strategy. 
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4.3.2. Trunk Coded Protection 
Trunk Coded Protection (TCP) is a NCP scheme that uses predefined coded trunks through 
a network. This allows network designers to decide in advance which ports on switches 
require linear combining functionality. When predefined trunks are used in a network, a 
few challenges arise. There are basically three problems for TCP: 
1. Determining the placement of the trunks inside a network. 
2. Generating the shared section. 
3. Creating efficient secondary connections. 
The placement of coded trunks in a network is an obvious problem for TCP. With a gen-
eralized approach, determining the most capacity efficient set of trunks is a difficult task 
worthy of further research. However, for the purposes of this thesis, a constrained method 
of establishing trunks has been utilized. This approach is based on the true goals of NCP. 
NCP has been designed to provide restoration times equivalent to Dedicated Path Protec-
tion (DPP), while using significantly less capacity. In a network, the adverse effects of poor 
restoration times is most apparent in long distance connections. In these long distance 
connections, restoration can take longer than the 200ms maximum, referred to in section 
D.3. Thus, TCP should have trunks that connect distant points in a network. The best 
way to conceptualize this distance problem is to subdivide a network into many zones z. 
Each zone z will represent a local group of nodes where restoration times are acceptable 
for SLAs. Thus a zone z can be considered a subset of the nodes in the network where 
traffic demands can use a normal Shared Backup Path Protection (SBPP) based techniques 
for survivability. On the other hand, traffic demands between nodes in separate zones can 
use protections sets s, built from inter-zone trunks Rt(z) to reduce their restoration times. 
Figure 4.32 depicts a simplified representation of a single inter-zone trunk for a four zone 
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network. The trunk in the network is designed to protect traffic demands heading to zone 
B by using a predefined coded section that extends into every other zone. 
Zone A Zone B r--------. ------. -. ------· -----------,----------· ·--. -----------. ----------. 
t () I ;I:J 
f ' / 
f \' ,.( f __ .,.... 
t / ; / 
Figure 4.32.: Inter-Zone Trunks 
By utilizing this technique, the problem of assigning trunk and the average restoration 
times are reduced. However, generating an efficient set of inter-zone trunks is also beyond 
the scope of this thesis. Therefore, arbitrary trunk assignments have been made for the 
analysis of TCP. 
The second problem for TCP is how to conceptualize the shared section Rs ( s). Since, TCP 
is designed to work in conjunction with a standard restoration scheme for intra-zone traffic, 
it is important that the two techniques be compatible. Thus, the shared section should 
consist of a modified SBPP technique. As mentioned in section B.2, SPS is an efficient 
and quick technique for providing SBPP. It uses the link costs along for the backup route 
to conceptualize available shared capacity in the network. SPS can be used to provide 
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survivability to inter-zone connections from the critical node C(s) to the destination D (r) 
and for intra-zone connections using the same spare capacity matrix. For that reason, SPS 
will be used to create the shared section Rs ( s) for TCP. From that, there are essentially 
four stages to routing a TCP connection request. 
1. Route a primary route R1(r) for the connection request r that intersects the trunk 
Rt(z). 
2. Route an inter-zone backup route R2(r) from the source S(r) of connection request r 
to the trunk Rt(z). 
3. Route the intra-zone backup route R3(r) from the critical node C(t) of the trunk to 
the destination D(r). 
These steps required to route a TCP connection request are conceptualized as the flowchart 
in figure 4.33. 
Run Protection Set 
As~ignrmwt Slriltegy 
Figure 4.33.: Trunk Coded Protection Flowchart 
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Before performing any routing operation, the algorithm must determine if a trunk is required 
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the source and destination are in the same zone and can be protected by the SPS technique. 
S(r) U D(r) C z ( 4.20) 
In that case, SPS can be used to provide protection to the traffic demand. Else, an inter-
zone trunk is required for the connection request. Clearly, the coded trunk Rt(z) used for 
protection should be for the zone z that contains the destination D(r) for the connection 
request r. With that, the critical node C(t) at the end of the trunk t can be used to provision 
the last mile of the backup connection over the shared capacity. Since the coded trunk Rt ( z) 
is known in advance, a routing algorithm can provision the primary route R1(r) so that it 
includes an intersection arc. This will remove the requirement for a feedback loop or branch 
connection to provide the secondary connection to the coded trunk. However, provisioning 
a primary route with an efficient intersection arc requires a special set of operations. This 
set of operations shall be known as the Intersection Routing Technique (IRT). The goal 
of IRT is to generate the shortest intersection of a route R1(r) between source S{r) and 
destination D(r) with an intermediate node I(r) E Rt(z). In order to ensure that the 
intersection takes the shortest possible route, I{r) should be chosen such that the relation 
in equation 4.21 is true. Where I 5 (r) and Id(r) are the costs from the source S(r) to the 
intersection I ( r) and from the intersection I ( r) to the destination D ( r) 
(4.21) 
To generate the conditions in equation 4.21, Dijkstra's algorithm must be used to determine 
the route Rs(r) from the source S(r) to all the potential intersection points Rt(z) and 
from the intersection points to the destination D{r). This operation is already completed 
by Dijkstra's algorithm. The algorithm only needs to be modified so that the endpoint 
conditions are different. Normally in Dijkstra's algorithm, the procedure ends when the 
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shortest path to the destination node is determined. In the node set variant of Dijkstra's 
algorithm, this is modified so that if a shortest route is created for any of the potential 
destinations, the procedure ends. For the IRT variant of Dijkstra's algorithm, the end 
point condition is set to when the shortest route has been generated for all the nodes that 
exist in the set of potential destinations. This modified variant of Dijkstra's algorithm is 
depicted as algorithm E.4 in appendix E. 
--•• Potential Routes - -)o-Ccded Trunk - • ._ Shortest Intersection R;(f) 
Figure 4.34.: Intersection Routing Technique Diagram 
The general outline of the IRT is depicted in figure 4.34. In the figure, two iterations of 
Dijkstra are used to create the intersection connection. 
1. Route R 5 (r) is generated from the source S(r) to all the potential intersections defined 
by the destination set D 1 (r). Where D 1 (r) consists of all the nodes along the coded 
trunk Rt(z) 
2. Route Rd(r) is generated from the destination D(r) to all the potential intersections 
defined by the destination set D 1 ( r). 
104 
4. Proposed Coded Protection Algorithms 
Since the links in the network are directional, routing from the destination to a set of sources 
is normally not allowed. However, if the link costs C(ij) are reversed so that C(ij) = C(ji) 
and C(ji) = C( ij) this method can be used by the routing algorithm. Afterward, a path 
can be created by combining the two routes such that equation 4.21 mentioned earlier is 
true. This operation is summarized in figure 4.35 . 
.A.il Md~s alcng 
:+the codt:•d trunk+. 
i Rr(z) 1 
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Figure 4.35.: Intersection Routing Technique Flowchart 
To ensure that the intersection path R 1(r) and the trunk Rt(z) remain link disjoint from 
each other, the link costs C1 ( ij) must be setup according to equation 4.22. By setting up 
the link costs such that the links along the trunk can not be used by the working route of 
the connection request, disjointness is maintained between them. 
C1(ij) ~ { ~ 
{ij} E Rt(z) 
else if b > Aij 
else if b ~ Aij 
( 4.22) 
After generating the intersection path, an intra-zone backup path R2 ( r) can be created 
from the source node S(r) to the coded trunk Rt(z). As with all backup routes, R2(r) must 
be disjoint from the working route R1 (r). Therefore, the cost of a link {ij} for R2(r) will 
be set according to equation 4.23. 
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Cz(ij) ~ { ~ 
{ij} E R1(r) 
else if b > Aij 
else if b :S Aij 
( 4.23) 
After generating a backup route R2(r) for r, the connection request must be added to a 
protection set s using the TCP protection set assignment strategy. This operation has been 
summarized as figure 4.36. 
~ ..... For any protectt<:;.n 
\__ "'"'"--.! ,.. Sift s 
Fer all H0 that 
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i 
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protection set s 
Figure 4.36.: Trunk Coded Protection Protection Set Assignment Strategy 
There are two requirements for joining a pre-existing protection set. 
1. The protection set must use the same coded trunk as the connection request. 
2. The working route R 1(r) of the connection request r must be disjoint from the pre-
existing working routes Rw ( s) in the protection set s. 
The availability of a protection set is determined by equation 4.24. For simplicity, the first 
protection set deemed available will be used be the connection request. 
C(s) # C(t) 
else if R1(r) E Rw(s) 
otherwise 
( 4.24) 
If no protection set is available, the algorithm will attempt to generate a new one for 
the connection request. In order to generate a new protection set, there must be enough 
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available capacity on the trunk to handle an additional protection set. This availability 
requirement is quantized as equation 4.25. From that, a new protection set can be generated 
if A(j) = 1 for all links {ij} E Rt(z). 
b<A· - ~J 
( 4.25) 
otherwise 
Following that, the connection request can be added to the new or existing protection set 
by adding the working R 1 (r) and inter-zone backup R 2 (r) routes of the connection request 
r to the working Rw(s) and backup Rc(s) routes of the protection set s. 
after the protection set assignment strategy for TCP, the algorithm will generate the intra-
zone backup route using a variant of SPS. In the variant, the amount of reserved capacity 
required on a link { ij} for the inter-zone backup route R3 (r) is determined by equation 4.26. 
Since all traffic demands in a protection set s use the same resources in the shared section 
R 8 (s), the union of their working routes Rw(s) must be used for all capacity requirement 
calculations. Therefore the amount of shared capacity required on link { ij} for a new 
connection request r is determined by equation 4.26. 
( 4.26) 
Adding to that, since each traffic demand in a protection set enters the network at a different 
time and the link costs are based on the union of all working routes in the protection set, 
the cost of a link for the intra-zone route is slightly different from the backup route for SPS. 
For TCP, a link along an intra-zone route for a new connection request can be reserved 
without additional capacity if the link is already being used for another intra-zone route 
R3(r) by a traffic demand in the protection set. Thus the link costs for the inter-zone 
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backup route can be determined using equation 4.27. 
00 {ij} E R1(r) 
E else if {ij} E Rs(s) 
C3(ij) = E elseifiij(r,s)::; Bij ( 4.27) 
Tij(r, s)- Bij elseifT·(r s)- B < k· 2] ' 2) - !) 
00 otherwise 
The operation of TCP is further summarized as algorithm A. 7 in appendix A. To ease in the 
understanding of the algorithm, it has been split into three sections: the main algorithm, 
the intersection route technique, the protection set assignment strategy. 
4.3.3. Stream Based Network Coded Protection 
Stream Based Network Coded Protection (SBNCP) is a novel heuristic algorithm based on 
the Stream Based Sharing (SBS) concept. With the SBS concept, SBNCP generates the 
coded section and the shared section of the coded route simultaneously. This avoids the 
inefficiency of the two step process usually required to create the shared and coded sections 
of the backup route. SBS can be considered a method of conceptualizing available shared 
capacity using graph transformations. The general outline for SBS is depicted in figure 
4.37. 
---JJIIJI. Real Urk - - -+- Phantom NetwCfk Link 
Figure 4.37.: Stream Based Sharing Concept 
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In the figure, the links Pl(s) in the phantom network Pn(s) represents the possibility of 
establishing a connection over shared capacity on links in J with the protection set s. Sep-
arating the phantom network from the real network are entrance Pe(s) and exit Px(s) links. 
These phantom links can have their costs manipulated to control their availability. That 
is, if a connection request meets the necessary constraints to use the shared capacity with 
the protection set s on link { ij}, the cost of the corresponding link in the phantom network 
will be made acceptable. 
For SBNCP, the general phantom network Pn ( s) appearance is depicted in figure 4.38. In 
the figure, for each protection sets s there is a phantom network Pn ( s) of all the coded Rc( s) 
and shared Rs ( s) nodes and links. The cost of using the links in this phantom network 
Pn ( s) of a protection set s is set to some small number E. 
Stream Bo~ect Sharing 
<:::~~=~:·~~::·-.~=·=~y=> . . . ' . ' . . 
·~~-Nod----~-..., ...... ~: 
CodF;d Ser;tion Sh~rnd Sectior~ 
D~tinatlon Nodf! Sourt:.a Nods 
- • ,..Sttearn Entraru.:e. Link - • Stream Lir:k. -~··• Stream Exit Linr; __.,.. RO?al Link 
Figure 4.38.: Stream Based Network Coded Protection Appearance 
The availability of using the protection set for survivability is determined by the cost of links 
in the phantom networks. To ensure that the working route R1 (r) of a connection request 
do not attempt to use any of the shared capacity, access through the phantom network is 
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denied. This is done by setting the cost of all the phantom links to oo. For the backup 
route R2 ( r) of the connection request, the phantom links must be setup so that the path can 
only enter the phantom network in coded section Rc( s) and exit in the shared section Rs ( s). 
SBNCP provisions a new connection request r similarly to NCP and SBNCP. The operation 
of SBNCP can be reduced into the following steps. 
1. Generate a primary route R1 (r) between the source S(r) and destination D(r) of the 
connection request r. 
2. Using the protection set availability equation A2 ( s), determine which protection sets 
s are available for the connection request. 
3. Modify the link costs C2(j) for the backup route R2(r) so that it can find a path 
through the phantom network Pn ( s), for all available protection sets .. 
4. Route the backup route R 2 (r) between the source S(r) and destination D(r) of the 
connection request r. 
5. Translate the backup route R2(r) through the phantom network into coded Rc(r) and 
shared Rs (r) links in the real network. 
6. Route the branch connection R3(r) between the source S(r) of the connection request 
r and the nodes in the coded section Rz ( s) of the protection set s. 
This operation is summarized as a flowchart in figure 4.39. 
Figure 4.39.: Stream Based Network Coded Protection Flowchart 
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Like all algorithms, SBNCP must first generate a working route R 1 (r) for the connection 
request r. Thus, it must be routed over dedicated capacity and not shared capacity repre-
sen ted by a phantom network Pn ( s). To conceptualize this, the cost of a link C1 ( ij) that 
exists in the phantom network Pn ( s) is oo. Otherwise the link cost will be controlled by 
the available capacity on the link. To summarize this the cost of a link {ij} for the first 
route is determined by equation 4.28. 
oo j E Pn 
C1 (ij) = oo else if b > Aj ( 4.28) 
E el.seifb:SAj 
Following the generation of the first route R 1 ( r), the algorithm determines which protection 
sets are available for sharing. In order for one to be available, the first route R 1 (r) must 
be disjoint from the shared Rs(s), coded Rc(s) , and working Rw(s) links of the protection 
set s. This is conceptualized as the protection set availability equation in equation 4.29. 
{ 





By using the protection set availability equation, the second route R2 (r) can be designed 
to take advantage of the shared capacity in the phantom networks. This is done by ma-
nipulating the cost of the links in the phantom network of available protection sets. Since 
these phantom links are essentially free, they are assigned the cost of some small number 
E. To numerically distinguish this from the cost of a standard link, they will be assigned 
a different number /3, where oo » f3 » E. From that, the link costs for the second route 
R2(r) can be determined by equation 4.30. 
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E {ij} E Pn(s) andA2(s) = 1 
(X) elseif {ij} E R1(r) 
C2(ij) ( 4.30) 
(X) else if b > Aj 
(3 else if b :::; Aij 
After generating the second route R2(r), it may contain phantom links that exist in P1(s). 
These links represent shared capacity on a protection set s. These links need to be converted 
into real links R[ij] that are part of the coded Rc ( s) and shared Rs ( s) sections of a protection 
set s. Figure 4.40 has been employed to explain the operation. The figure depicts the 
protection set assignment and conversion technique. 
Figure 4.40.: Stream Based Network Coded Protection Protection Set Assignment and Con-
version Technique 
This technique has two directions based on the second route R2(r). Either R2(r) contains 
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phantom links that exist in Pz(s) or it does not. If the former of the two options is true, 
then the shared resources of a protection set have been used by the connection request. In 
that case, there are two operations are required to convert it into links for a protection. 
1. Determine the protection set represented by the phantom links {ij}. 
2. Convert phantom links {ij} into their real link equivalents R[ij]. 
The first of these operations is required to determine which protection set s they belong too. 
This is easily done using a unique identifier of the link that determines which protection set 
it belongs to. Likewise, another identifier can be used to determine which real link R[ij] 
is represented by {ij}. With that information, R 2(r) can be modified so that all phantom 
links are replaced with real links. This is done by adding all links R[ij] represented by { ij} 
to R2(r) and removing all phantom intra-network Pz(s), entrance Pe(s), and exit Px(s) 
links from R2 ( s). 
The other direction taken by the technique is for the instance where R2(r) does not contain 
any phantom inter-network links { ij}. In this circumstance, no protection set was used for 
the connection request. Therefore, the connection must create a new protection set s. R 2 (r) 
will be used to generate the coded Rc(s) and shared Rs(s) sections of the new protection 
set s. Along this route, the critical node C(s) is assigned based on equation 4.31. that is, 
the critical node C(s) for the new protection set s will be set to the highest degree node 
along R2 (r). 
(4.31) 
Independent of which direction the protection set assignment and conversion technique 
takes for the connection request, it must subdivide the second route R 2 (r) into coded Rc(r) 
and shared Rs(r) routes. The coded route Rc(r) is created from all the links j between the 
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source S(r) and the critical node C(s). Likewise, the shared route Rs(r) is created from all 
the links j between the critical node C(s) and the destination D(r). 
After routing the backup route for the connection request a secondary connection must 
be generated. For SBNCP, the secondary connection is a branch connection. Figure 4.41 
depicts the set of operations required to generate the branch connection . 
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Figure 4.41.: Stream Based Network Coded Protection Branch Connection Generator 
First off, the branch connection link costs C3 (ij) must be setup such that it connects from 
the working route R1 (r) to one of the nodes in the coded section Rc( s) of the protection 
set s. This can be done by setting the cost of the links used by R 1 (r) to be a really small 
number E compared to a standard link cost of {3, where oo » f3 »E. This link cost for the 
branch connection is defined by 4.32. 
00 {ij} E Pn 
E elseif {ij} E R1(r) 
C3(ij) = ( 4.32) 
00 else if b > Aij 
f3 else if b :S Aij 
A depth search first routing algorithm like Dijkstra's algorithm will proceed up the shortest 
route defined by R 1 ( r) until a short branch can be formed that connects to the coded 
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section Rc( s) of the protection set s. The potential destinations for the node set Dijkstra's 
operation are presented as equation 4.33. 
D3(r) = Rc(s) U Rc(r)- S(r) ( 4.33) 
In order to prevent branches from occurring from the source node, it is removed from the 
potential destinations D3 (r). Afterward, the third route R3 (r) can be transformed into a 
branch connection using equation 4.34. 
( 4.34) 
Equation 4.34 removes all links that are used by both R1 (r) and R3(r) from R3 (r). This 
creates a route that has a source that is one of the nodes along R1 ( r) and a destination 
that will be in the coded section R( s) of the protection set s. 
The SBNCP heuristic algorithm is also depicted in algorithmic form as algorithm A.8 
in appendix A. To simplify the algorithm, the protection set assignment and connection 
technique and branch connection generator are presented after the main algorithm. 
115 
5. Results 
5.1. Simulated Algorithms 
In this chapter, the heuristic algorithms of chapter 4 will be compared with the benchmark 
algorithms of chapter B. The algorithms were simulated using an in house C++ simulation 
model. Each of the eight proposed algorithms in chapter 4 are based off one of the three 
different protection schemes proposed in chapter 3. All of these algorithms and schemes 
are depicted together with the benchmark algorithms in figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1.: Simulated Algorithms 
5.2. Performance Criteria 
There are five metrics used in this thesis to compare the proposed and benchmark algo-
rithms. These performance metrics are depicted in table 5.1. These five metrics together 




Table 5.1.: Simulation Performance Metrics 
Metric I Definition 
Availability Average percentage of a demand's life that is spent in an 
operational state 
Restoration Failure Probability that a demand will not be restorable when its 
Rate primary path fails 
Hop Requirement Average number of hops required to provision the working 
and backup routes of a traffic demand. 
Demand Blocking The probability that a traffic request can not be provisioned 
Probability in the network. 
Restoration Hops Average number of hops along the restoration route for a 
traffic demand 
The effectiveness of an algorithm can be determined with two metrics: 
• Availability 
• Restoration Failure Rate 
The availability can be interpreted as the percentage of a traffic demand's life that is spent 
in a operational state. It is calculated in the simulation as equation 5.1. This metric 
provides a good indicator on how well a technique insulates traffic demands from failure 
events. For comparison purposes, the availability of each traffic demand in the network is 
averaged to generate an availability for the network. 
A . b·z· Demand lifetime- Failure time vazla 2 zty = D d . eman tzme (5.1) 
As a complement to availability, the effectiveness of an algorithm is also determined by its 
restoration failure rate. The restoration failure rate is calculated as the probability that a 
traffic demand will be unrestorable when a fault event occurs. This provides another view-
point of how effective a technique provides survivability to a network. For the simulations, 
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the restoration failure rate is calculated as equation 5.2. Like availability, the restoration 
failure rate is averaged among all traffic demands in the network for the results displayed 
in the thesis. \Vith this metric we can compare the frequency of failures as opposed to just 
the percentage of time a traffic demand is available. 
R . F ·z R Unsuccessful restoration events estoratwn azure ate= ---R=----'----------estoration events (5.2) 
The efficiency of an algorithm measures how much resources are required to provide surviv-
ability to traffic demands. In these simulations, the hop requirement is used to determine 
the efficiency. The hop requirement is the number of links required to provide the working 
and backup path from the source to the destination node of a traffic demand. For shared 
capacity, the first traffic demand to require the capacity records it in its hop requirement. 
Subsequent, traffic demands using the shared capacity reserve it without cost. Like all the 
previously mentioned metrics, the hop requirement of each traffic demand in the network 
is averaged to generate the mean hop requirement for a traffic demand in the network. In 
the specific case for SCP based algorithms (NOSCP and FSCP), the hop requirement is 
modified into equation 5.3. This is done because the SCP based algorithms both fragment 
traffic demands into a smaller size. This allows a proper comparison of the SCP based 
algorithms. 
SCP HopRequirement = HopRequirement x FragementSize (5.3) 
The demand blocking probability is an important metric for determining how often a sur-
vivability technique can generate traffic demands. It measures the number of times, traffic 
demands were accepted and rejected during the life of a network. Algorithms that have more 
constraints on routing tend to have higher demand blocking probabilities. It is calculated 
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using equation 5.4. 
. . . Rejected demands 
DemandBlockzngProbab~l~ty =A dd d R . dd d (5.4) ccepte eman s + eJecte eman s 
This metric is important because some techniques require specific conditions in order to 
provide survivability. For example, the SCP based algorithms both require at least three 
disjoint connections between the source and destination nodes. This is not always possible 
and is reflected as a high blocking probability for SCP based algorithms. Furthermore, 
some algorithms may be greedy in the use of certain links in the network. For example, 
TCP uses pre-defined trunks. Once the capacity of these pre-defined trunks is reached, no 
more traffic demands can be provisioned. 
The last and arguably most important metric for showing the advantages of coded based 
protection is the number of restoration hops. With restoration based algorithms, when 
a fault event occurs on the working path of a traffic demand, a backup route must be 
provisioned. This time critical endeavor generally produces a time delay proportional to the 
number of hops that must be provisioned along the backup route. Because of this concept, 
the average number of restoration hops is recorded from each technique for comparison. 
5.3. Network Maps 
In these simulations, two network maps have been utilized. The first of these maps is the 
National Science Foundation Network (NSFNET). This network is depicted in figure 5.2. 
NSFNET contains 16 nodes interconnected by 25 bidirectional links. These links have an 
average fiber length of 733 Miles. From this, the network has an average nodal degree of 







Figure 5.2.: National Science Foundation Network Map 
Table 5.2.: National Science Foundation Network Statistics 
I Links I Nodes I Average Nodal Degree Highest Nodal Degree Average Fiber Length (Miles) 
25 16 3.13 4 733 
For TCP, the NSFNET had to be adjusted so that it contained zones and inter-zone trunks. 
These zones and trunks are depicted in figure 5.3. The network has been subdivided into 
three zones: Zone A, Zone B, and Zone C .. Each zone has a trunk that interconnects it 
with the other two zones. 
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- · - · - · - ·lo- Zon• A Trunk 
- · ·- · ·- · ·"" ZoneBTrunk 
------+ ZoncCTrun~ 
Figure 5.3.: National Science Foundation Network Zones and Trunks for Trunk Coded Pro-
tection 
In addition to the NSF NET, all algorithms have also been simulated on the Global Crossing 
Network (GCN) .The GCN is depicted in figure 5.4. This network is much larger than 
the NSFNET and will require many more hops to route a traffic demand from source to 
destination. In the GCN, there are 27 nodes and 38 bidirectional links. Like the NSFNET, 
the maximum nodal degree in the GCN is 4. However, the ratio of nodes to links is smaller 
in the GCN. In the GCN the average nodal degree is 2.81, much lower than the 3.13 average 
nodal degree in the NSFNET. Additionally, the average link length in the network is only 
440 Miles, much smaller than the 733 Miles required in the NSFNET. These statistics are 
depicted in table 5.3. 
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Figure 5.4.: Global Crossing Network Map 
Table 5.3.: Global Crossing Network Statistics 
Links Nodes Average Nodal Degree Highest Nodal Degree Average Fiber Length (Miles) 
38 27 2.81 4 440 
Like the NSFNET, to generate TCP, the GCN had to be modified so that it contained 
zones and inter-zone trunks. These zones and trunks are depicted in figure 5.5. Like the 
NSFNET, The GCN has also been subdivided into three zones: Zone A, Zone B, and Zone 
C. Each zone has a trunk that interconnects it with the other two zones. 
122 
5. Results 
- · ·-· ·-· · -)>ZoooATrunk 
-.-.-.- • -t>ZoooBTrunk 
------ _.ZoooCTrunk 
Figure 5.5.: Global Crossing Network Zones and Trunks for Trunk Coded Protection 
5.4. Network Model 
In order to properly produce a set of metrics to compare the algorithms in each network, a 
set of simulation statistics is required. These statistics are as follows: 
• Each link in the network consists of two directional links between the adjacent nodes. 
• All directional links have a capacity of 1 Gbps. This was done to maintain backwards 
compatibility with previous research in the field. 
• The failure rate of each link is based on 500 FITsjMile. This value is based on the 
crawford study in reference [26]. 
• A link failure affects both directional links contained within it. This is done as opposed 
to allowing directional links to fail independantly. It is our belief that fault events will 
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affect both directional links simultaneously. Thus this technique will more accurately 
represented failure events. 
• All link failures are independant of each other, creating the potential for multiple 
failures in the network. This allows the algorithms to be simulated under more realistic 
conditions 
• 10 hours are required to restore a failed link. This was done to maintain backwards 
compatibility with previous research in the field. 
• Traffic demands are generated between a random source node and random destination 
node in the network. 
• All traffic demands require a capacity of 100 Mbps. This was done to maintain 
backwards compatibility with previous research in the field. 
• The simulation and all traffic demands are held in the network for 1 year. 
• Each survivability algorithm is simulated 5 times for each network with 30-70 traffic 
demands, with a total of 400 iterations per algorithm. The 30-70 traffic demands 
correspond roughly to network loads of between 25%-80%. However, this number 
varies between algorithms, due to thier capacity requirements. 
5.5. Simulation Results 
5.5.1. Availability 
The average traffic demand availability provides a good metric of how effectively a scheme 
protects a demand from failure events. In single failure simulations, since all of the algo-
rithms use disjoint routes, the availability would be 100%. However, in these simulations, 
multiple failures are not prohibited. This allows us to compare how the schemes and al-
gorithms would perform when failures beyond their level of protection occur. The average 
availability for traffic demands in the NSFNET are presented in figure 5.6a. Likewise, the 
average availability for traffic demands in the GCN are presented in figure 5.6b. Since, 
the availability of traffic demands are generally independent of the number of demands in 
the network, their results are presented as a bar graph. The following section, will explain 
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the results for each of the different proposed algorithms compared with the benchmark 
algorithms. 
WDPP ~WSCP SSt.tSCP fS(p NDP SBilCP TCP RMSCP FMSCP WS 
(a) National Science Foundation Network 
NO~CP WllPP ~SMSCP fS(p rlllP ~SfiCP FI;ISCP HP RMSCP WS 
(b) Global Crossing Network 
Figure 5.6.: Average Availability 
5.5.1.1. Source Coded Protection 
The two algorithms NOSCP and FSCP produce the same form of SCP and therefore produce 
comparable results. Furthermore, since SCP based algorithms do not allow sharing between 
multiple traffic demands, the both FSCP and NOSCP produces results similar to SPDPP. 
Unfortunately, since the SCP based algorithms split their capacity requirement onto many 
routes, the number of links traversed by an average demand is increased over SPDPP. Since 
more links generally means a greater probability of failure, the SCP algorithms produce 
results that are slightly weaker than SPDPP. Since FSCP can produce less efficient results 
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when links become congested, it requires more hops and therefore has a lower availability 
5.5.1.2. Multiple Source Coded Protection 
Availability is generally lower for MSCP based algorithms ( RMSCP, FMSCP, SSNISCP) 
than in SCP based algorirthms. This is because sharing of resources between traffic demands 
is allowed. Thus, traffic demands in a protection set can utilize protection resources, pre-
venting other demands from being recovered in failure events. This culminates in a reduced 
availability when compared to the SCP algorithms and SPDPP. Generally, in networks that 
can have multiple failures, lower sharing translates into higher availability. Since the num-
ber of traffic demands in a protection set are limited by the nodal degree of the destination 
node, sharing is kept to a minimum in MSCP. 
The highest availability of all MSCP algorithms is seen with SSMSCP, which provides an 
average availability to traffic demands that approaches the SCP algorithms. This is because 
sharing is limited to only the designated backup route of the protection set. On the other 
hand, RMSCP and FMSCP both allow sharing with any of the routes in the protection set. 
This increases the sharing potential and reduces the availability. This method of sharing 
along any of the routes in the protection set is only used in RMSCP and FMSCP and not 
any of the other proposed or benchmark algorithms. Thus, the availability of RMSCP and 
FMSCP are reduced so that they are more comparable with SPS. 
5.5.1.3. Network Coded Protection 
The availability of the NCP based algorithms (NDP, TCP, SBNCP) derive their statistics 
from their foundation of SSMSCP, in that they only allow sharing along backup routes. 
This gives them a relatively high availability compared to SPS. However, since sharing 
is not as constrained for the NCP algorithms as it is for SSMSCP, the results do become 
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weaker. Both NDP and SBNCP have average demand availabilities that are almost as good 
as SSMSCP. The reduction is mainly caused by the loss of the destination nodal degree 
constraint imposed on MSCP algorithms. 
TCP produces the lowest availability of the NCP based algorithms because it contains a 
pool sharing based component. Unlike the other two NCP based algorithms, TCP permits 
sharing between traffic demands that are not in the same protection set. This improves the 
efficiency of the algorithm at the cost of availability. 
5.5.2. Restoration Failure Rate 
The average restoration failure rate is a measure of the probability that a demand can not 
be restored in a failure event. It is closely related to the availability of a traffic demand, 
as it influences how many times a demand will be unrestorable during failure events. The 
average restoration failure rate results are presented as a bar graph in figure 5. 7. 'Within 
the figure, the average restoration failure rate for the NSFNET and GCN are presented in 
figures 5.7a and 5.7b respectively. The following section explains the results exhibited by 
each of the algorithms presented in this thesis. 
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(b) Global Crossing Network 
Figure 5.7.: Restoration Failure Rate 
5.5.2.1. Source Coded Protection 
Both NOSCP and FSCP produce low restoration failure rates. This is because both of 
them are not sharing resources with other traffic demands. Therefore the only way a SCP 
based algorithm can fail to restore a traffic demand in a failure event, is if two of its disjoint 
routes have failed. This situation is highly unlikely, giving SCP algorithms a low restoration 
failure rate. This failure rate is still higher than SPDPP, which only has two routes that 
can fail, as opposed to the N possible routes for SCP based algorithms. 
5.5.2.2. Multiple Source Coded Protection 
The restoration failure rate for the MSCP based algorithms (RMSCP, FMSCP, SSMSCP) 
form the middle ground between the low failure rates of SPDPP and the higher failure 
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rates of SPS. Like the availability metric, the limited sharing potential of MSCP prevents 
competition in protection sets for redundant resources. This is most apparent in SSMSCP, 
which because of its increased constraints on sharing, produces the lowest failure rate of 
the MSCP algorithms. 
Similar to the availability results, the increased sharing potential of RMSCP and FMSCP 
increase their restoration failure rates over SSMSCP. From them, since RMSCP re-optimizes 
traffic demands so more sharing can occur, it produces the greatest level of sharing and 
therefore the highest restoration failure rate. This gives it a restoration failure rate closer 
to that of SPS. 
5.5.2.3. Network Coded Protection 
NDP, TCP, and SBNSCP are all based on SSMSCP, in that they have distinct backup 
and working routes. However, unlike SSMSCP all NCP algorithms include a shared section 
where bandwidth is reserved but not assigned. Of the three NCP based algorithms, NDP 
and SBNCP only allow sharing with traffic demands in a protection set. Thus, the possibil-
ity of failing to restore a connection in failure event is affected only by the other demands 
in the protection set. This allows NDP and SBNCP to produce restoration failure rates 
comparable to SSMSCP. Since NDP and SBNCP are less constrained than SSMSCP, they 
have a slightly higher restoration failure rate. 
However, unlike the other two algorithms, TCP uses an additional link based sharing con-
cept to route the intra-zone portion of its backup paths. This allows traffic demands that 
are not part of the protection set to preempt resources required to restore demands protec-
tion by TCP during multiple failure situations. Thus, TCP has a much higher restoration 
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failure rate than the other two algorithms. Since sharing is still constrained, the restoration 
failure rate for TCP is still not as high as SPS. It is in fact, comparable to the FMSCP and 
RMSCP, because all three have increased levels of sharing. 
5.5.3. Hop Requirement 
5.5.3.1. Source Coded Protection 
The hop requirement results for NOSCP and FSCP are presented in figures 5.8a and 5.8b 
respectively. For the NSFNET the average hop requirement for the two algorithms fit neatly 
between SPDPP at the high end and SPS in the low end. In general, five hops worth of 
bandwidth are required for a traffic demand protected by NOSCP or FSCP. However, in the 
GCN, both FSCP and NOSCP seem to have performed far superior to SPS. Unfortunately, 
this result is skewed by the structure of the GCN. As depicted earlier in figure 5.6b, the 
GCN can be subdivided into two networks connected in the middle by two links. Since 
both SCP based algorithms require at least three disjoint paths between the source and 
destination, any cross network connection requests must have been declined. This had 
the unfortunate effect of giving both SCP based algorithms low hop requirements. This 
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Figure 5.8.: Source Coded Protection Hop Requirement 








- • FSCP 
The hop requirements for the three MSCP algorithms (RMSCP, FMSCP, SSMSCP) vary 
widely between each other and in both of the networks. In the NSFNET depicted in figure 
5.9a, the algorithms perform well. Closest to SPDPP is the SSMSCP algorithm. Since this 
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technique only allows sharing along the backup route, the sharing potential is quite limited. 
As such the reduction in bandwidth is minimal betvveen it and the benchmark algorithm. 
On the other hand, the FMSCP algorithm reduced the bandwidth requirement by one full 
hop from SPDPP. In fact it is only one hop above the ideal SPS hop requirement. On the 
other hand, RMSCP did not perform as well as expected. This can be attributed to the 
fact that RMSCP does not unprovision traffic demands before re-optimizing them. This 
reduces the effectiveness of the algorithm but prevents blips in service when traffic demands 
switch to their new route. From this, as the network becomes more congested, RMSCP 
becomes increasingly less effective. 
The results for the algorithms in the GCN are depicted in figure 5.9b. The advantages of 
all the algorithms over SPDPP are reduced in this network. This is most likely because of 
the increased number of nodes in the network. Since all MSCP based algorithms require 
the same destination node to share capacity, the increased number of nodes in the GCN 
reduce their efficiency. So much so, that SSMSCP is performs very similar to SPDPP. 
Fortunately though, both FMSCP and RMSCP perform well enough to fit comfortably 
in between SPDPP and SPS. However, RMSCP still maintains its efficiency problem that 
prevents it from clearly surpassing FMSCP. 
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Figure 5.9.: Multiple Source Coded Protection Hop Requirement 
5.5.3.3. Network Coded Protection 
The NCP based algorithms (NDP, TCP, SBNCP), because of their unique formations gen-
erate the most interesting results. Since all three NCP based algorithms have many simi-
larities with SSMSCP, they inherit some of its aspects. However, each algorithm also has 
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special characteristics which affect the hop requirements. 
The results for the NCP based algorithms in the NSFNET are depicted in figure 5.10a. In 
these results, TCP is the most visible algorithm. It requires more hops than SPDPP when 
the network is lightly loaded. This is because TCP must provision an entire trunk for all 
inter-zone traffic demands that can not find an available protection set. Thus, under light 
loaded conditions SPDPP requires less hops. Fortunately though, this problem disappears 
as more traffic demands are added to the network. On the other hand, NDP and SBNCP 
both perform much better than SPDPP. Thus, the advantages of those two algorithms out-
weigh the constraints imposed on them, even under low network utilization. 
The results for the NCP based algorithms in the GCN are depicted in figure 5.10b. The 
one aspect of the results which garners the most interest is the hop requirements of each 
of the algorithms under low network utilization. All of the algorithms require more hops 
than SPDPP when the network is lightly loaded. This is because all of the NCP algorithms 
require secondary connections, which increases the hop requirements. Under light loaded 
conditions, this secondary connection outweighs the capacity reduction advantages of the 
algorithms. Fortunately though, this problem is quickly mitigated as more traffic demands 
are added to the network. Of the three algorithms, TCP appears to perform the best. 
However, this can be partially attributed to the SPS based intra-zone traffic demands in 
the network. In reality, TCP probably performs much like SBNCP in the GCN. 
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Figure 5.10.: Network Coded Protection Hop Requirement 
5.5.4. Demand Blocking Probability 
The demand blocking probability is the probability of declined traffic demands over accepted 
traffic demands. Because SPS does not experience network congestion at the same point 
as the proposed algorithms, it has been omitted from some of the results. 
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5.5.4.1. Source Coded Protection 
The demand blocking probability is where SCP based algorithms (FSCP, NOSCP) under 
perform. This is because they require at least three disjoint routes between the source and 
destination nodes. If either the source or destination node of a traffic demand do not have 
a nodal degree of three, then it must be declined. This generates blocking events even 
when the network is not congested. Thus, the demand blocking probability for SCP based 
algorithms in the NSF network depicted in figure 5.1la is much higher than either of the 
benchmark algorithms. A special case occurs in the GCN in figure 5.1lb. In the GCN, 
the network can be subdivided into two halves connected by two links. Two links does not 
provide enough disjoint routes for traffic demands with source and destination nodes in dif-
ference halves of the network. Thus, all these demands are blocked by the SCP algorithms. 
This provides the SCP algorithms with a significantly greater demand blocking probability. 
Therefore, only the NSF results for SCP will be compared with the benchmark algorithms. 
Demand blocking probability is also one instance where FSCP and NOSCP perform differ-
ently. As mentioned in chapter 4, NOSCP adjusts the link costs between path set search 
iterations while FSCP does not. Because of this, FSCP requires significantly less iterations 
than NOSCP. However, it also prevents FSCP from taking advantage of congested links 
where a fragmented traffic can fit but an unfragmented traffic demands can not fit. This 
increases the demand blocking probability of FSCP over NOSCP. This attribute is most 
apparent in results for the NSFNET. In the NSFNET, under the lighter load conditions 
FSCP has a higher blocking probability. As an unintended result of FSCP having a higher 
blocking probability in the light loaded area, it favors traffic demands that are easier to 
route. This slightly improves the blocking probability of FSCP under congested conditions. 
However, when the network becomes congested, both FSCP and NOSCP still produce un-
acceptable blocking probabilities. As mentioned earlier, pairing the SCP algorithms with 
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Figure 5.11.: Source Coded Protection Demand Blocking Probability 
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5.5.4.2. Multiple Source Coded Protection 
MSCP algorithms (RMSCP, FMSCP, SSMSCP) were all designed so that traffic demands 
with the same destination could share resources. Thus, they all have significantly smaller 
blocking probabilities than SPDPP. The simulation results for the NSFNET and GCN are 
depicted in figures 5.12a and 5.12b respectively. For these results both networks produced 
similar results excluding the different magnitudes. The best performer of the MSCP algo-
rithms is FMSCP. It produces results that get reasonably close to that of SPS. This can be 
attributed to the availability of all paths in the protection set for sharing opportunities. In 
the middle, between FMSCP and RMSCP is SSMSCP. Because SSMSCP could only use 
the designated backup route to share capacity, it had to block more traffic demands than 
FMSCP. Like always, RMSCP produced results that were unexpected at the time. Since 
RMSCP attempts to re-optimize all the traffic demands in the protection set without re-
leasing capacity, it has added difficultly sharing resources. This results in RMSCP favoring 
many small protection sets instead of a few large protection sets. The latter of these two 
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Figure 5.12.: Multiple Source Coded Protection Demand Blocking Probability 
5.5.4.3. Network Coded Protection 
The NCP based algorithms (NDP, TCP, SBNCP) all generate interesting blocking prob-
abilities. The blocking probability for the NCP algorithms in the NSFNET are depicted 
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in figure 5.13a. Likewise, the blocking probability of the NCP algorithms in the GCN are 
depicted in figure 5.13b. 
The most visible algorithm of these results is TCP. The TCP algorithm seems to be gen-
erating a linearly increasing blocking probability, where every other algorithm follows an 
exponential growth pattern. This is because TCP tends to fill up the network with trunks 
before finding efficient sharing opportunities. As a result, TCP is always more selective in 
which traffic demands are accepted into the network. By doing this, TCP favors intra-zone 
traffic demands, reducing the overall hop requirement and blocking probability in congested 
networks. This quality of TCP is visible in both the NSFNET and GCN. 
At the other end, NDP generates results that are comparable to the SSMSCP algorithm 
mentioned in the previous section. This is expected because NDP is very similar in design 
to SSMSCP. However, since NDP is very constrained in comparison to the other NCP based 
algorithms, it has a weaker performance. This is most apparent in the GCN, where TCP 
and SBNCP utilize their sharing advantages to generate desirable blocking probabilities. 
However, NDP can not provide the same advantages in this situation. Reducing the neigh-
bor constraint so that more than one hop is allowed for the shared section may reduce this 
problem. 
SBNCP produced results that were expected. Since SBNCP still only allows sharing along 
a designated backup route it can not produce blocking probabilities comparable to FM-
SCP. Nor can SBNCP compare with the unconstrained SPS for blocking probability. As 
such SBNCP seems to have generated fair results for NCP. However, it is envisioned that 
adjusting SBNCP so that few secondary connections are required may free up capacity for 






:a 0.) .. 
.0 
0 a. 0.~ ... 
" ::!< ... 
0 0.~ (iii ..., 
c .. 






~ 0.7 ... 





"' s o3 .. 
0 
01 




Number ofT raffle Demands 
--Sf'(IPP 
••••••• SBtlO' 
- • SPS 
--~-TCI' 
-· mw 
(a) National Science Foundation Network 
.. ~ 
:.;::.~~;.;~~:;.::;;;><:.;:;';:-_:·~·:~~ -- \PllPP 
~-;;-:..,-. ·········' ....... SBIJ(P 
-· ............ -· SPS ........... ·· 
----TCI1 ---- • • -- • •. - • tlOP 
.~ ............. ~.~~· 
. ----- .... _....~ .. 
so 55 1\0 65 70 
Number of Traffic Oem~nds 
(b) Global Crossing Network 
Figure 5.13.: Network Coded Protection Demand Blocking Probability 
5.5.5. Restoration Hops 
The restoration hops metric truly portrays the advantages of NCP based algorithms (NDP,TCP,SBNCP). 
With only a few restoration hops, a network can recover from failures within the time re-
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quired to provide high level SLAs. Of all the algorithms, the following do not have any 
restoration hops: 
• Shortest Pair Dedicated Path Protection (benchmark algorithm) 
• Near Optimal Source Coded Protection 
• Fast Source Coded Protection 
• Re-optimized Multiple Source Coded Protection 
• Fast Multiple Source Coded Protection 
• Single Stream Multiple Source Coded Protection 
This is because each of them has redundant information pro-actively provided to the desti-
nation. The following algorithms have reactive components and therefore require restoration 
hops: 
• Simple Pool Sharing (benchmark algorithm) 
• Neighbor Decoded Protection 
• Trunk Coded Protection 
• Stream Based Network Coded Protection 
These four algorithms have their average restoration hop requirements depicted in figures 
5.14a and 5.14b respectively. For this metric, SPS is the only benchmark algorithm. Since 
the number of restoration hops required by a traffic demand is uncorrelated with the num-
ber of demands, the results will be compared as a bar chart for each network. SPS, having 
a reactive backup path, obviously requires the greatest number of hops. This corresponds 
to a requirement of 4.5 hops in the NSFNET and 7 hops in the GCN. As designed, NDP 
generates at most a one hop restoration route. Since one hop restoration routes are gener-
ated for most of the traffic demands, the average restoration hop requirement for NDP is 
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approximately one. This quality of NDP is apparent in both the NSFNET and GCN. 
The final two algorithms produce results in between SPS and NDP. Both create this char-
acteristic between SPS and NDP using different techniques. TCP has pre-defined trunks 
that force traffic demands to provision coded routes up to the zone of the destination. From 
there the number of hops to the destination is limited. The zones for TCP were designed 
so that there would only be a few hops between each node. Unfortunately, these routes can 
be blocked because of disjointness requirements. This has pushed up the restoration hop 
requirement for TCP unintentionally high levels. On the other hand, SBNCP used demand 
generated formations created with the SBS concept. Since traffic demands are not forced 
into trunks, they can take more direct paths between source and destination. From that, 
since at least some portion of the route must be devoted to the coded section, the number 
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Figure 5.14.: Restoration Hops 
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6.1. Contributions 
The contributions of this thesis are in three novel protection schemes for logical networks. 
These schemes are: 
• Source Coded Protection (SCP) 
• Multiple Source Coded Protection (MSCP) 
• Network Coded Protection (NCP) 
SCP offered coded based protection for one traffic demand by fragmenting and encoding 
data over disjoint routes. From this, two algorithms were generated based on the trade off 
between speed and efficiency. These algorithms are: 
• Near Optimal Source Coded Protection (NOSCP) 
• Fast Source Coded Protection (FSCP) 
NOSCP provided an efficient set of routes using several iterations of a path search algo-
rithm. On the other hand, FSCP significantly reduced the number of path search operations 
with reduced efficiency in congested networks. 
MSCP removed the single traffic demand constraint and fragmentation requirements ap-
parent in SCP. With MSCP traffic demands are linearly combined in the network to reduce 
redundancy. From this scheme, three algorithms were presented based off on efficiency, 
speed, and complexity. These algorithms are: 
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• Fast Multiple Source Coded Protection (F]\ISCP) 
• Single Stream Multiple Source Coded Protection (SSMSCP) 
• Re-optimized Multiple Source Coded Protection (RMSCP) 
FMSCP provided a quick method for generating MSCP. However, it required that destina-
tion nodes perform computationally complex decoding. To mitigate this problem a variant 
was created called SSMSCP, which removed the complexity issue at the cost of efficiency. At 
the other end, RMSCP was designed to generate an efficient form of MSCP by re-optimizing 
previously established traffic demands with new traffic requests. 
The last scheme proposed was NCP. All previous schemes required that traffic demands 
share the same destination node. NCP removed this constraint. By removing this con-
straint, a shared restoration route was required from the decoding point to the destination 
node. Routing this shared route with the coded route was the major challenge for NCP. 
Three proposed solutions to this problem were created as three algorithms. The algorithms 
were: 
• Neighbor Decoded Protection (NDP) 
• Trunk Coded Protection (TCP) 
• Stream Based Network Coded Protection (SBNCP) 
NDP simplified the shared route to one hop so that neighbors of the decoding point can 
share protection resources. At the same time, TCP defined the coded section in advance 
using pre-defined trunks. This removed most of the coded section calculations, so that 
the working and shared routes could be optimized together. Meanwhile, SBNCP used the 
Stream Based Sharing (SBS) technique to conceptualize the coded and shared routes into 
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phantom links. This allowed the coded and shared routes to be generated together. 
All of these algorithms were compared with two benchmark algorithms to determine there 
effectiveness. The two benchmark algorithms were: 
• Shortest Pair Dedicated Path Protection (SPDPP) 
• Simple Pool Sharing (SPS) 
6.2. Summary of Results 
To summarize the results, each of the proposed schemes and algorithms have advantages 
for different applications. In networks where traffic demands can not be linearly combined, 
FSCP and NOSCP can be used to provide survivability. If provisioning speed is an issue 
then FSCP is the ideal choice. Otherwise, if efficiency is more important, NOSCP is a good 
choice. To mitigate the demand blocking ratio problem of SCP based algorithms, SPDPP 
can be substituted when three disjoint routes do not exist. 
However, if some nodes in the network can be made to linearly combine traffic demands 
then TCP may be an option. This technique also performs well in large networks where 
trunks can be used to reduce restoration times. The algorithm provides efficient results and 
provides network designers with the option of choosing which nodes should be capable of 
linearly combining information. 
On the other hand, if a network can linearly combine traffic demands at any point in the 
network, two approaches can be taken: 
• Low cost and simple decoding. 
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• Efficient and complex decoding. 
The low cost simple decoding technique is used in SSMSCP, ~DP, and SBNCP. The choice 
of among these three algorithms is based on the restoration time requirements. If a min-
imum restoration time is desired, then SSMSCP can be used. Otherwise, if a one hop 
restoration is acceptable, NDP can be chosen. On the other end, if restoration time is not 
a great issue, SBNCP can be selected. 
However, if complex decoding can be performed by the destination node, the FMSCP and 
RMSCP algorithms are desirable. Their good availabilities, low hop requirements, and 
proactive nature make them ideal survivability techniques for traffic demands. 
6.3. Future VVork 
Due to the emphasis on introducing different coded protection algorithms, this thesis did 
not have the opportunity to look into the depth on constraints that can be added. Among 
these potential constraints for future work are: 
• SRLG constraints 
• Wavelength continuity constraints 
• Partial coding capable networks 
In addition to these potential constraints, variants of the proposed algorithms were omitted. 
This is especially true for the algorithms based on NCP. The NCP scheme was proposed 
with possible variants. However, from these six possibilities only three algorithms were 
realized. More over, these three algorithms used drastically different techniques for con-
ceptualizing the coded and shared sections. Thus, many different algorithms for NCP not 
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presented in this thesis are possible. 
Above that, some algorithms could be modified slightly to produce superior results. For 
example, SBNCP could have the cost of phantom networks modified so that traffic demands 
favor protection sets that have a critical node equal to their destination node. This would 
reduce the requirement for costly secondary connections. Modifying SBNCP in this respect 
may let NCP inherit some of the attributes of FMSCP when the critical node and destina-
tion node are the same. 
Adding to that, RMSCP could be designed such that capacity is released before optimiza-
tion occurs. This would improve the performance of RMSCP significantly, but cause blips 
in service as traffic demands switch to their new routes. 
Of particular importance for future work would be on an optimized version of TCP. For this 
thesis, the zones and trunks of TCP were generated manually. This sub-optimal assignment 
reduced the acceptability of TCP. Optimizing the zones and trunks for TCP would signif-
icantly improve its performance. Furthermore, in this thesis each zone was provided with 
one trunk. If trunks were designed between zone pairs, they may become more practical 
and efficient. 
Lastly, the NDP algorithm was designed to generate at most one hop restorations. It is our 
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A. Proposed Survivability Techniques 
Algorithmic Form 
A.l. Near Optimal Source Coded Protection 
Algorithm A.l Near Optimal Source Coded Protection 
Definitions: 
• G(N, J): a network G with a set of nodes N, set of links J. 
. 
1n 
• dmax: the minimum nodal degree of both the source and destination nodes. Calculated 
as min(Jrsl, jrDJ). 
• d: the current number of disjoint routes being generated by the algorithm. 
• b: bandwidth requested by connection requests. 
• C(ij): cost of using link {ij} for the path of demand r. 
• Rn(r): the set of all new routes R~(r) generated for demand r. 
• Ra(r): the set of all old routes R~(r) generated for demand r in the previous iteration. 
• Cn ( r): the total cost of the new set of links for demand r. Calculated as 
L:dERn(r) I:{ij}ER~(r) C(ij) 
• Ca(r): the total cost of the previous set of links for demand r. Calculated as 
L:dERo(r) I:{ij}ERg(r) C(ij) 
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Algorithm: 
1. Let dmax = min(lfsl, lfDI), d = 2, Ca(r) = oo 
2. If d 2: dmax 
go to step 6 
3. d + + , If { ij} E J let G( ij) = { ~ d~l > Aij 
d~l :S Aij 
4. Run dth Shortest Paths Set Algorithm 
Rn(r): the d routes generated by the Shortest Paths Set Algorithm 
5. If [ ~~~)] :S [ ~o~;)] 
R 0 (r) = Rn,(r), Ca(r) = Cn(r), go to step 2 
6. If C0 (r) < oo 
Provision demand r with Ra(r) 
7. END 
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A.2. Fast Source Coded Protection 
Algorithm A.2 Fast Source Coded Protection 
Definitions: 
• G(N, J): a network G with a set of nodes N, set of links J. 
• dmax: the minimum nodal degree of both the source and destination nodes. Calculated 
as min(lfsl, lfDI). 
• d: the current number of disjoint routes being generated by the algorithm. 
• b: bandwidth requested by connection requests. 
• C(ij): cost of using link {ij} for the path of demand r. 
• Rn(r): the set of all new routes R~(r) generated for demand r. 
• R0 (r): the set of all old routes R~(r) generated for demand r in the previous iteration. 
• Cn ( r): the total cost of the new set of links for demand r. Calculated as 
I::dERn(r) I::{ij}ER~(r) C(ij) 
• C0 (r): the total cost of the prevwus set of links for demand r. Calculated as 
I::dER0 (r) ).{ij}ER~(r) C(ij) 
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Algorithm: 
1. Let dmax = min(lfsl, If vi), d = 3, Ca(r) = oo, if d > dmax 
go to step 11 
2. 'I { ij} E J let C( ij) = { ~ d~l > Aij 
d~l ::; AiJ 
3. Run dth Shortest Paths Set Algorithm 
Rn ( r): the d routes generated by the Shortest Paths Set Algorithm 
4. If Cn(r) 2 oo go to step 11 
5. If [ ~n~2 J ::; [ ~o~;) J go to step 10 
6. R0 (r) = Rn(r), C0 (r) = Cn(r), if dmax = d 
go to step 10 
7. d + +, \1 {ij} E Rn(r) 
C(ji) = -C(ij) 
C(ij) = oo 
8. Run the Modified Dijkstra's Algorithm 
R1(r): the route generated by the Modified Dijkstra's Algorithm 
9. \1 {ij} E R1(r) U Rn(r) 
Rn(r) = R1 (r) 6 Rn(r) 
go to step 5 
10. Provision demand r with Ra(r) 
11. END 
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A.3. Re-optimized Multiple Source Coded Protection 
Algorithm A.3 Re-optimizing Multiple Source Coded Protection 
Definitions: 
• G(N, J, P): a network G with a set of nodes N, set of links J, and set of protection 
sets P. 
• dmax: the minimum nodal degree of both the source and destination nodes. Calculated 
as dmax =ifni· 
• r: a traffic request. 
• rj: traffic demands that already exist in the protection set s. 
• b: bandwidth required by connections. 
• C(ij): cost of using link {ij} for the path of demand r. 
• s: a set of traffic demands protected together. 
• Rnw ( s): the new working connections for all the traffic demands in the protection set 
s. 
• R~~(s) :the new first route of the traffic demand rj in the protection sets. 
• ~~(s): the new second route of the traffic demand rj in the protection sets, gener-
ated using the redundant path R,.(s). 
• D(s): the common destination of all the traffic demands in the protection sets. 
• D ( r): the destination for the traffic request r. 
• S(rj): the source node of the traffic demand rj· 
• P8 (s): the phantom source node for the protection set s. 
• P1 ( s): a directional link that connects the phantom source P8 ( s) to a source node 
S(rj)· 
• Rrj(s): the redundant connection for the traffic demand rj in the protection sets. 
• Rw ( s): the old working connections for all the traffic demands in the protection set 
s. 
157 
A. Proposed Survivability Techniques in Algorithmic Form 
Algorithm: 
1. For any protection set s E P, 
If (Is I + 2 :S dmax) and ( D ( s) = D ( T)) 
Go to step 4 
2. Run Shortest Pair Algorithm from S(r) to D(r) 
Rnw(s): the two routes generated by the Shortest Paths Set Algorithm 
If (Rnw(s) = 0), go to step 9, else go to step 10 
3. Lets= sUr 
4. Generate working route Rnw ( s) for all traffic demands in the protection set 
Let P8 (s)= a new phantom source node, N = N U P8 (s) 
Y (rj E s), generate a phantom link j = {P8 (s), S(r)}, Pz(s) = j U Pz(s) 
J=JUPz(s) 
{
oo b >A 
Y{ij} E J let Cw(ij) = ~1 
E b <A - ZJ 
Run lslth Shortest Paths Set Algorithm from P8 (s) to D(s) 
Rnw(s): the (lsi+ 1) routes generated by the Shortest Paths Set Algorithm 
"1 mw(s): the working route generated for the traffic demand Tj 
If (Rnw(s) = 0), s = s- {r }, Run Remove Phantom Graph Transformation, go 
to step 2 
Rnw(s) = Rnw(s)- Rnw(s) n Pz(s) 
5. Run Redundant Path Generator: 
if Fail, s = s- {r }, Run Remove Phantom Graph Transformation, go to step 2 
6. For lsi - 1 iterations, 
Run Branch Redundant Path Generator 
If fail, s = s - { T}, Run Remove Phantom Graph Transformation, go to step 2 
7. Run Remove Phantom Graph Transformation 
8. Provision new routes 
Yj E Rnw(s) let A1 = Aj- B 
Yj E Rw(s) let Aj = A1 + B 
Rw(s) = Rnw(s) 
9. Done 
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Redundant Path Generator: 
1. V {ij} E Rnw(s) 
C(ji) = -C(ij) 
C(ij) = oo 
2. Run the Modified Dijkstra Algorithm from P8 (s) to D(s) 
Let Rrj ( s) = set directed links { ij} E J along the shortest route 
Let rj= the traffic demand which was provided the redundant path Rrj(s) 
If (Rr(s) = 0), go to step 2 
3. V {ij} E Rw(s) U Rr(s) 
Rnw(s) = Rnw(s) D. Rr(s) 
Branch Redundant Path Generator: 
{
00 {ij} E Rnw(s) 
2. V {ij} E J let Cr(ij) = oo b > Aij 
E b <A - ~J 
3. Run the Node Set Dijkstra Algorithm from P8 (s) to a node in Db(s) 
Let Rrj ( s) = set directed links { ij} E J along the shortest route 
Let rj= the traffic demand which was provided the redundant path Rr1(s) 
If (Rrj(s) = 0), Fail 
4. Let Rnw(s) = Rnw(s) U Rrj(s) 
Remove Phantom Graph Transformation: 
1. Rnw(s) = Rnw(s)- Rnw(s) n P1(s) 
2. J = J- {Pl(s)} 
3. N = N- {Ps(s)} 
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A.4. Fast Multiple Source Coded Protection 
Algorithm A.4 Fast Multiple Source Coded Protection 
Definitions: 
• G(N, J, P): a network G with a set of nodes N, set of links J, and set of protection 
sets P. 
• s: a set of connection requests that are protected together. 
• Rz ( s): The set of links used by a set of connection requests in the protection set s. 
• Rn ( s): The set of nodes and links used by a set of connection requests in the protection 
set s. 
• D(s): The common destination node for the set of connection requests s. 
• D(r): the destination node for connection request r. 
• D2 ( r): The available destinations for R2 ( r). 
• Aij: available bandwidth on link {ij}. 
• b: bandwidth requested by connection requests. 
• R1 (r): set of links along the first path of demand r. 
• R2 (r): set of links along the second path of demand r. 
• Rp ( r): set of links along the shortest pair of demand r. 
• C(ij): cost of using link {ij} for a path. 
160 
A. Proposed Survivability Techniques in Algorithmic Form 
Algorithm: 
{
oo b > Aij 
1. \;/ {ij} E J let C(ij) = E 
b :S: Aij 
2. Run the Modified Dijkstra Algorithm 
Let R1(r) =set directed links {ij} E J along the shortest route 
If ( R 1 ( r) = 0) , Fail 
3. \;/ {ij} E R1(r) 
C(ji) = -C(ij) 
C(ij) = oo 
4. \:fs if A1 (s) ~ n D(r) i= D(s) else if R1(r) E Rz(s) 
otherwise 
5. Run the Node Set Dijkstra Algorithm 
Let R2 (r) = set directed links { ij} E J the shortest route 
Let d = the last node incorporated along the shortest route 
If ( R2 ( r) = 0), Fail 
6. V {ij} E R1(r) U R2(r) 
Rp(r) = R1(r) !.'-. R2(r) 
7. If (d = D(r)), create a new protection sets such that s = s U {r}, go to step 9 
8. For an arbitrary protection set s, 
0 D(r) i= D(s) 
0 elseif R1(r) E Rz(s) 
0 elseifdtf-Rn(s) 
1 otherwise 
Else, go to step 8 
9. Let Rz(s) = Rz(s) U Rp(r) 
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A.5. Single Stream Multiple Source Coded Protection 
Algorithm A.5 Single Stream Multiple Source Coded Protection 
Definitions: 
• G(N, J, P): a network G with a set of nodes N, set of links J, and set of protection 
sets P. 
• s: a set of connection requests that are protected together. 
• Rw(s): The set of links used as working routes for the set of connection requests. 
• Rb( s): The set of links traversed by backup route of the set of connection requests in 
the protection set s. 
• Rbn ( s): The set nodes traversed by backup route of the set of connection requests in 
the protection set s. 
• D{s): The common destination node for the set of connection requests s. 
• D(r'): the destination node for connection request r. 
• D 2 (r): The available destinations for R 2 (r). Initially D2 (r) = {D(r)}. 
• Ai{ available bandwidth on link {ij}. 
• b: bandwidth requested by connection requests. 
• R 1 ( r): set of links along the first path of demand r. 
• R 2 ( r): set of links along the second path of demand r. 
• Rp(r): set of links along the shortest pair of demand r, where Rp(r) = Rw(r) URb(r). 
• Rw(r): set of links along the working route of the shortest pair for demand r. 
• Rb(r): set of links along the backup route of the shortest pair for demand r. 
• C(ij): cost of using link {ij} for a path. 
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Algorithm: 
{
oo b > Aij 
1. V {ij} E J Let C(ij) = E 
b:::; Aj 
2. Run the Modified Dijkstra Algorithm 
Let R1(r) =set directed links {ij} E J along the shortest route 
If ( R 1 ( r) = 0) , Fail 
3. V {ij} E R1(r) 
C(ji) = -C(ij) 
C(ij) = oo 
if A1(s) ~ n D(r) =f. D(s) 4. \Is E P else if R1(r) E (Rw(s) U Rb(s)) 
otherwise 
5. Run the Node Set Dijkstra Algorithm 
Let R 2 (r) =set directed links {ij} E J the shortest route 
Let d = the last node incorporated along the shortest route 
If (R2(r) = 0), Fail 
6. V {ij} E R1 (r) U R2(r) 
Rp(r) = R1(r) 6 R2(r) 
7. If (d = D(r)), create a new protection set s such that s = s U {r }, go to step 9 
8. For an arbitrary protection set s, 
0 D(r) =f. D(s) 
0 else if R1(r) E (Rw(s) U Rb(s)) 
If A2 ( s) = s = s U { r} 
0 elseifdtt.Rbn(s) 
1 otherwise 
Else, go to step 8 
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A.6. Neighbor Decoded Protection 
Algorithm A.6 Neighbor Decoded Protection 
Definitions: 
• G(N, J, P): a network G with a set of nodes N, set of links J, and set of protection 
sets P. 
• s: a set of connection requests that are protected together. 
• r v: the neighbour nodes of a node v. 
• Rw(s): The set of links used as working routes for the set of connection requests. 
• Rc(s): The set of links traversed by coded route of the set of connection requests. 
• Rcn ( s): The set of nodes traversed by coded route of the set of connection requests. 
• Rs ( s): The set of links traversed by shared route of the set of connection requests. 
• D ( r): the destination node for connection request r. 
• D2(r): The available destinations for R2(r). Initially D2(r) = {D(r)}. 
• Aij: available bandwidth on link {ij}. 
• b: bandwidth requested by a connection request. 
• R 1 (r): set of links along the first path of demand r. 
• R 2 (r): set of links along the second path of demand r. 
• Rp(r): set of links along the shortest pair of demand r. Rp(r) = Rw(r) U Rb(r). 
• Rw(r): set of links along the working route of the shortest pair for demand r. 
• Rb(r): set of links along the backup route of the shortest pair for demand r. 
• C(ij): cost of using link {ij} for a path. 
• D1 (r): the second last node along the longer path of a shortest pair Rp(r). 
• D8 (r): the second last node along the longer path of a shortest pair Rp(r). 
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Algorithm: 
{
oo b > Aij 
1. V {ij} E J let C(ij) = E 
b ~ Aij 
2. Run the Modified Dijkstra Algorithm 
Let R1 (r) = set directed links { ij} E J along the shortest route 
If (R1(r) = 0), Fail 
3. V {ij} E R1(r) 
C(ji) = -C(ij) 
C(ij) = oo 
0 D(r) t{. f C(s) 
0 else if R1(r) E (Rs(s) U Rc(s) U Rw(s) U {C(s)D(r)} U {D(r)C(s)}) 
4. Vs E P ifA1(s) = 1 elseif{C(s)D(r)} E R 3 (s)and{D(r)C(s)} E Rc(s) 
1 else if Ac(s)D(r) :?: band AD(r)C(s) :?: b 
0 otherwise 
5. Run the Node Set Dijkstra Algorithm 
Let R2 ( r) = set directed links { ij} E J the shortest route 
Let d = the last node incorporated along the shortest route 
If (R2(r) = 0), Fail 
6. V {ij} E R1(r) U R2(r) 
Rp(r) = R1 (r) 6 R2(r) 
7. Run NDP Routed Protection Set Availability Function 
8. s = s U {r }, Rw(s) = Rw(s) U Rw(r) 
END 
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NDP Routed Protection Set Availability Function: 
1. Ifd=D(r) 
Perform Critical Node Assignment Strategy 
END 
2. If any s E P, If A1(s) = 1 and C(s) = D(r) and dE Rc(s) 
Rc(s) = Rc(s) U Rb(r) 
END 
3. If any s E P, If A1(s) = 1 and {C(s)D(r)} E R 8 (s) and {D(r)C(s)} E Rc(s) and 
dE Rc(s) 
Rc(s) = Rc(s) U Rb(r) 
END 
4. If any s E P, If A1(s) = 1 and {D(r)C(s)} E Rc(s) and B ~ Ac(s)D(r) and dE Rc(s) 
Rs(s) = Rs(s) U {C(s)D(r)}, Rc(s) = Rc(s) URb(r) and Ac(s)D(r) = Ac(s)D(r)- B 
END 
5. If any s E P, If A1(s) = 1 and B ~ Ac(s)D(r) and B ~ An(r)C(s) and dE Rc(s) 
R 3 (s) = Rs(s) U {C(s)D(r)} and Ac(s)D(r) = Ac(s)D(r)- B 
Rc(s) = Rc(s) U Rb(r) U {D(r)C(s)} and An(r)C(s) = An(r)C(s)- B 
END 
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Critical Node Assignment Strategy: 
1. If lfD(r)l2: lfD1(r)l and lfD(r)l2: lfDs(r)l 
C ( s) = D ( r), Rc ( s) = Rc ( s) U Rb ( r) 
END 
2. If lrDI(r) I > lrD(r) I and AD(r)Dl(r) 2: B 
C(s) = Dz(r) 
AD(r)D1(r) = AD(r)D1(r)- B, 
R 5 (s) = Rs(s) U {D(r)Dz(r)}, Rc(s) = Rc(s) U Rb(r)- {D(r)Dz(r)} 
go to step 5 
3. If lrDs(r) I > lrD(r) I and AD(r)Ds(r) 2: B 
C(s) = D5 (r) 
AD(r)Ds(r) = AD(r)Ds(r) - B(r) 
R 5 (s) = Rs(s) U {D(r)Ds(r)}, Rc(s) = Rc(s) U Rb(r)- {D(r)Ds(r)} 
go to step 5 
4. C(s) = D(r), Rc(s) = Rc(s) u Rb(r), END 
5. R8 (s) = R 8 (s) U {C(s)D(r)} and Rc(s) = Rc(s) U {D(r)C(s)} 
END 
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A. 7. Trunk Coded Protection 
Algorithm A. 7 Trunk Coded Protection 
Definitions: 
• G(N, J, P, Z): a network G with a set of nodes N, set of links J, set of protection sets 
P, and set of zones Z. 
• s: a set of connection requests that are protected together. 
• z: a set of nodes that are protected together with an inter-zone trunk. 
• Rw ( s): The set of links used as working routes for the set of connection requests. 
• Rc( s): The set of links and nodes traversed by inter-zone route of the set of connection 
requests. 
• Rs ( s): The set of links and nodes traversed by intra-zone route of the set of connection 
requests. 
• Rt ( z): The set of links along the trunk for zone z. 
• Rtn ( z): The set of nodes along the trunk for zone z. 
• D(r): the destination node for connection request r. 
• D1(r): The available destinations for Rs(r) and Rd(r). 
• D2(r): The available destinations for R2(r). Initially D2(r) = {D(r)}. 
• Aij: available bandwidth on link {ij}. 
• b: bandwidth requested by demand r. 
• R1 (r): set of links along the working path of demand r. 
• R2(r): set of links along the inter-zone path of demand r. 
• R3 (r): set of links along the intra-zone path of demand r. 
• C1 (ij): cost of using link {ij} for the working path R1(r). 
• C2(ij): cost of using link {ij} for the inter-zone path R2(r). 
• C3(ij): cost of using link {ij} for the intra-zone path R3(r). 
• I ( r): an intersection point along the coded route Rt (z). 
• C[J5 (r)]: cost of a route from the source S(r) to an intersection point J(r). 
• C[Id(r)]: cost of a route from the destination D(r) to an intersection point I(r) 
• Bij: the total shared backup bandwicUWrequired on link {ij}. Calculated as Bij = 
maxv{kl}EJ [B{kl}{ij} ]. 
• Tij(r): the maximum amount of bandwidth required on link j if a link on the working 
path R1(r) fails. Calculated as 'Iij(r,s) = b+maxv{kl}ERw(s)[B{kl}{ij}]· 
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Algorithm: 
I \1 {ij} E J let C1(ij) ~ { ~ {ij} E Rt(z) else if b > Aij 
else if b :S Aj 
2. Run the Intersection Routing Technique 
Let R1 (r) = set directed links { ij} E J along the shortest route 
If ( R 1 ( r) = 0) , Fail 
3. \1 { ij} E Jlet C,(ij) = { ~ {ij} E R1(r) else if b > Aj 
else if b :S Aij 
5. Run the Node Set Dijkstra Algorithm 
Let R2 (r) =set directed links {ij} E J the shortest route 
Let d = the last node incorporated along the shortest route 
If (R2(r) = 0), Fail 
6. Run Protection Set Assignment Strategy 
00 
E 
7. V {ij} E J let C3(j) = E 
{ij} E R1(r) 
else if {ij} E Bz(s) 
elseifTij(r,s) :S Bij 
Tij(r, s)- Bij else if Tij(r, s)- Bij :S Aij 
oo otherwise 
8. Run the Modified Dijkstra Algorithm 
let R3 (r) = set directed links { ij} E J along the shortest route 
If ( R3 ( r) = 0), Fail 
9. V{ij} E Rw(s) and {kl} E R3(r) if j rf_ Rs(s) 
e{ij}{kz} = e{ij}{kz} + b 
END 
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Intersection Routing Technique: 
2. Run the Intersection Routing Technique Dijkstra's Algorithm from the source node 
S (r) to all of the potential intersections in D1 (r) 
Let Rs (r) = set directed links { ij} E J along the spanning tree 
If (R3(r) = 0), Fail 
3. V{ij} E J let C(ij) = C(ji) and C(ji) = C(ij) 
4. Run the Intersection Routing Technique Dijkstra's Algorithm from the source node 
D ( r) to all of the potential intersections in D1 ( r) 
Let Rd(r) = set directed links { ij} E N along the spanning tree 
If (R3(r) = 0), Fail 
5. V{ ij} E Rd(r) let { ij} = {ji} 
6. R1(r) = Rs(r) U Rd(r) such that C1(r) = min(C[Is(r)] + C[Id(r)]) 
Protection Set Assignment Strategy: 
{
0 C(s) # C(t) 
1. For any protection set s if A1 ( s) = 0
1 
else if R1 (r) E Rw ( s) 
otherwise 
Lets= s U {r}, Rw(s) = Rw(s) U R1(r), Rc(s) = Rc(s) + R1(r) 
2. Else, ifV{ij} E Rt(z), b::; Aij 
Create a new protection set s such that s = s U {r}, Rw(s) = Rw(s) U R1(r), 
Rc(s) = Rc(s) + R1(r) 
3. Else, Fail 
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A.B. Stream Based Network Coded Protection 
Algorithm A.8 Stream Based Network Coded Protection 
Definitions: 
• G(N, J, P, Pn): a network G with a set of nodes N, set of links J, set of protection 
sets P, and phantom networks Pn· 
• s: a set of connection requests that are protected together. 
• Pn(s) = [Pv(s), P1(s), Pe(s), Px(s)]: A phantom network for a protection set s that 
contains phantom nodes Pv ( s), phantom network entrance links Fe ( s), phantom net-
work exit links Px(s), and phantom inter-network links Pz(s). 
• Rw ( s): The set of links and nodes used as working routes for the set of connection 
requests in s. 
• Rc(s): The set of links and nodes traversed by coded section of the protection set s. 
• Rs ( s): The set of links and nodes traversed by shared section of the protection set s. 
• D ( r): the destination node for connection request r. 
• D2(r): The available destinations for R2(r). Initially D2(r) = {D(r)} 
• d2 :The destination chosen for R2(r). 
• Aij: available bandwidth on link {ij}. 
• b: bandwidth requested by connection requests. 
• R 1 (r): set of links along the working path of demand r. 
• R 2 (r): set of links along the backup path of demand r. 
• Rc ( r): set of links along the coded section of demand r. 
• Rs ( r): set of links along the shared section of demand r. 
• R3 (r): set of links along the secondary connection of demand r. 
• C1 ( ij): cost of using link { ij} for the first path R1 (r). 
• C2 (ij): cost of using link {ij} for the backup path R2(r). 
• C3(ij): cost of using link {ij} for the secondary connection R3(r). 
• R[ij]: the real version of a phantom link {ij}. 
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Algorithm: 
1 If { ij} E J U Pn let C1 ( ij) ~ { ~ {ij} E Pn else if b > Aij 
else if b :S Aij 
2. Run the Dijkstra's Algorithm 
Let R1 (r) = set directed links { ij} E J the shortest route 
If (R1 (r) = 0), Fail 
{
0 R1(r) E (Rs(s) U Rc(s) U Rw(s)) 
3. Vs E S let A2(s) = 
1 otherwise 
4. V{ij} E JUPn let C2(ij) = 
5. Run the Dijkstra's Algorithm 
f. {ij} E Pn(s) andA2(s) = 1 
oo elseif {ij} E R1(r) 
oo else if b > Aij 
f3 else if b :S Aij 
Let R2 ( r) = set directed links { ij} E J the shortest route 
Let d2 =the destination chosen be R2 ( r) 
If (R2(r) = 0), Fail 
6. Run Protection Set Assignment and Conversion Technique 
7. If [d2 f. C(s)], Run Branch Connection Generator 
8. Let Rc(s) = Rc(s) U Rc(r) Rs(s) = Rs(s) U Rs(r) Rw(s) = Rw(s) U R1(r) 
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Protection Set Assignment and Conversion Technique: 
1. Vs E S if R2(r) n Pn(s) = 0 
Go to step 3 
2. V {ij} E R2(r) 
If {ij} E Pi(s) 
R2(r) = R2(r) U R[ij] 
If {ij} E [Pe(s) U Px(s) U Pz(s)] 
R2(r) = R2(r)- {ij} 
Go to step 4 
3. Let s= a new protection set in S, where C(s) = maxvER2 (r) lvl 
4. Let Rc(r)= all links {ij} E R2(r) between S(r) and C(s), R 8 (r)= all links {ij} E 
R2 (r) between C(s) and D(r) 
Branch Connection Generator: 
oo {ij} E Pn 
1. V{ij} E JUPn let C3(ij) = E elseif {ij} E R1(r) 
oo else if b > Aij 
f3 else if b :::; Aij 
2. Vv E [Rc(s) U Rc(r) - S(r)]let D3(r) = D3(r) U v 
3. Run the Node Set Dijkstra Algorithm 
Let R3 (r) =set directed links {ij} E J the shortest route 
Let d = the last node incorporated along the shortest route 
If (R3(r) = 0), Fail 
4. Let R3(r) = R3(r)- R3(r) n R1(r) 
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For path survivability schemes, there is always a trade off between speed and efficiency. 
Quick and inefficient protection is always pitted against slow and efficient restoration. From 
these schemes many heuristic algorithms have been designed. In order to properly compare 
coded based survivability with the traditional protection and restoration schemes, at least 
two benchmark algorithms must be selected. It is important that these two algorithms 
represent the best their parent schemes can offer. From that, a protection heuristic algo-
rithm should be chosen which minimizes the capacity usage required for protection without 
unnecessarily sacrificing its simplicity and speed. Likewise, a heuristic algorithm should 
be selected which attempts to reduce restoration time without adversely affecting capacity 
usage. By selecting algorithms in this fashion, they can act as acceptability boundaries for 
their coded counterparts. For most of the different performance qualities captured from 
the results, these two algorithms should sit on opposing extremes. From that, it will be 
unacceptable for a coded heuristic algorithm to generate results that are not between these 
two bounds. This will allow a proper comparison of the qualities of each of the coded sur-
vivability schemes and their heuristic algorithms. The two benchmark algorithms selected 
for this purpose are Shortest Pair Dedicated Path Protection (SPDPP) and Simple Pool 
Sharing (SPS). The following two sections will briefly explain the operation of each of the 
heuristic algorithms. 
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8.1. Shortest Pair Dedicated Path Protection 
Shortest Pair Dedicated Path Protection (SPDPP) is a standard path based protection 
scheme that can be used in any network. It generates dedicated backup path protection, a 
completely proactive survivability scheme. As stated in table B.1, the failure route, channel 
assignments and cross-connects are assigned and configured before the fault occurs. This 
allows the backup connection to proactively send data to the destination in advance. If 
there is a fault occurrence along one of the links on the primary path, the destination node 
will immediately switch the connection to the backup route. Thus, it does not matter 
where the failure occurs as the redundant capacity is dedicated and proactively used for 
survivability. Since this algorithm generates dedicated backup paths, it can be used to 
create platinum SLA connections. SPDPP does not violate any other constraints required 
to use a one step solution. Therefore, it can be given shortest path set characteristics. 
Table B.l.: Shortest Pair Dedicated Path Protection 
Failure recovery route Channel assignment Cross-connect Failure 
on failure recovery on failure specific 
route 
Computed I Assigned Computed I Assigned recovery route 
before before before before before no 
Shortest path set characteristics is a term to describe an algorithm which can resolve short-
est path sets instead of taking a simple two step approach. Since, this technique is reused 
in several of the algorithms presented in this thesis, a brief explanation is being provided. 
By having this functionality, the algorithm reduces its capacity usage and becomes immune 
to the trap topology problem. Shortest path set characteristics can only be added to a 
heuristic algorithm if the backup route link costs do not depend on the working route and 
no link in the network has a lower cost for the backup route than it had for the working 
route. Reference [13] provides an excellent proof and a few examples of these constraints 
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required for shortest path set characteristics. 
If an algorithm does not require that the working path be determined before the backup path 
and doesn't change its link costs, it can to generate a shortest pair. Adding shortest path set 
characteristics to an algorithm takes at least two route modifications. These modifications 
are illustrated in figure B.l. In the figure, after the first route is generated the links along 
that route are transformed. They are transformed so that the cost of directional link C(ij) 
connecting node j to node i in the first route R1 (r) is set to infinite and the cost of its 
opposite direction pair C(ji) is set to -C(ij). With these modifications the second route 
R2 (r) can be routed partially over the negative cost links to reduce its path cost. Afterward, 
in order to generate the shortest pair Rp(r), any bidirectional links that exist in both R 1 (r) 
and R2 (r) are removed. If shortest triplets or quadruples are desired, then at the end of 
the algorithm, the shortest path R1(r) can be set to the shortest pair Rp(r) and modified 
again for a third route. Therefore, the number of paths in the shortest paths set is only 
limited by the min-cut between the source and destination. For a detailed explanation of 
this concept please refer to [13]. 
Figure B.l.: Shortest Path Set Modifications 
Using shortest path set modifications, SPDPP generates two paths for a connection request 
r. From an algorithmic point of view, SPDPP can be setup with two iterations of a path 
search algorithm. For a given network G = (N, J), where N is a set of nodes and J is a 
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set of links, a shortest first path R1(r) can be determined by running any shortest path 
algorithm. For path computation purposes, the cost of using a link C1 ( ij) will be set 
according to equation B .1. 
{
oo b(r) > Aij 
C1(ij) = 
E b(r) <A· - 2] 
(B.1) 
In the equation, the cost of using a link C1 ( ij) for R 1 ( r) of demand r will be set to oo if the 
bandwidth of demand r is greater than the available capacity Aij on link { ij}. Otherwise, 
the link cost is set to some small number E. The second path R2(r) can be determined 
afterward with link costs C2 ( ij) set by the shortest path set modifications. Thus the link 
costs C2 (ij) for the second route R2(r) can be determined with equation B.2 where link 
{ji} is the opposing directional link pair of link { ij} . 
oo {ij}ER1(r) 
C2(ij) = -C1 (ji) {ji} E R1(r) (B.2) 
c1 (ij) otherwise 
Afterward, in order to generate the shortest pair Rp(r), an exclusive disjunction of routes 
R 1(r) and R2 (r) is performed. This means that any bidirectional links that exist in both 
R 1 (r) and R 2 (r) are removed. To further explain this concept, a short example has been 
included. 
{A,B,C,D}.6{C,D,E,F} = {A,B,E,F} 
In the example, The exclusive disjunction is performed on two sets of letters. Any letters 
contained in both sets are removed from the result. Using this concept, bidirectional links 
contained within both paths are removed. For an extensive treatise on this topic, please 
refer to [13]. Algorithm B.1 has been employed to further explain the operation of SPDPP. 
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Algorithm B.l Shortest Pair Dedicated Path Protection 
Definitions: 
• G(N, J): a network G with a set of nodes N and set of links J. 
• C1 ( ij): cost of using link {ij} for the working path. 
• C2(ij): cost of using link {ij} for the backup path. 
• {ji}: the directional link opposite link { ij} in a bidirectional link. 
• Aij: available bandwidth on link {ij}. 
• b(r): bandwidth requested by demand r. 
• R1 (r): set of links along the first path of demand r. 
• R2 ( r): set of links along the second path of demand r. 
• Rp ( r): set of links along the shortest pair of demand r. 
Algorithm: 
1. \1 {ij} E J let C1(ij) ={ 00f. b(r) > Aij 
b(r):s;Aj 
2. Run shortest path algorithm 
R 1 ( r) = the set of links traversed by the shortest path 
3. v {ij} E J let C2(ij) = {~C1(ji) 
C1(ij) 
4. Run shortest path algorithm 
{ij}ER1(r) 
{ji} E R1(r) 
otherwise 
R2 ( r) = the set of links traversed by the shortest path 
5. Rp ( r) = R 1 ( r) U R2 ( r) 
V{ij} E R1(r) if ({ji} E R2(r)) 
Rp(r) = Rp(r)- {ij} 
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8.2. Simple Pool Sharing 
Simple Pool Sharing (SPS) is a SBPP with non pre-assigned channels scheme presented in 
[27]. It is a semi proactive scheme designed for logical layer netvvorks. To this end, it puts 
special emphasis on determining an efficient shared backup route. In order to allow more 
efficient routing assignments, channels are not determined until after the fault occurs. Thus 
the set of cross-connects required to route the connection can only be determined after fault 
isolation occurs. Since SPS was designed to operate at the logical layer, channel assignments 
were considered of limited importance. These characteristics of SPS are summarized in table 
B.2. Because failure recovery can be guaranteed in single link failure situations, SPS can 
be relied upon to provide gold SLAs. Additionally, due to the innovative strategy this 
algorithm employs, it produces close to optimal redundancy levels 
Table B.2.: Pool Sharing 
Failure recovery route Channel assignment on Cross-connect Failure 
failure recovery route on failure specific 
Computed I Assigned Computed I Assigned recovery route 
before before after after after yes 
To provision demand r in a network G(N, J) protected by SPS, a two step approach is 
required. The procedure for setting up the working path R1 (r) for the demand is equivalent 
to that of SPDPP. The cost of a link C1 (j) is determined by the ability of the link to support 
the additional bandwidth b(r) required demand r. Therefore the cost of a link C1(j) can 
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{
oo b(r) > Aj 
C1(j) = 
t: b(r) ::; Aj 
(B.3) 
Once the working path has been setup, a spare capacity matrix is used to determine the 
link cost of the backup route C2 (j). The spare capacity matrix is seen in equation B .4 with 
elements eij. In the matrix, each element eij is the spare capacity required on link j if link 
i fails. To allow sharing across all links in the network a ( J x J) square matrix is required, 
where J is the number of links in the network. Fortunately, a link only requires a column 
of the matrix in order to get enough information for sharing computations. This allows for 
SPS to be used as a distributed algorithm when creating network survivability. 
en e12 ()13 eu 
e21 en e23 e2J 
<I>= e31 e32 e33 e3J (B.4) 
e11 e]2 ()13 eNJ 
To determine amount of capacity that must be reserved on a link j, the maximum of all 
requirements for spare capacity from all the other links can be utilized. By using the 
spare capacity matrix, this can be determined by calculating the maximum of the column 
corresponding to link j. Mathematically, this required backup capacity Bj can be calculated 
as maxviEJ[eij]· When computing the backup route for a demand r, a method is required to 
determine how much additional bandwidth must be reserved on link j if the working path 
R1(r) of demand r fails. This can be determined by calculating the maximum of the spare 
capacity requirement of every link on the working path for link j added to the bandwidth 
182 
B. Benchmark Algorithms 
requirement b( r) of demand r. For simple pool sharing this is calculated as 
If the bandwidth required to protect the demand Tj(r) is less than the amount of bandwidth 
Bj that link j has already reserved for protection, then the backup path R2(r) can be 
routed on that link without using any additional capacity. Under these conditions the cost 
of routing over the link will be set to some small number E. If Tj (r) > Bj, then for demand r 
to utilize link j for it's backup connection Tj (r)- Bj additional bandwidth must be reserved. 
As long as the link has enough available capacity Aj to reserve the additional bandwidth, 
the link can be used. In this case the cost of using the link is set to the amount of additional 
capacity Tj (r) - Bj required to route demand r over link j. If there is not enough available 
capacity on link j then the link cost C2(j) for R2(r) must be set to co. From that, the cost 
of a link C2 (j) for the backup route R2(r) can be determined by equation B.5. 
co j E R1(r) 
C2(j) = E 
else if Tj(r)::; Bj 
(B.5) 
Tj(r)- Bj else if Tj (r) - Bj ::; Aj 
co otherwise 
If the connection request r can be given a working route R1 (r) and a backup route R2(r) 
then the demand will be accepted. After accepting the demand, the spare capacity matrix 
will update all matrix elements with the new redundancy requirements. these updates can 
be calculated as eij = eij + b(r) for all i E R 1 (r) and j E R2(r). For further reference, SPS 
is further explained as algorithm B.2. 
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Algorithm B.2 Simple Pool Sharing 
Definitions: 
• G(N, J): a network G with a set of nodes N and set of links J. 
• C1 (j): cost of using link j for the working path. 
• c2 (j): cost of using link j for the backup path. 
• Aj: available bandwidth on link j. 
• b(r): bandwidth requested by demand r. 
• R1 (r): set of links along the working path of demand r. 
• R2(r): set of links along the backup path of demand r. 
• qi; the backup bandwidth square matrix where Bij is the amount of backup bandwidth 
required on link j for link i. 
Bn 812 813 elJ 
821 822 823 e2J 
gl= 831 832 833 831 
e11 812 813 eJJ 
• Bj: the total shared backup bandwidth required on link j. Calculated as Bj = 
maxviEJ[Bij] 
• Tj(r): the maximum amount of bandwidth required on link j if a link on the working 
path R1(r) fails. Calculated as Tj(r) = br +maxviER1 (r)[8ij] 
Algorithm: 
1. '1:/j E J let C1(j) = {c: b(r) > Aj 
'- b(r) ::; Aj 
2. Run shortest path algorithm 
• R1 ( r) = the set oflinks traversed by the shortest path 
00 
3. '1:/j E J let C2(j) = t 
00 
4. Run shortest path algorithm 
j E R1(r) 
elseifTj(r)::; Bj 
else if Tj(r) - Bj ::; Aj 
otherwise 
• R2 ( r) = the set of links traversed by the shortest path 
5. For all links i E R1(r) and j E R2 (r) 184 
• eij = eij + b(r) 
C. Min-Cut Max-Flow Theorem 
The min-cut max-flow theorem is an important concept in both network survivability and 
network coding. For example, let a network be represented by a graph abstraction G = 
(N, J), where N is a set a nodes and J is a set of links. In this network, we have a source 
node S E N that is sending information to a destination node D E N. A cut is a set 
of edge removals that completely separates a node S from node D. The min-cut is the 
minimum size cut set that will completely separate the two nodes. For example, in figure 
C.l removing the edges covered by the min-cut will completely separate the source and 
destination. Every other cut set will be larger than the min-cut depicted in the figure. If 
the min-cut associated with the source destination pair is h, then it can be said that the 
max-flow is proportional to h, where the max-flow is the highest possible rate of information 
transfer. That is, given that the min-cut is h, we can find at most h disjoint paths between 
the two nodes. This concept is used extensively in this thesis to determine when sharing 
can occur. 
, 
• Min Cut 
Figure C.l.: Min-Cut 
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C.l. Pseudo Min-Cut Determinator 
The Pseudo min-cut determinator is a simplified method for approximating the min-cut 
between two nodes in a network. In this technique we determine the pseudo min-cut dmax 
with equation C.l. 
(C.1) 
From the equation the pseudo min-cut dmax is calculated as the minimum nodal degree of 
the source If s I and destination nodes If D I· This technique is computationally insignificant 
compared with determining a new N + 1 set of paths. Using this pseudo min-cut approach 
generates two possible scenarios. 
• The min-cut is equal to the pseudo min-cut. 
• The min-cut is less than the pseudo min-cut. 
The pseudo min-cut can not be less than the true min-cut because then it would be the 
min-cut. Thus, there can only be the two scenarios mentioned above. These two possible 
situations are depicted in figure C.2. Figure C.2a depicts the scenario where the min-cut is 
equal to the pseudo min-cut. In this instance, the technique produces the same results as a 
complex min-cut algorithm without the required solution time. In figure C.2b, the pseudo 
min-cut is greater then the actual min-cut. This situation is where both the source and 
destination nodes have more incident links then the available disjoint connections through 
the intermediate nodes. This scenario is as infrequent and barely affects normal operations. 
It is very unlikely that the available disjoint connections for a source-destination pair are 
determined by the structure of the intermediate nodes in the network. It is significantly 
more likely that the nodal degree of either the source or destination nodes will be the 
186 
C. Min-Cut Max-Flow Theorem 
bottleneck. As mentioned earlier, the effect of the pseudo min-cut being greater than the 
true min-cut is minimal. It only means that the algorithm will attempt to get another 
N + 1 set of paths. Thus the pseudo min-cut is used extensively in the SCP and MSCP 
heuristic algorithms. 
."'filfi---MMany Hops---+' 
(a) Min-cut is equal to pseudo min-cut 
(b) Pseudo min-cut is greater than min-cut 
Figure C.2.: Pseudo Min-Cut Scenarios 
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The telecommunication networks that are moving valuable information throughout the 
world are engineering marvels. They are so important to the continuance of society that 
they have been declared critical infrastructure by our government. The mere mention of 
unscheduled downtime causes waves of panic throughout those most dependent on the 
system. Thus, it is monumentally important that we prevent or mitigate the problem of 
transport network failures. Normally with an asset this important it would be a simple 
choice to enact a series of procedures to prevent these outages. However, it has proved to 
be futile to protect such a mega structure from harm. When a telecommunication network 
traverses over 100,000 miles it is impossible to fully protect against damage. Failures will 
occur irrespective of how deep the cables are buried, how many warning signs are placed 
in the area, or how sturdy the cable carrying conduits are made [1]. It is a statistical 
certainty that portions of our telecommunications networks will fail. This certainty has been 
quantized as 4.39 fiber cuts/1000 miles annually [2]. This corresponds to approximately 500 
FITS/mile or 500 failures in 109 hours of operation. Additionally, this failure probability 
has been further subdivided into metro and long haul networks. Where by the former 
experiences 13 fiber cuts/1000 miles and the latter has 3 fiber cuts/1000 miles. 
0.1. Causes and Durations 
This problem with the inevitability of failures in our telecommunication network became 
of increasing concern during the early 1990s as fiber networks came into prevalence. This 
led to the Crawford study [26] on the causes and durations of network failures. Figure 
D.1 presents the the probability of failure by cause from 160 failures recorded in the study. 
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The most prevalent cause of failures was due to contractor dig-ups, which accounted for a 
slight majority of the incidents. The second leading cause of failures were vehicle accidents 







Figure D .1.: Fiber Optic Failures By Cause (data from [26]) 
Additionally, the Crawford study included details regarding the repair time and restoration 
time required after each failure. Figure D.2 depicts the statistics for these repair times and 
restoration times. The mean repair time was 14.2 hours with a maximum of over 100 hours. 
Likewise, the restoration of service took an average of 5.2 hours to complete. An important 
aspect of this study was that all recorded events were single-failures. This realization has led 
to a focus in research on creating networks that are resilient against single-failure scenarios. 
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Figure D.2.: Histogram of Service Restoration and Repair Times (data from (26]) 
0.2. Failure Scenarios 
There are two general types of failures that a telecommunications network can experience. 
1. Single Link Failure 
2. Node Failure 
In the following sections; concise descriptions will be provided for each of the failure situ-
ations. These descriptions will provide details on what causes each failure how often they 
occur and what restoration/protection type is ideal for resolving them. 
0.2.1. Single Link Failures 
The link is the most identifiable point of failure for a network. Figure D.3 shows the 
effect of a link failure in a network. At the physical layer this is the most common failure 
type. Thus most network survivability techniques in the literature are concerned only with 
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this kind of failure [13, 28, 12, 15, 27, 29, 10, 11]. As mentioned earlier the probably of 
failure associated with single link is 500 FITs/mile. Due to the ability of network operators 
to simplify all other failure types into a set of link failures, the single link failure situation 
can be protected by most survivability techniques. An exception to this is the traditional 
approach to protecting against node failure scenarios, which will be alluded to in section 
D.2.2. All of the survivability algorithms presented in this thesis are based on the single 
link failure concept. 
Figure D.3.: Single Link Failure 
0.2.2. Node Failures 
Node failures are the least common but most devastating of all failure scenarios. In a 
node failure two devastating events occur simultaneously. To begin with, all local traffic 
that connects directly to that node is immediately disconnected from the larger network. 
If the node is a gateway for simpler one-connected access networks, the traffic will be 
unrecoverable until the fault is repaired. Adding to that, every link that is incident to 
the failed node will lose functionality. This relationship between node failures and the 
corresponding link failures is summarized in figures D.4a and D.4b respectively. In high 
degree nodes, one node failure can result in the appearance of several concurrent link 
failures. Since it is reasonable to assume that a significant portion of the network will 
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be affected by such a failure, it is generally understood that it is more economical to use 
redundant hardware to protect against node failures, instead of rerouting [3]. 
(a) Node Failure 
0.3. Impacts 
(b) Node Failure Effect on Network Operation 
Figure D.4.: Node Failures 
Network failures have a variety of impacts on customers and carriers. The loss of revenue 
associated with the failure of a major trunk group has been quoted as $100000/minute or 
more [2]. There is also a loss of reputation experienced by carriers when these disruptions 
occur [1]. In extreme cases this may lead to violations of service level agreements (SLAs), 
resulting in further decreases in revenue and reputation. Due to this high cost and loss 
of reputation, it has become increasingly important that service outages are minimized. 
Clearly, it is of the greatest importance that carriers attempt to reroute customer traffic over 
redundant connections while repairs are performed. If traffic can be restored over redundant 
circuitry in the order of a few seconds, the problems associated with failures become purely 
technical with minimal customer impact. The technical effects of outage durations were 
originally summarized by [30] and updated in [2] to include more recent communication 
protocols. Table D.1 presents these effects as target ranges for telecommunication carriers. 
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Table D.l.: Traffic Restoration Target Ranges(Data from [30]) 
Target Range I Duration I Characteristics 
Protection <50ms System re-frames 
Switching 
1 50ms-200ms <5% voice band disconnects, SS7 switch 
overs, SMDS and ATM cell rerouting may 
begin 
2 200ms-2s DSl CGA activates, TCP /IP protocol back 
off 
3 2s-10s All switched circuit services disconnect, 
private line disconnects, X.25 disconnects, 
TCP session timeouts start, hello protocol 
affected 
4 10s-5min All calls and data services are terminated, 
TCP /IP application layer programs timeout, 
routers flood network with LSA 
Undesirable 5min-30min Minor societal/business effects, noticeable 
Internet brownout 
Unacceptable >30min Major societal impacts 
The most desirable objective is the protection switching target range. In this target range 
restoration occurs in less than 50ms. Restoration times in this range are usually associated 
with 1+ 1 automated protection switching (APS) but with improvements in techniques and 
technology it might become obtainable by other techniques. In this range, the transmission 
system will only register a "hit". Client layers will perceive this as a damaged frame and will 
attempt retransmission. Due to high cost and excessive performance associated with this 
range, there has been discussion as to whether this should be a target [2]. However, it is still 
considered the telecommunication standard for voice grade quality. After the protection 
switching range is the 1st target range. During this time period, Switched Multimegabit 
Date Service (SMDS) and Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) cell rerouting may begin, 
however this is only a concern as the duration approaches 200ms. Fortunately, TCP /IP 
only performs retransmissions, which will not permanently degrade it's quality of service. 
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In the second target range, some carrier group alarms (CGA) for old Digital Signal I (DSl) 
circuits trip and the TCP /IP protocol starts performing exponential back-off and window 
resizing operations. But otherwise all connections at the client layers remain intact. Due to 
minimal amount of adverse effects associated with the 2nd target range, it has been touted 
as the defacto standard for IP traffic restoration [2]. Following the 2nd target range, the 
severity of the technical issues associated with the outage becomes unacceptable. At the 
third target range and beyond, multiple client layers may attempt to perform their own 
connection restoration techniques, leading to suboptimal results. 
0 .4. Service Level Agreements 
To provide customer assurances that connections will be available when required and 
disruptions will be minimal, service level agreements have been created [3]. The levels of 
service offered are summarized in table D .2. While these standards have not been officially 
defined yet, they still provide a good idea of the different guarantees that can be offered. 
Table D.2.: Classes of Service 
I Service Level Description 
Platinum Highest level of service and fastest restoration time. 
Restoration time is typically 50ms 
Gold High availability and fast restoration times. Restoration 
time is a few hundred milliseconds 
Silver Best effort services. Typically involves re-provisioning of 
connections 
Bronze No protection is provided with this service 
Lead Lowest availability and lowest priority. Consists of 
preemptable connections 
From table D.2, the best service level offered is platinum. The platinum service level is 
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associated with restoration times in the protection switching target range and very high 
availability guarantees. The second level of service is gold. This service level is usually 
associated with protection and restoration schemes that have a shared backup route. Its 
restoration time is usually associated with the second target range. The silver service 
level is associated with best effort services like IP rerouting and lower layer connection 
re-provisioning. At this level, attempts will be made to restore traffic when a failure occurs 
but capacity will not be proactively reserved for the connection. The bronze service level 
is used for unprotected traffic. No attempts will be made to restore the traffic until the 
failed hardware has been repaired. The lowest service level is lead. At this level, the traffic 
consists of connections temporarily routed over the reserved capacity for higher service level 
connections. If the higher service level connection that reserved the capacity requires it, 
the lead level connection will be preempted. 
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E. Fundamental Algorithms 
Algorithm E.l Dijkstra 
Definitions: 
• G(N, J): a network G with a set of nodes N and set of links J. 
• D E N: the destination node. 
• d{ A}: denote the distance of vertex A E N from source vertex S E N. where d(S) = 0. 
• P(A): denote the predecessor of vertex A along the path. 
• r A :set of neighbor vertices of vertex A. 
• l( ij): the cost of link from vertex i to vertex j. 





• d(S) = 0, 
• d(A) ~ {~SA) A E rs 
otherwise 
• V = N- {S} 
• P(A) = S VA E V 
• Find j E V such that d(j) =min [d( i)], i E V . 
• v = v- {j} 
• if (j = D), END; otherwise go to step 3 
• ViE rj n V, if d(j) + l(ij) < d(i), set 
d(i) = d(j) + l(ij), P(i) = j 
• Go to Step 2 
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Algorithm E.2 Modified Dijkstra 
Definitions: 
• G(N, J): a network G with a set of nodes N and set of links J. 
• D E N: the destination node. 
• d(A): denote the distance of vertex A EN from source vertex SEN. where d(S) = 0. 
• P(A): denote the predecessor of vertex A along the path. 
• r kset of neighbor vertices of vertex A. 
• l ( ij): the cost of link from vertex i to vertex j. 





• d(S) = 0, 
• d(A) ~ {~SA) AEfs 
otherwise 
• V = N- {S} 
• P(A)=S VAEV 
• Find j E V such that d(j) =min [d(i)], i E V . 
• v = v- {j} 
• if (j = D), END; otherwise go to step 3 
• ViE rj n v, if d(j) + l(ij) < d(i), set 
d(i) = d(j) + l(ij), P(i) = j 
V=VU{i} 
• Go to Step 2 
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Algorithm E.3 Node Set Dijkstra 
Definitions: 
• G(N, J): a netvvork G with a set of nodes N and set of links J. 
• D c N: a set of potential destination nodes. 
• d( A): denote the distance of vertex A E N from source vertex S E N. where d(S) = 0. 
• P(A): denote the predecessor of vertex A along the path. 
• r A :set of neighbor vertices of vertex A. 
• l ( ij): the cost of link from vertex i to vertex j. 





• d(S) = 0, 
• d(A) ~ {~SA) A E rs 
otherwise 
• V = N- {S} 
• P(A) = S 'v'A E V 
• Find j E V such that d(j) =min [d(i)], i E V . 
• v = v- {j} 
• if (jED), END; otherwise go to step 3 
• ViE rj n v, if d(j) + l(ij) < d(i), set 
d(i) = d(j) + l(ij), P(i) = j 
v = v u {i} 
• Go to Step 2 
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Algorithm E.4 Intersection Routing Technique Dijkstra's Algorithm 
Definitions: 
• G(N, J): a network G with a set of nodes N and set of links J. 
• D c N: a set of potential destination nodes. 
• d{ A): denote the distance of vertex A E N from source vertex S E N. where d(S) = 0. 
• P{A): denote the predecessor of vertex A along the path. 
• r A :set of neighbor vertices of vertex A. 
• l ( ij): the cost of link from vertex i to vertex j. 





• d(S) = 0, 
• d(A) ~ {~SA) A E rs 
otherwise 
• V = N- {S} 
• P(A) = S VA E V 
• Find j E V such that d(j) =min [d( i)], i E V . 
• v = v- {j} 
• if ( D ~ V), END; otherwise go to step 3 
• ViE rj n V, if d(j) + l(ij) < d(i), set 
d(i) = d(j) + l(ij), P(i) = j 
v = v u {i} 
• Go to Step 2 
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Algorithm E.5 Bhandari's Algorithm 
Definitions: 
• G(N, J): a network G with a set of nodes N and set of links J. 
• D E N: the destination vertex. 
• d{A): denote the distance of vertex A EN from source vertex SEN. where d(S) = 0. 
• P{A): denote the predecessor of vertex A along the path. 
• r A :set of neighbor vertices of vertex A. 
• l ( ij): the cost of link from vertex i to vertex j. 
• V: the nodes that have been visited by the algorithm. 
• R1 ( r): the first set of links along the paths between source vertex S and destination 
vertex D. 
• R 2 (r): the second set of links along the paths between source vertex Sand destination 
vertex D. 
• Rp(r): the final set oflinks along the edge disjoint shortest pair between source vertex 
S and destination vertex D. 
Algorithm: 
1. Run the Modified Dijkstra Algorithm 
• let R 1(r) =set directed links {ij} EN along the shortest route 
• if (R1(r) = 0), Fail 
2. \i {ij} E R1(r) 
l(ji) = -l(ij) 
l(ij) = 00 
3. Run the Modified Dijkstra Algorithm 
• let R2(r) =set directed links {ij} E V the shortest route 
• if (R2(r) = 0), Fail 
4. \i {ij} E R1(r) U R2(r) 
Rp(r) = R1(r) 6 R2(r) 
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Algorithm E.6 K Shortest Path Set Algorithm 
Definitions: 
• G(N, J): a network G with a set of nodes N and set of links J. 
• D E N: the destination vertex. 
• d(A): denote the distance of vertex A EN from source vertex SEN. where d(S) = 0. 
• P(A): denote the predecessor of vertex A along the path. 
• r A :set of neighbor vertices of vertex A. 
• l( ij): the cost of link from vertex i to vertex j. 
• V: the nodes that have been visited by the algorithm. 
• R 1(r): the first set of links along the paths between source vertex Sand destination 
vertex D. 
• R 2 (r): the second set of links along the paths between source vertex S and destination 
vertex D. 
• Rp ( r): the final set of links along the edge disjoint shortest pair between source vertex 
S and destination vertex D. 
• k: the current number of disjoint paths. 
Algorithm: 
1. Run the Modified Dijkstra Algorithm 
• let R 1(r) =set directed links {ij} EN along the shortest route 
• k = 1 
• if ( R 1 ( r) = 0) , Fail 
2. V{ij}ER1(r) 
l(ji) = -l(ij) 
l(ij) = 00 
3. Run the Modified Dijkstra Algorithm 
• let R2 ( r) = set directed links { ij} E V the shortest route 
•k=k+l 
• if ( R2 ( r) = 0) , Fail 
4. V {ij} E R1(r) U R2(r) 
Rp(r) = R1(r) 6 R2(r) 
R1(r) = Rp(r) 
5. if k < K, go to step 2 
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